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My topic is the question 'Does time pass?'

.

Although

much has been written in attempts to answer this question,
not enough attention has been paid to the asking of the

question itself. As

a

result,

it has not been clear exactly

what is at issue in this matter, and, consequently, it has
not been clear just what are the different views available
to one who wishes to give an answer to the question.

I

hope

to ameliorate this situation.
The aims of my essay are:

(i)

to state the issues

involved in the controversy over temporal passage in
fruitful way;

(ii)

to formulate what

I

a

see as the leading

candidates among the possible responses to those issues; and
(iii)

to consider the best arguments relevant to the choice

among these alternative views.

Roughly one-quarter of the essay is devoted to

linguistic questions about time and tense. Another quarter
is devoted to metaphysical matters involving the status of

such putative properties as pastness, presentness and
futurity. What emerge are not just two but, rather,
vi

five

.

distinct views about whether or not time passes: one view,

which

I

pass,

and four different views, which

call the 4D view, to the effect that time does not
I

call the 3D views,

to the effect that time does pass. Each of these five views

consists of

a

package of linguistic and metaphysical

components
Once

present,

I

have formulated these five different views,

for each of the five views,

a

I

formal language, with

semantics, that would be appropriate for that view. Next,

various arguments that have been suggested in the literature
against the claim that time passes are considered as

arguments against the 3D views; each such argument is found
to be defective. Similarly, various arguments that have been

suggested in the literature against the claim that time does
not pass are considered as arguments against the 4D view;

each of these arguments is also found to be defective.
Finally,

I

explain why

I

prefer

views over its four rivals, and

objections to that view.

vii

I

a

certain one of the 3D

consider some possible
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CHAPTER

1.1

INTRODUCTION

1:

'Does Time Pass?'

My topic is the old question,

'Does time really pass?'

This is a strange question in at least two respects. For one
thing, the question does not have about it the air of an

inquiry into some deep and controversial matter. Non-

philosophers (and even some philosophers) tend to respond,
immediately upon hearing about this question, that it is one
of the easiest questions they have ever heard.

"Of course

time passes," they generally say. "Everyone knows that. Next
question, please."
The apparent simplicity of the task of providing an

answer to the question makes the second strange aspect of it
all the more strange.

It turns out that philosophers have

been debating the matter since antiquity, and that it has

been more or less hotly debated, without any sign of

a

settlement, at least since the turn of the present century.
It's odd that such a simple-sounding question should become
a

topic of considerable philosophical discussion. But it

has

1

Of course,

no one has tried to deny that we
all have

the feeling that time passes. Questions
have been raised,
however, about what we should make of this
feeling. Does it
correspond to a fact in the world, or is it somehow

misleading, or just plain illusory?
Those who have maintained that time does not
pass have
generally held that the feeling of time's passage is
largely
illusory. Many of them have claimed that time is more
or
less space-like. Some have even held that time is
exactly

similar to any one dimension of space. Thus, it is useful
at
least to begin our consideration of the debate between those

who say that time passes and those who say that it doesn't
by considering the following thesis.

Space-time (SPT)
Among the four dimensions of
the world, there is nothing special about
time; time is essentially similar to each of
the dimensions of space.
:

SPT is

a

thesis that non-passage theorists have

generally affirmed; passage theorists have generally denied
it.

The non-passage theorists typically think that,

in

virtue of the fact that time is roughly space-like, there is
no sense in which it is correct to say that time moves or

passes.

1

The passage theorists,

on the other hand,

generally

1
As will be seen in Chapter 3, there are stronger and
weaker versions of this thesis. The stronger versions say
that time is a dimension of space, no different in any way
from any of the other three dimensions. The weaker versions
allow that there are some differences between time and the
dimensions of space - there may be an intrinsic direction to
time, for example - but claim that time is essentially like
the dimensions of space - i.e., is no different in kind from

2

.

think that, among the dimensions of the world, time is
very
special indeed: it is the only dimension that may properly
be said to flow or pass. We shall see,

in Chapters 2-4,

how

this basic disagreement can be spelled out and amplified in

terms of various other issues.
The main aim of this essay is to cast some light on the

nature of the controversy over whether time passes. My

primary thesis is that the controversy has not been settled
in part because it has not been understood just what is at

stake in the issue. The question 'Does time pass?'
simple,

is not a

yes-or-no question; in fact there are no less than

five different views that one may hold in response to the

question. This is because the question, when properly

understood,

involves

host of related issues,

a

so that to

give an appropriate answer to the question is to provide

package consisting of
issues; and,

a

a

response to each of these relevant

as it happens,

that constitute reasonable,

there are five distinct packages

internally consistent

collections of responses to the relevant issues. Thus there
are five distinct ways of answering the question 'Does time

pass?'
My secondary thesis is that,

once the issues involved

in the controversy over temporal passage have been spelled

out in a fruitful way,

and once the views that constitute

the leading candidates among the possible responses to those

them - in that there is no important sense in which we can
^ruly say both that time passes and that space does not.

3

issues have been formulated,

it can be shown that there
are

no good arguments against any one of
those views. This does
not mean, however, that I do not have
a preference for one
of the views over the others. I do have
such a preference;

but

I

do not think that there is any good
argument that can

prove the view that

I

prefer.

The essay is divided as follows. Chapter

2

is devoted

to certain linguistic matters that have been
central to the

debate over the passage of time; here the main question
is

whether we could somehow eliminate the phenomenon of tense
from our language. Roughly speaking, those who have said
that time passes have said that our language could not be

made tenseless, and those who have said that time does not
pass have said that our language could be made tenseless.

Chapter

3

is devoted to certain metaphysical matters

that have been central to the debate. The main question that
has been discussed in this regard is a question about the

status of such putative properties as pastness

,

presentness

and futurity. Those who have said that time does not pass
have claimed that these are not genuine properties, and

those who have said that time does pass have claimed that
they are genuine properties.
By the end of Chapter

3

I

have arrived at the five

different packages of views alluded to above. There is one
package, which

call the 4D view,

I

that amounts to

a

way of

saying that time does not pass, and there are four different
packages, which

I

call the 3D views, that amount to ways of

4

saying that time does pass. In Chapter
case of each of these packages,

a

4

I

consider,

in the

formal language, with

a

semantics, that would be well-suited to that package. The

main purpose of doing so is to make clearer the differences
among the relevant packages.
In Chapter 5

I

turn to a consideration of what

I

take

to be the best arguments that can be formulated against the

passage views.
argument;

conclude that none of these is

I

for each of the passage views,

a

good

and for each of the

relevant arguments, there is some premise of that argument
that ought to be rejected by one who holds that view.
In Chapter

6

I

consider what

I

take to be the best

arguments that can be formulated against the non-passage
view.

I

conclude that none of these arguments works, either;

for in the case of each of these arguments,

there is some

premise of that argument that ought to rejected by

a

proponent of the non-passage view.
Finally,

in Chapter 7,

preferring the view

I

I

explain the reasons

happen to favor, and

some objections to that view can be met.

5

I

I

have for

also show how

.

1.2 Defining

'Time'

One might think that the best way to begin

a

discussion

of the question of whether time passes would
be to give a

rigorous definition of the word 'time'

.

Unless we are armed

with such a definition, it is natural to suppose, we
cannot
even begin to make sense of the question about time's
passage. With the required definition in hand, however, the

matter is likely to be cleared up easily, according to this
way of thinking; we will then only need to examine the

analysans that has resulted from our bit of conceptual
analysis,

in order to see if it involves the notion of

passage in any relevant sense. If it does, then we should
say that time passes; if it does not, then we should say

that time does not pass. Thus,

it seems,

the entire project

will be greatly simplified by our first arriving at

a

definition of 'time'
But it would be a mistake to think in this way.

would be

a

It

mistake for reasons that have to do with the

difficulties inherent in the project of providing the kind
of conceptual analysis that would count as a rigorous

definition of 'time'

.

Those difficulties have been well

documented ever since Augustine pointed them out in
passage in his Confessions

He there says,

2
.

roughly,

a

famous

that in

pre-philosophical moments he is not aware of any problem
2

Augustine,

Confessions, Book XI, Chapter 14.

6

.

;

.

with understanding the concept expressed
by the word 'time'
but that as soon as he tries to provide a
definition of the
term,

he finds that he cannot do it. Somehow,
the concept

eludes him whenever he thinks hard about it.
There are,

I

think,

two main reasons for the inevitable

failure of any attempt to define the word 'time'

.

The first

reason is simply that the word has too many different,
but
relevant, senses. Consider how the word 'time' is
used
in

each of the following sentences:

'There is still plenty of

time';

'The time is exactly twelve noon';

time';

'Time waits for no-one';

time when
time';

I

lived in Paris';

'We all had a good

'All of this was during the

'He got there in the nick of

'Time flies like an arrow';

'Time is asymmetrical';

and 'Ridiculous the waste sad time stretching before and
after'

The point is that there is no one sense attached to

the word 'time'

as it appears in all of these sentences.

So

no single definition would supply a definiens that could be

substituted uniformly for the word 'time' in each of these
sentences

3

The second reason for the failure of attempts at

defining the word 'time'
too promiscuous

-

is that the concepts involved are

they tend to be incorporated into the

definiens of any plausible definition. The consequence of
this is that the resulting definitions are circular.
3

Cf.

Waismann,

4

"Analytic-Synthetic," p. 56.

Cf. Gale, The Language of Time, pp.
The Structure of Time, p. 3.

4

7

4-5;

and Newton-Smith,

Aristotle's proposed definition of 'time', for example,
this:

is

"time is the number of movement in respect of the

before and after." 5 This is circular because 'movement',
'before'

and 'after'

are all temporally infected;

i.e.,

the

6

concepts expressed by these terms are all inextricably
linked with concepts expressed by 'time'

,

and it is just

these latter concepts that we are trying to analyze. Similar
8

remarks apply to Plato's definition, according to which time
is "an eternal moving image of the eternity which remains

forever one;"

Plotinus's definition of time as "the Life of

the Soul in movement as it passes from one stage of act or

experience to another;"

and modern dictionary definitions

such as "the measured or measurable period during which an
action, process,

or condition exists or continues," and "a

continuum which lacks spatial dimensions and in which events
succeed one another from past through present to future."
Because such difficulties arise in connection with

attempts to give analytic definitions of the word 'time'

,

it

has been fashionable, ever since Wittgenstein, to point out
the inappropriateness of such attempts. 8 Writers such as
s

Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, Chapter 11, 220a 25.

6

Plato,

7

Plotinus,

8

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary.

Timaeus,

37c,

38c.

"Time and Eternity," p. 32.

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, pp. 42fr.,
and Blue Book, pp. 6, 26ff.; Waismann, Analytic-Synthetic,
and Introduction to Mathematical Thinking, pp. 116ff.;
Bouwsma, "The Mystery of Time;" and Gale, The Language of
9

Cf.

Time,

pp.

5ff.

8

Waismann, Bouwsma and Gale have suggested that,
rather than
try to define 'time' in one fell swoop, we should
instead

examine various other temporal expressions, and the
grammar

governing those expressions, in order to understand time
itself. This kind of examination,

it has been suggested,

will result in the clarification of certain temporal
concepts, without ever yielding an analysis of some one

thing that is the referent of the expression 'the concept of
time'

.

Moreover, these writers have suggested, this is the

most we can hope for; to ask the further question,
time?',

'What is

is to ask the wrong question altogether. For this

question makes it appear as if

a

helpful and informative

answer of the form "Time is

"

can be given,

when in fact none can.
I

think that the approach suggested by Wittgenstein et

alia is basically right. So

will not here try to give

I

definition of the word 'time'

.

Rather,

I

a

will define certain

temporal expressions, which will then feature prominently in
the discussion that follows. This does not mean that

I

think

we must give up on the task of considering the question
'Does time pass?'.

this way,

It's just that the question,

and without further explanation,

stated in

is not

sufficiently clear. We can make sense of the question,
however, by reformulating it in terms of several different,

related questions concerning notions captured by temporal

expressions that can be manageably defined.

9

.

1.3 The Event-series and the Time-series

In what follows,

I

will use the terms

'thing'

,

'event'

and 'process' as if their meanings were already understood;

these terms will be taken as primitives. The kind of

i.e.,

events that

I

have in mind are instantaneous, concrete

events. That is, they have no extension, or duration, and

they are one-time occurrences, as opposed to event-types,

which may recur (in the sense that
have two or more tokens)

.

a

single event-type may

Roughly, then, the idea is that

each process is made up of

a

continuous

(or at least dense)

series of events.
shall refer to all of these

I

processes

-

-

things,

events and

as things in time. As will be seen in Chapter

3,

the question of the relationship between events and

processes,

on the one hand,

is an important question.

Prior

-

and things, on the other hand,

For there are some

-

e.g.,

Arthur

who say that events and processes are just

constructions out of things. This is an issue on which

I

wish to remain neutral, at least at the outset of my
discussion

Another important, and controversial, question concerns
the matter of how we should characterize the entities that

will count as things: are these enduring, three-dimensional

10

continuants, or extended,

four-dimensional space-time

objects? Much more will be said about this issue later,
but
for now it is important to note that there is such an issue,
3-^d-

that acceptance of talk about things does not commit us

one way or the other with regard to this issue. A similar

issue arises concerning the status of different events and

processes: are the events and processes occurring now the
only real ones, or do all of them,

including the ones

occurring now as well as the ones that have already finished
occurring and the ones that have yet to occur, have the same
ontological status? This too is

a

matter that

I

do not wish

to pre-judge.
I

think it is fair, however, to agree to talk about the

set of all events,

i.e.,

the ones occurring now as well as

the ones that have occurred and the ones that will occur,

while leaving open the question of how such talk is to be
analyzed. And all parties to these disputes agree that,

insofar as we can talk about the set of all events, there is
an ordering to that set.

I.e.,

the events form

a

series,

ordered by the binary relation earlier than or simultaneous
with. This relation,

too,

ought to be taken as primitive;

but we can say some things by way of characterizing it. To

begin with, we can define the binary relation earlier than
in terms of the relation earlier than or simultaneous with,
as follows:

e is

simultaneous with

earlier than
e'

,

e'

=df e is earlier than or

and it's not the case that

earlier than or simultaneous with

11

e.

e'

is

Then we can say the

)

'

.

following things about the relation earlier than:

(i)

earlier than is an ordering relation (i.e., there are at
least two distinct events,

than

and

e

but not vice versa);

e'

e'

,

such that e is earlier

earlier than is

(ii)

irreflexive (i.e., no event is earlier than itself);
earlier than is asymmetric (i.e.,
earlier than some other event,
than

e)

event,

and

;

e,

(iv)

'

then

,

e'

e is

is not earlier

earlier than is transitive (i.e., if some

is earlier than some other event,

earlier than some third event,
e'

e'

if some event,

(iii)

e'

,

e'

,

and

is

e'

then e is earlier than

Moreover, the binary relations later than and

.

simultaneous with can be defined in terms of the relation
earlier than, as follows: if some event,
some event,
events,

and
e'

e'

e'

,

e and e'

then
,

e'

is later than e;

e,

is earlier than

and if two distinct

are such that e is not earlier than

is not earlier than e,

e'

,

then e is simultaneous with

.

Of course,

it is a further question whether there is

some monadic property, pastness

,

such that it

brethren, presentness and futurity)

(and its

also order the series of

events, but in such a way that these monadic properties are

not analysable in terms of earlier than, etc. This, too,
an issue that

I

is

wish to leave unresolved at the outset of my

discussion
The series of events ordered by the relation earlier

than will,

in what follows,

be called the event-series

.

stipulated above that our talk about events is not to be

12

I

taken as committing us to any view about their ontological
status;

in particular,

I

specified that events may or may

not be just constructions out of things. One result of this

stipulation is that the event-series may or not turn out to
be reducible to the series of things ordered by the relation

sarlier than. In any case, however,
talk about the event-series,

I

shall here indulge in

leaving aside,

for the moment,

questions about how such talk is to be analyzed.
I

shall also,

'moment'

,

'instant'

in what follows,
,

use the expressions

'period of time'

as if their meanings,

too,

and 'interval of time'

were already understood. The

first two of these expressions will used as if they are

a

pair of synonyms, and so will the latter two. In addition,
the word 'time' will be used equivocally,
it is meant to be synonymous with

so that sometimes

'instant'

and 'moment',

while other times it is meant to be synonymous with 'period
of time'

and 'interval of time'

The kinds of instants

I

like their event counterparts,

have in mind here are,

instantaneous. And in

.

a

way that parallels the above

thinking about the relationship between events and
processes, the rough idea here is that each period of time
is made up of a continuous

(or at

instants. Following Newton-Smith,

least dense)
10

I

series of

shall refer to

instants and intervals of time alike as temporal items.
It

is clear that,

just as with the set of events, the

set of instants is ordered by the relation earlier than.
10

Newton-Smith,

The Structure of Time, p.

13

3.

I

.

shall call the series of instants that is ordered
by this

relation the time-series

And as with the event-series,

questions arise concerning the possibility that there is
some monadic property

-

pastness

-

brethren, presentness and futurity)

series

such that it

(and its

also order the time-

.

1.4 Temporal Platonism and Temporal Reductionism

Prima facie, at least, we can distinguish between

things in time and the event-series, on the one hand, and

temporal items and the time-series, on the other hand. But
once again there is an important controversy involved here.
Some writers have held that temporal items and the time-

series exist independently of the existence of things in
time and the event-series. On this view, the time-series

should be thought of as

a

container in which the things in

time are situated, so that even if the world had been devoid
of things in time,

the time-series would still have existed.

Other writers, however, have said that the existence of

temporal items and the time-series depends on the existence
of things in time and the event-series;
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if there were no

.

things in time, then, according to this view, there would
be
no time-series

11
.

The former view, which is often associated with Newton,
I

will call "temporal Platonism",

following Newton-Smith.

The latter view, which is often associated with Leibniz,

I

will follow Newton-Smith in calling "temporal reductionism"
In addition to their ontological theses,

temporal Platonism

and temporal reductionism each has linguistic and

topological components. For according to temporal
reductionism, talk about the time-series can be analyzed in
terms of talk about the event-series. Platonists, of course,

deny this. And according to temporal Platonism,

since the

time-series would have existed even if there were no events
at all,

it follows that the topological features of the

time-series

(e.g.,

has a beginning,

having a beginning, if the time-series

or not having a beginning,

if it doesn't;

being linear, if the time-series is linear, or not being
being closed,

linear,

if it isn't;

closed,

or being open,

if the time-series is

if it is open)

are not contingent

upon the topological features of the event-series. Hence,

according to temporal Platonism, but not according to
temporal reductionism, the topological character of the

time-series is

a

matter of necessity.

The most famous discussion of this issue occurs in The
Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence; the issue is also the main
topic of Newton-Smith's The Structure of Time.
11
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For the purposes of this essay, these two views will
be

understood as involving the following tenents:

12

Temporal Platonism: (i) Temporal items and the
time-series are ontologically independent of
things in time and the event-series; (ii)
temporal relations among things in time hold
in virtue of the temporal relations holding
among the times at which those things occur;
(iii) talk about temporal items and the timeseries is not reducible to talk about things
in time and the event-series; and (iv) the
time-series possesses whatever topological
properties it possesses as a matter of
necessity
Temporal Reductionism: (i) temporal items and
the time-series are ontologically dependent on
things in time and the event-series; (ii)
temporal relations among times hold in virtue
of the temporal relations holding among the
things in time that occur at those times;
(iii) talk about temporal items and the timeseries is reducible to talk about things in
time and the event-series; and (iv) the
possession by the time-series of whatever
topological properties it possesses is a
contingent matter.

In what follows

I

take it that the dispute between temporal

Platonism and temporal reductionism remains undecided, so
that it would be inappropriate,

in the absence of

independent arguments for either one, to assume either

temporal Platonism or temporal reductionism.

These characterizations of temporal Platonism and
temporal reductionism are based on those given by NewtonSmith; see The Structure of Time, pp. 9-10 and pp. 214ff.
12
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CHAPTER

2:

LINGUISTIC MATTERS

2.1 Introduction

I

said in Chapter

that

1

a

useful way of approaching

the debate over the passage of time is to consider the

following thesis:
SPT Among the four dimensions of the world,
there is nothing special about time; time is
essentially similar to each of the dimensions
:

of space.

Those who say that time does not pass generally want to

affirm something SPT; they think that time is roughly spaceand that,

like,

in virtue of this,

there is no sense in

which it is correct to say that time moves or passes. But
those,

on the other hand,

who say that time does pass

generally want to deny SPT. These people think that, among
the dimensions of the world, time is very special indeed: it
is the only dimension that may properly be said to flow or

pass
Of course,

SPT is,

as it stands,

far from clear.

It

needs to be fleshed out. What it would mean to say that time
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is special; what is involved in the claim that
time is

essentially similar to any of the dimensions of space;
exactly how the differences between time and space, if any,
may be said to entail that time passes,
sense; and,

in particular,

in some relevant

just what this relevant sense

could be, are all matters that require considerable

discussion
I

will turn to such metaphysical matters in the

following chapter. But first, in this chapter,

I

will take

up some linguistic issues that have been considered central
to the debate over the passage of time. There are two main

reasons why

I

will discuss these linguistic issues before

the metaphysical issues. The first reason is historical:

many of the writers who have taken up the issue of whether
or not time passes have begun their discussions by focussing
on linguistic matters.

This is true both of such non-passage

theorists as Goodman, Quine, Smart and Mellor, and of such

passage theorists as Prior, Gale, Schlesinger and Smith

1
.

The general idea that each of these people has entertained,

some of them with more conviction than others,

is that the

metaphysical issues involved in the question of whether or
not time passes

from

a

-

including, especially, questions that stem

consideration of SPT

-

can all be settled simply by

1
See in this regard Goodman, The Structure of Appearance
Chapter XI; Quine, Word and Object, pp 170ff.; Smart, "The
River of Time;" Mellor, Real Time; Prior, Time and Modality,
Past , Present and Future, and Papers on Time and Tense;
Gale, The Language of Time; Schlesinger, Aspects of Time and
"How Time Flies;" and Smith, "Problems with the New
Tenseless Theory of Time," and "Sentences About Time."
,

.
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settling the relevant linguistic issues. Consequently,
these

writers have turned, in some cases almost immediately,

from

discussions of those metaphysical issues to discussions of
linguistic matters.
The second reason for my adopting this order of topics
is philosophical.

It turns out,

not surprisingly, that all

of these linguistically minded debaters were onto something.
It does appear that a settling of the appropriate linguistic

issues would settle, once and for all, the metaphysical

debate over the passage of time. Let me explain.
At the center of the linguistic issues involved here is

the undisputed fact that in our ordinary language
for our purposes,

to say,

in English)

,

(which is

time is accorded

a

special status that no other dimension of the world enjoys.
We have numerous tense distinctions in English

tense,

the present tense,

perfect,

and so on

-

-

the past

the future tense, the past

but we do not have spatial distinctions

along these lines built into our language.
Prima facie, at least, this seems to be

a

datum that

may be used in an argument against SPT. For it may be

claimed by the passage theorist that our language is

necessarily this way; it could not have been otherwise, and
still have provided us with the means for accurately

describing all of the objective features of the world that
we are in fact able to describe. If our language had been

otherwise, the claim may go,

if,

that is, time had been

treated just like space in our ordinary language, then we
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would not be able to capture in our descriptions
of the
world all of the objective features of the
world that we are
in fact able to capture. This can be
explained only by the
fact that important features of our language
correspond to

important features of the world; i.e., by the fact
that
language mirrors reality. Hence, the argument would
go, it
follows from time's essentially special status in our

language that time also has an essentially special status
in
reality: time passes.
This somewhat plausible argument may be formulated as

follows

The Linguistic Argument Against SPT
(1) Time's special treatment in our ordinary
(3)
language
is necessary; time could not be
treated in ordinary language in just the way
space is, without our thereby losing some of
our ability to describe accurately objective
features of the world.

then there is something special
(2) If (1)
about time; it is not just like space.
,

There is something special about time; it
just like space.

is not

But,

of course,

just what inferences we ought to draw

from our main linguistic datum

-

the fact of time's special

treatment in our ordinary language

-

is a controversial

matter. Non-passage theorists have drawn their own

conclusions. While they have admitted that time does get
special treatment in ordinary language, they claim that
20

things need not be this way. They try to show that we could
3-

language in which time is treated as on

space; a language,

a

par with

that is, with no tense distinctions and

no tensed verbs. And they argue that the fact that we could
do this shows that there is,

in reality,

no objective

difference between time and space; time, like space, does
not pass.
Here,

is another rather plausible argument;

then,

this

one may be formulated as follows.

The Linguistic Argument For SPT
(1) Time's special treatment in our ordinary
language is not necessary; time could be
(3)
treated
in ordinary language in just the way
space is, without our thereby losing some of
our ability to describe accurately objective
features of the world.
(2)

If

(1)

,

about time;

then there is nothing special
it is just like space.

There is nothing special about time; it is
just like space.

Arguments such as these have appeared convincing to
many. But those who have wanted to reject either of these

arguments have generally not challenged the second premise
of that argument

-

the one that makes the connection between

the seemingly linguistic first premise and the seemingly

metaphysical conclusion. It is the first premises that have
been controversial- Thus, almost all of the action has
centered on the (apparently) linguistic theses in question.
21
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In what follows,

I

will refer to the first premise
of

The Linguistic Argument Against SPT as
"the linguistic
thesis of passage," or "LP." Similarly, i will
refer to the
first premise of The Linguistic Argument for
SPT as "the

linguistic thesis of non-passage," or "LNP

.

"

What is at

issue is whether either one of these rival linguistic
theses
can be proven. In light of the above arguments,
it appears
that if either LP or LNP could be proven, then we would
have
a

sound argument for the corresponding metaphysical thesis

(i.e.,

either SPT or its negation). In that case, all that

would remain would be the task of spelling out

a

somewhat

sketchy metaphysical thesis that we nevertheless know to be
true. So our immediate concern is to determine whether

time's special treatment in our ordinary language is somehow

necessary
The most obvious way in which time is accorded special

treatment in ordinary language is in the existence of verbal
tenses. We have sentences like 'It is raining',
raining'

and 'It will be raining'

,

'It was

but it seems that there

is nothing analogous in the case of space.

The matter is not quite so simple, however.

It's true

that the phenomenon of tenses is generally the focus of

discussions of LP and LNP, but it's also true that in these
discussions

'tense'

is usually taken to refer to a

phenomenon more general than that of mere verbal tense. This
more general phenomenon is taken to be one that is

manifested by any sentence that may have different truth-

22

values at different times. And the question
of whether we
can treat matters temporal in our ordinary
language

in the

way we treat matters spatial is generally taken
to boil down
to the question of whether we can do without such
sentences.
As James Plecha has recently remarked,
It is commonly believed that if language can
be detensed, if, roughly, sentences which
change their truth values can be translated by
sentences which do not, then ours is a fourdimensional block universe and there is no
absolute present.
"Tenselessness and the
Absolute Present," p. 529.]
[

questions about LP and LNP take us to the

Thus,

question of whether language can be detensed

-

whether

sentences that may change their truth-values can be

translated by sentences that may not. This is the main
question that

I

will address in this chapter. First it will

be necessary to spell out the question and some related

issues in

a

clear and useful way. Once this has been done,

it will be seen that there are available to proponents of LP

and LNP,

respectively, different semantical views about the

relations among propositions, truth and time. Hence, LP and
LNP will each be shown to involve what amounts to

a

package

of different but related linguistic views.

Since LP and LNP are packages of linguistic views that
are supposed to be used in arguments supporting the

metaphysical theses corresponding to them,

I

will consider

whether there are any arguments that can support these
linguistic packages. After looking at what
23

I

take to be the

.

best of such arguments that are available,

I

will conclude

that, while there may arguments with key metaphysical

premises that could be taken to support each of these
linguistic packages, there are no good arguments with purely

linguistic premises that can be appealed to in support of
either LP or LNP
This means that one cannot appeal to LP in any argument

designed to prove the metaphysical theses of the passage
view (such as The Linguistic Argument Against SPT) without

begging the question, since LP itself cannot be defended
without appeal to those same metaphysical theses. But
similarly,

one cannot appeal to LNP in any argument designed

to prove the metaphysical theses of the non-passage view
(such as The Linguistic Argument For SPT)

without begging

the question, because LNP cannot be defended without appeal
to those metaphysical theses.
In short,

I

will conclude that the metaphysical issues

involved in the question of whether time passes cannot, as
has been supposed, be decided by first deciding the

linguistic issues involved. Rather,

it must be the other way

around: the metaphysical issues must be decided first, and

this will lead to

a

resolving of the linguistic issues.

24
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2.2 Some Term.q

In the debate over the possibility of
detensing

language,

a

good deal of the discussion has focussed on

alleged similarities and differences among sentences
like
the following:

(

1

)

(2)

It's raining
Rain falls on Wednesday, February 17.

1988.
(3) The falling of rain is simultaneous with
this token.
(4) The Battle of Hastings took place nine
hundred and twenty-two years ago.
(5) The date of the Battle of Hastings is
1066.
(6) The Battle of Hastings occurs nine hundred
and twenty-two years before this token.

Varous claims have been made concerning the classes of
sentences represented by
example, that

(1)

and

(

(4)

1

)

—

(

6

)

It has been suggested,

for

represent an entirely different

class of sentences than do

(2),

(3),

(5)

and (6), because

sentences of the former kind, but not sentences of the.
latter kind, can change their truth-values; 2 but it has also

been suggested that this is false because sentences like
and

(4)

(1)

do not properly express any propositions at all,

unless they express propositions like those expressed by the
other sentences. 3 What has normally been taken to be at
2

Cf.,

Cf

for example,

for example,
287ff.
pp.
3

.

,

Gale,

The Language of Time,

Goodman,

Chapter IV.

The Structure of Appearance,

25

.

.

stake here is whether sentences like

(1)

and

(4)

can in some

important sense be translated by sentences
like the others
whether, in the popular jargon, language
can

-

be detensed.

But this issue, which has long been at the
center of the
debate concerning language and the passage
of time,

is an

elusive one, partly because it is not immediately
clear how
we ought to understand the expressions 'tensed
language'

and

tenseless language'

or the notion of detensing language

,

I

will try to get clear on these and related issues
below; but
in order to do so,

it will

first be necessary to establish

a

minimal framework within which to discuss such matters.
In what

follows

I

will accept, without argument,

a

certain general account of the way language works. Although
I

have never seen all of the components of this account laid

out in a single philosophical work,

the view may,

I

think,

be appropriately thought of as the received view. For

reasons that will be obvious

I

will refer to the account in

question as the three-tiered picture of language.
On the lowest level of the three-tiered picture are

what

I

will call utterances

These are simply concrete

events or processes that typically consist in some person

using his or her mouth to make

a

noise or noises. Some

utterances are meaningful; that is, they involve coherent
strings of sounds that are

(in principle,

at least)

understandable to members of the speaker's linguistic
community. Such utterances are generally used to perform

linguistic acts; i.e., they are used for the purpose of

26

expressing

a

proposition, or asking

question,

a

or issuing a

command, etc. It is convenient to pick out just the

utterances that, by themselves, are used to perform
linguistic acts. For this purpose we can say that if some

utterance is used to perform

a

linguistic act, but no proper

part of the utterance is used to perform
all by itself,

then the utterance is

a

a

linguistic act

sentence. A

To characterize sentences in the above way is,

unfortunately, to fail to do justice to the chameleon-like

character of language. Making noises is not, after all, the
only method by which we acomplish linguistic acts
do so by waving our hands,

-

often we

raising our eyebrows, or writing

things down. We can capture at least the last kind of these
cases simply by agreeing to broaden our conception of what

counts as a sentence so as to include insciptions as well as

utterances. Roughly, an inscription is any recognizable mark
or series of marks on some surface.

5

As with utterances,

some insciptions are meaningful and some are not. Meaningful

inscriptions are the ones that are used to perform
linguistic acts. Among these are some insciptions that are
used to perform linguistic acts, but are such that no proper

4

Cf.

Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, p. 194.

This is actually too narrow as it stands. On this
definition, a bunch of hanging strips that spelled out some
message would not count as an inscription, and neither would
a piece of paper with some letters cut out of it. So the
definition is in need of revision. Nevertheless, it is
enough to give us a rough idea of what an inscription is,
and that is sufficient for our present purposes.
5
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part of them is used to perform

a

linguistic act all by

itself; these, too, will be called
sentences
As characterized here,

sentences, whether of the noisy

variety (i.e., utterances) or of the
quiet variety
(inscriptions),

individual,

are all individual,

concrete processes.

concrete events, or

(Some processes,

of course,

are rather dull. Most inscriptions are
like this; they

consist of some thing's staying the same for
They are processes nonetheless,
the word

'event'

a

long time.

if we allow ourselves to use

in such a way that a thing's remaining
the

same from one instant to the next can count as an
event; for

then

a

thing's remaining the same for some length of time

will count as

a

process.)

It is natural,

however, to think

of sentences as falling into certain groups;

the following three sentences,

for example,

of

it seems natural to group

together the first two, but exclude the third one from such
a

grouping:

(7)
(8)

(9)

For

(7)

and

The redcoats are coming.
The redcoats are coming.
A tree grows in Brooklyn.

(8)

have much in common, but there are many

differences between these two and

(9).

We can make use of a

distinction originally fromulated by Peirce 6 in order to
capture what we feel is the important difference between
and

(8),

on the one hand,

on the other hand:

and (9),

Peirce, The Simplest Mathematics
Collected Papers), p. 423.
6
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(vol.

IV of his

(7)

(7),

,

.

(8)

and

(9)

but

(7)

and

are three distinct sentence tokens
(8)

are of the same sentence type

,

we can say,

while

(9)

is

of a different sentence-type.

Ever since Peirce introduced the notion of the

distinction between tokens and types, the notion has
featured prominently in philosophy in general and in

philosophy of language in particular. In
in philosophy of language,

a

recent textbook

the distinction between types and

tokens is explained as follows:
Tokens are datable, placeable parts of the
physical world. Thus, Nana and her successor,
Lulu, are cat tokens. The obvious examples of
word tokens are inscriptions on a page or
sounds in the air. Types, on the other hand,
are kinds of tokens. Any token can be grouped
into many different types. Thus, Nana and Lulu
are tokens of the type cat, female, pet of
Devi tt, and so on. And prior to this sentence,
this paragraph contains two tokens of the
inscription type 'Nana' and eleven of the
inscription type four-lettered Inscription
types and sound types are identifiable by
their overt physical characteristics and so we
might call them "physical" types. Word tokens
are also grouped semantically. Suppose that an
inscription type 'Liebknecht' is used in a
book on German history to refer to two
different people, father and son; the type is
ambiguous Sometimes we will group the tokens
that refer to the father in one type and those
that refer to the son in another. We thus get
"semantic" types. Tokens that are in different
media cannot be of the same physical type but
may be of the same semantic type; for natural
languages are medium-independent. A spoken and
written token of 'Liebknecht' might supply an
example of tokens of the same semantic type
from different media. [Michael Devitt and Kim
Sterelny, Language and Reality, p. 59.]
•

.
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There is some controversy over whether
types should be
taken to be universals, in some Platonic
sense of

universal', or simply sets of tokens.
Nominalists are
generally not happy with the former approach,
but,

as it

turns out, there are problems with the latter
approach. 7 For
our purposes here it is important to be able
to talk about

types and tokens, and to distinguish between them.
The issue
of whether types are universals or sets, or something
else,

is an important and interesting issue,

but it is not one

that is relevant to the discussion that follows; nothing

turns on this issue. In what follows, then,

I

I

will

help myself to talk about expression, word and sentence
tokens, with the uncontroversial understanding that these
are "dateable, placeable parts of the physical world."

I

will also avail myself of talk about expression, word and

sentence types, without thereby intending to presuppose some
account of what types are. All that
is that there are such things,

I

presuppose about types

and that we have a rough idea

of some of their salient features.

One such problem is the problem of unexemplified types.
There is only one such type (the empty set)
if types are to
be identified with sets of their actual tokens. So maybe
types should be identified with sets of actual and merely
possible tokens. Another problem has to do with the
characterization of the sets in question: is it physical
similarity that determines which tokens are members of a
given physical type? Consideration of a few examples shows
that it will be very difficult to get the desired results
here. For some discussion of these issues, see Goodman, The
Structure of Appearance, pp. 287ff.; Quine, Word and Object,
pp 194-195, and Philosophy of Logic, pp. 55ff. For a
thorough discussion of some of the issues involved in trying
to define types in set-theoretical terms, see Wetzel,
"Expressions Versus Numbers."
.
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For the sake of convenience

I

will adopt an ad hoc

convention for the purpose of distinguishing
between mention
of an expression type and mention of
an expression
token.

will use single quotes when
type,

and slash marks when

want to refer to an expression

I

want to refer to

1

I

a token.

Thus,

an expression token consisting of a single
quote followed by
some expression followed by another single
quote will refer
to the expression type represented by the
expression token

inside the single quotes; and an expression token
consisting
of a slash mark followed by some expression
followed by

another slash mark will refer to the expression token
inside
the slash marks.

In addition,

I

will sometimes use proper

names for expression tokens inside of single quotes as

a

way

of referring to the expression type represented by the
token

named; thus,

'

(

1

'
)

is to be read as shorthand for

the expression type represented by

(1)

Types are the entities that occupy the second level of
the three-tiered picture of language. They differ from

tokens in that they are abstract objects

(for whether they

are universals or sets they are abstract)

.

On the third

level of the three-tiered picture are another kind of

abstract objects: meanings.

I
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have said that

a

sentence is

.

used to perform

'

.

linguistic act if it expresses

a

proposition, or asks

a

question,

a

or issues a command,

etc.

Propositions, questions, commands and the like are what

mean by 'meanings'

.

For the sake of convenience

I

I

will,

whenever possible, restrict my discussion in what follows to
just the sentences that express propositions, which

I

will

follow custom in calling declarative sentences
There are many important questions about types, tokens

and meanings that

I

do not wish to raise here. The purpose

of the above sketch of a general account of language is

simply to provide

a

basis for making some distinctions that

are relevant to issues about time and language. To begin

there is

with,

a

distinction between two different kinds of

sentence type: those that are tensed, and those that are
tenseless. It is natural to say,
a

tensed sentence type while

'

(2

for example,
)

that

'(1)'

is

is a tenseless sentence

and that the crucial difference between the two is

type,

that the former, but not the latter, can have different

tokens that express things with different truth-values. That
is,

it may be the case that at one time a sentence that is a

token of '(1)' expresses something true, while at another
time

a

different token of the same type expresses something

false; but it seems that such

case of

'

(2

a

thing cannot happen in the

)

'

This is not all there is to the matter of tensed and

tenseless sentence types, however; for we do not want to say
that the sentence types represented by
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(10)

1777

Washington slept here on February 14th

and

(11)

I

was born on November 13th,

1969

are tensed sentence types. After all, the relevant

characteristic

'(10)'

of

is that whether or not a given

token of it expresses something true depends partly on where
the token is located; and similarly the relevant

characteristic of

'

(11)

'

is that whether or not a given

token of it expresses something true depends on who is the
inscriber of that token. What we are after is

a

way of

characterizing exactly those sentence types whose tokens may
express things with different truth-values solely in virtue
of the different times at which they occur. The relevant

distinction can,
of definitions.

I

think, be captured by the following pair

8

(Dl) 5 is a tensed sentence type =df it is
possible that a token of S at one time
expresses a proposition with one truth-value
and another token of S, at another time,
expresses a proposition with another truthvalue, even if the non-temporal indexicals in
the two tokens of S (if any) refer to the same
places, people and things.

For similar definitions see Sosa, "The Status of Becoming:
What is Happening Now?" p. 27; Gale, The Language of Time,
especially p. 49; Goodman, The Structure of
pp 40ff
Appearance, p. 290; and Quine, Philosophy of Logic, p. 14.
8

.

.
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;

(D2) 5 is a tenseless sentence type =df
it is
not possible that a token of S at one time
expresses a proposition with one truth— value
and another token of S, at another time,
expresses a proposition with another truthvalue, if the non-temporal indexicals in the
two tokens of S (if any) refer to the same
places, people and things.

This is still not all there is to the matter of tensed

and tenseless sentence types, however,
we should have to say that
tensed,

and so,

for if it were then

'Two plus two equals four'

for that matter,

is

is every other sentence

type. This is because the rules of language may change.

Consider the audible sentence type that corresponds to
'Ah key ess oon ah may sa'

.

According to Linda Wetzel, this

sentence type (or else something very close to

it)

has

a

peculiar property: it may be used by speakers of Spanish to
say that there is a table here,

Yiddish speakers to say that
something like that)

a

and it may be used by
cow eats without

a

knife

(or

This property alone is enough to make

.

the sentence type a tensed one,

according to the above

definition; but this is not the intended result.

A similar problem arises in cases involving word types
such as the audible word type that corresponds to 'shot'
the type has one meaning in English and another in French.
Again, problems of this kind can arise when people use
for example,

expressions in non-standard ways; when,
says to Bert prior to the meeting,
in here,

'

that means

I

"If

I

Ernie

'My it's hot

say,

want you to vote in favor of the

motion." Indeed, there is nothing to prevent
34

a

group of

people from one day deciding to use
tokens of 'Two plus two
equals four' to express the proposition
that the moon is
made of Swiss cheese; and, hence, it
turns out
that that

sentence type is

a

tensed one, according to

(Dl)

In order to get around such
difficulties,

in a way that

leaves out nothing that is important to the
spirit of our
inquiry, we can, adopting a suggestion from
Goodman, 9

stipulate that when discussing tensed types,
tenseless
types,

and related matters, we mean to confine the

discussion to expressions all occurring within an

appropriately limited discourse. I.e., we will be
considering only types whose tokens are expressions all of
which occur in the context of a group of people speaking,
and writing,

a

single language, using expression types

sincerely and in

2

.

3

a

uniform way.

The Issue

It is now

possible to state more explicitly what is at

issue between the passage theorists who have been concerned

with language and the non-passage theorists who have been

concerned with language. As it is often characterized, the
Goodman, The Structure of Appearance
Quine, Philosophy of Logic, p. 14.
9
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,

p.

290;

see also

:

issue is whether,

and to what extent,

:

language is

irreducibly tensed. What is at stake in the issue is whether
all,

some or none of what is expressible in tensed language

can be expressed in tenseless language. The difference

between tensed and tenseless language, as the terms are
normally understood,

is the difference between utterances

and inscriptions that are tokens of tensed sentence types,
on the one hand,

and utterances and inscriptions that are

tokens of tenseless sentence types, on the other hand. As
see it,

then,

I

the issue can best be understood in terms of

the question, Can we,

in principle at least,

do without

tensed sentence types? I.e., can we express all of the
things that we normally express, using tokens of both tensed
and tenseless sentence types,

if we restrict ourselves to

using only tokens of tenseless sentence types?
The two sides to this dispute, then,

are represented by

the following two theses:
We could
our
from
eliminate tensed sentence types
of our
some
losing
language without thereby
objective
accurately
ability to describe
features of the world.
The tenseless view of language

(TL)

We could not
The tensed view of language (TD)
eliminate tensed sentence types from our
language without thereby losing some of our
ability to describe accurately objective
features of the world.

But in order to get a handle on this issue, we shall first

have to address

a

further question, namely, What kinds of
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propositions are expressed by tokens of tensed and tenseless
sentence types, respectively?
Take,
•

type,

for example,

the tensed sentence type

'It

is

Consider two different utterances of this sentence

occurring at two different times, tl and t2

.

Call

these two utterances "ul" and "u2", respectively. The

question is this: Do ul and u2 express the same proposition,
or two different propositions? I.e.,

the proposition that it is raining,

is it that ul expresses

and u2 expresses the

same proposition? Is this a proposition that can be true at
one time and then false at another time? Are propositions in

general such that they can have different truth-values at

different times? If so then language, presumably, cannot be

detensed
Or is it that ul expresses the proposition that it is

raining at tl, while u2 expresses the proposition that it is
raining at t2? And are these latter two propositions such
that it is impossible for either of them to true at one time

and false at another? Indeed,

is it that these propositions

are such that it is inappropriate to speak of their having

truth-values at times? Are all propositions in fact this
way? If this is the case then language, presumably, can be

detensed.
Such are the issues on which our question about

eliminating tensed sentence types will turn. In order to
address the latter question properly, then,

it will

first be

necessary to consider these other issues about the nature of
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propositions, and the nature of their relationships
with
truth and time. I turn to such matters in the next

section.

2-lA

—Three

Ways of Thinking About Propositions. Truth and

Time

In addition to the distinction between tensed and

tenseless sentence types there is also, it seems,

a

sense in

which we can distinguish between what might be called tensed
propositions, on the one hand, and what might be called

tenseless propositions, on the other hand. Prior has

remarked that
Prima facie, we may divide propositions, or
ostensible propositions, into two sorts. There
are those, such as 'Socrates is sitting down'
or 'Socrates was sitting down'
of which it
obviously makes sense to ask When are they
true?'
though the answer may in some cases be
And there are, on the
'Always' or 'Never'
other hand, those of which it does not so
obviously make sense to ask this question; one
sub-species of these would be exemplified by
and another by 'The
'Two and two are four'
date of the Battle of Hastings is 1066'
Worlds Times and Selves, p. 67.]
,

'

,

.

,

[

,

Propositions of the first kind, if there are any, are

propositions to which we may sensibly ascribe truth-values
at times.

It is natural to think,

for example,

that we can

sensibly ascribe to the proposition that Socrates is sitting
38
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down the truth-value true at some time,

t,

and that we can

also sensibly ascribe to the same proposition the truth-

value false at some other time,

t'

Propositions of the second kind, if there are any, are

propositions to which we may not sensibly ascribe truthvalues at times. For example, it might be said that we
cannot sensibly ascribe to the proposition that two and two
are four the truth-value true at the time

can sensibly ascribe to that proposition

t,
a

even though we

truth-value

-

we

can say that the proposition is true simplici ter. For it

seems natural to say, with regard to such propositions,

which could not in any case have different truth-values at
different times, that time therefore does not enter into the
ascriptions to them of truth-values.
What is really revealed by the apparent distinction

between propositions that can be said to be true or false at
times,

on the one hand,

and propositions that can only be

said to true or false simplici ter, on the other hand, is

a

distinction between different ways of thinking about
propositions, truth and time, and the connections among
these. And these different ways of thinking about

propositions, truth and time, of which there are three,
really represent three different ways of doing semantics.
Let me explain.

According to one way of doing semantics, which

I

will

call the tensed view of propositions, the bearers of truth

and falsity

-

i.e.,

propositions
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-

are thought to have

truth-values at times. On this way of thinking, the
most
basic assignments of truth-values to propositions will

have

the form "P is v at t", where the term in place of

refers to some proposition, the term in place of
to some truth-value,

and the term in place of

some time. This locution,

't'

'P'

'v'

refers

refers to

indeed, will be thought of, by

those holding the tensed view of propositions, as the

fundamental semantical locution. It captures what adherents
of this view take to be the fundamental semantical relation:

the three-place relation that relates

truth-value at
Here

I

a

proposition to

a

a

time.

must digress.

I

have already been speaking of

propositions as if they are genuine entities. Some people
have objected to this ontological extravagance. 10 In this
essay,

I

hereby confess,

I

will be assuming, without

argument, that there are such things. And, to make matters
worse,

I

will also be appealing to

a

controversial thesis

about the nature of propositions: that they are ordered
sets.

11

For the latter thesis, however,

following argument:

I

offer the

I

think that there are sets; ordered

sets can be constructed out of sets,

so

I

think that there

are ordered sets too; certain ordered sets have certain

characteristics that make them ideal for playing the role of

See, for example,
pp. 10-12.
10

11

As far as

I

Quine and Ullian,

The Web of Belief

,

can tell, this view goes back to Russell's

Principles of Mathematics

.
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propositions;

12

therefore,

since

I

have these entities in my

ontology anyway, and since they are ideally
suited to the
role of propositions, I believe that
they are propositions.
In what follows, then, I will help
myself
to the

assumption that there are propositions, and that
these are
ordered sets. Doing so will make certain issues

about time

and semantics considerably easier to discuss.
Moreover, the
assumption will neither help nor hurt any of the parties
to
our dispute about the passage of time. It will simply
make
it possible to spell out each of the relevant
views in a

clearer fashion than would otherwise be possible.
If we take propositions to be ordered sets,

then the

tensed view of propositions tells us that the sentence
(12)

The Orioles are in first place in their

division

expresses the proposition

division

the Orioles>,

,

< beinq-in-f irst-place-in-thei r-

and that this proposition,

like all

propositions, has truth-values at times. It happens to be
false as

I

write this, but it has been true in the past, and

will be again, no doubt,

in the future.

12

This is a weak point in the argument. There are various
puzzles that are generally believed to afflict the view that
propositions are ordered sets (see, for example, Frege, "On
Sense and Meaning;" Kripke, "A Puzzle About Belief;" Kaplan,
"Dthat," "On the Logic of Demonstratives," and
Demonstratives ; Salmon, Frege's Puzzle; and Ryckman,
"Belief, Linguistic Behavior, and Propositional Content").
Whether these puzzles are fatal to the view that
propositions are ordered sets is another question, but one
that is beyond the scope of this essay. I will assume that
they are not.
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In general,

according to the tensed view of

propositions, any basic assignment of truth-values to

propositions must involve times. A complete assignment,
i.e.,

one that picks out a unique possible world, must

consist of

function from ordered pairs

a

consisting of

a

proposition and

a time,

each one itself

-

in such a way that

each proposition is matched with every time

values
I

-

to truth-

.

have said "the fundamental semantical locution,

"

"the

fundamental semantical relation" and "any basic assignment
of truth-values." This is because it is open to one who

holds the tensed view of propositions to allow that there
may be

a

derivative semantical locution: one that captures

a

derivative semantical relation by making non-basic
assignments of truth-values. For example, such
say that if the proposition expressed by

time

t 1,

(12)

a

one might

is true at

then it is permissible to say that the makeshift

proposition

< beinq-in-f irst-place-in-their-division-at-tl

the Orioles> is true simpliciter; provided, that is,

understood that this latter way of talking
truth-value is assigned to
but,

simpliciter

rather,

-

a

a time,

just a construction out of the

is

proposition at

it is

in which a

proposition, not at

a

more fundamental way of talking

assigned to

-

.

a

-

in which a truth-value is

time. Such

a

person might dub

propositions of the first kind (which are said to have
truth-values at times)

tensed propositions, while calling

propositions of the second kind (which may be said to have

42

.

truth values simplicite r)

tenseless propositions

He or she

.

will say that talk of the latter is always to be analyzed
in
terms of talk of the former, which is to be taken as

primitive
The second way of doing semantics, which

the tenseless view of propositions,

I

will call

is essentially the

inverse of the tensed view of propositions. It involves

thinking of propositions as having truth-values simpliciter,
not at times. According to this view, the most basic

assignments of truth-values to propositions will have the
form "P is v", where the term in place of

proposition and the term in place of

'v'

'P'

refers to some

refers to some

truth-value. This is the locution that, according to

adherents of the tenseless view of propositions, should be

thought of as the fundamental semantical locution; it
captures what they take to be the fundamental semantical
relation: the two-place relation that relates a proposition
to a truth-value.
Of course, proponents of this view will have to say

that there is
Thus,

a

time element built into each proposition.

for example,

us that

(12)

the tenseless view of propositions tells

now expresses the tenseless proposition

in-f irst-place-in-their-division-on-27- Julv-1 989

Orioles>. This proposition,
question,

is simply false.

,

c beinq-

the

according to the view in
Other,

related propositions, with

earlier and later times built into them, such as
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< being-in-

n

.

first-pla ce- in-their-division-on- 2 7- September- 1 97
Orioles>,

.

the

are true.

In general,

according to the tenseless view of

propositions, although propositions themselves involve
times,

no basic assignment of truth-values to propositions

will involve times. In order to achieve

a

complete

assignment,

specifying a unique possible world, all that is

required is

a

function that takes each proposition to

a

truth-value
Of course,

it is open to one who holds this view to say

that we may speak derivatively of propositions as having

truth-values at times

-

we simply have to extract the time

element from the real proposition and incorporate it into
the ascription of a truth-value to a makeshift proposition.

For example,
is basic,

from the truth of the above proposition, which

we derive the truth on 27 September 1970 of the

makeshift proposition
division

,

< beinq-in-f irst-olace-in-their-

the Orioles>. A proponent of the tenseless view of

propositions might agree to refer to the first proposition
as a tenseless proposition and the second proposition as a

tensed proposition. He or she will say that it is the
tenseless propositions that are primitive, and the tensed
ones that are derivative.

Finally, there is a third option, which

I

will call the

mixed view of propositions. According to this view, there
are some propositions for which the most fundamental

semantical relation is a three-place relation that relates
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a

:

:

proposition to

a

truth value at

a time,

and there are also

some propositions for which the fundamental semantical

relation is

a

two-place relation that relates

a

proposition

to a truth-value. Propositions of the first kind, which

might be called tensed propositions, need not have any time

element built into them; propositions of the second kind,

which could be called tenseless propositions, will each have
to have some time element in them.

Thus,

one who holds this

view will countenance, as unanalysable, talk of the
proposition

< being- in-

first-place- in-their-divi si on

.

the

Orioles>, which proposition has truth-values truth-values at
times,

and is,

such

one will also countenance,

a

the proposition
2

in particular,

as unanalysable,

talk of

< beinq-in-f irst-place-in-their-division-on-

7- September- 1970

the Orioles>, which proposition has

.

truth-value simpliciter
Here,

true on 27 September 1970. But

.

then are the three relevant views on the

relationships among propositions, truth and time:
The tensed view of propositions (TDVP)
Propositions have truth-values at times; the
most fundamental semantical locution is "P is
v at t", where the term in place of 'P' refers
to some proposition, the term in place of 'v'
refers to some truth-value, and the term in
place of t refers to some time.
'

'

The tenseless view of propositions (TLVP)
Propositions have truth-values simpliciter;
the most fundamental semantical locution is "P
is v", where the term in place of 'P' refers
to some proposition and the term in place of
'v' refers to some truth-value.

Some
The mixed view of propositions (MVP)
the
times;
at
truth-values
propositions have
:
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a

"

most fundamental semantical locution for these
propositions is "P is v at t", where the term
in place of 'P' refers to some proposition,
the term in place of 'v' refers to some truthvalue, and the term in place of 't' refers to
some time; but some other propositions have
truth-values simplici ter; the most fundamental
semantical locution for these propositions is
"P is v", where the term in place of 'P'
refers to some proposition and the term in
place of 'v' refers to some truth-value.

2.5 Are Tensed Sentence Types Eliminable?

It is important to distinguish among several different

variations of TL. These different theses represent different
ways of trying to carry out the relevant elimination. The
first and perhaps most natural of these is a thesis

involving type-f or-type translations of tensed sentence
types by tenseless sentence types. The thesis may be

formulated as follows:
TLa: For every tensed sentence-type, T, there
such that
is some tenseless sentence type, T'
every token of T could be replaced, without
loss of meaning, by a token of T'
,

.

It is not difficult to find an account that at least

appears to be an attempt at filling out TLa

passage in his essay,

"The River of Time,
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In a famous

Smart writes

When we say that the boat 'was upstream, is
will be downstream'
we are saying that
occasions on which the boat is upstream are
Q&rlier then this utterance, that the occasion
on which it is level is simultaneous with this
utterance, and that occasions on which it is
downstream are later than this utterance. That
is, a language could be devised in which
temporal copulae did not exist, but in which
we used the words 'earlier than', 'later
than'
or 'simultaneous with' in combination
with a non-temporal copula and the expression
'this utterance'
This language would not
contain words like 'past', 'present', and
'future'
For example, 'is past' would be
translated by 'is earlier than this
utterance'. ["The River of Time," p. 224.]
level,

,

,

.

.

This passage has been much discussed in the literature
on questions about the passage of time,

and the detensing of

language. The account proposed here by Smart is widely

referred to as "the token reflexive analysis" of tensed
language. Unfortunately, whatever Smart has in mind here, he

does not have in mind
the sense in which
language'

I

a

proposal for detensing language, in

am using the expression

'detensing

For it is clear enough that sentence types like

.

'The boat's being level is simultaneous with this utterance'

are themselves tensed sentence types;

for they can have

different tokens with different truth-values.

I

take this as

evidence that Smart's proposal in this passage is not meant
to be one by which we can eliminate tensed sentence types by

systematically replacing them with tenseless sentence types
involving expressions like 'earlier than' and 'this

utterance

'

.

I

think that part of what Smart has in mind

instead is the analysis of talk that appears to involve the
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attribution of properties such as pastness, presentness and
futurity to events. I will discuss the question of the
status of such putative properties in more detail in Chapter
3

below.
If the analysis proposed here by Smart is not meant to

incorporate

a

type - f or - type translation scheme that reveals

the eliminability of tensed sentence types, then what would

such

translation scheme

-

i.e.,

out the claim made in TLa

-

look like?

a

I

one suitable for filling

don't know exactly what such

would look like, or even what

a

translation scheme

a

rough proposal along the

appropriate lines would be like. But

I

think it can be

easily shown that any such scheme or proposal is doomed to
failure. Consider some tensed sentence type,

proposed tenseless translation,

S'

.

and its

S,

Let S be one of the many

tensed sentence-types that not only can have different
tokens that express propositions with different truthvalues, but in fact does have different tokens that express

propositions with different truth-values. Let ul and u2 be
tokens of S expressing propositions that are true and false,
respectively. Then ul' and u2' are the tokens of

S'

that are

meant to translate ul and u2, respectively; i.e., ul' is the

utterance that would result from the tokening of
context of ul, and u2'
from the tokening of

S'

S'

in the

is the utterance that would result

in the context of u2

.

But the

propositions that would be expressed by ul' and u2' are
either both true or else both false, since ul' and u2' are
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tokens of the same tenseless sentence type. Hence S
and
are such that there is some context
ul and ul',

-

S'

either the context of

or else the context of u2 and u2'

-

in which a

token of S would express a proposition with one truth-value,
and

a

token of S

'

,

which is meant to replace the token of S

without loss of meaning, would express

a

proposition with

a

different truth-value.
It

is not at all obvious what we should say about the

meanings of sentence types in general. Is it appropriate to
say that sentence types have meanings? If so, how are we to

characterize these meanings? There will be some discussion

below of these issues. Similarly, it is not at all obvious
what we should take to be the criteria for one sentence

type's being

a

good translation of another, or under what

circumstances we should say that one utterance could replace
another without loss of meaning. More will be said about
this,

too,

below.

But no matter what we say about these matters,

seem clear that in the case we are considering,
said to be

a

good translation of

that would express

a

S,

nor can

a

S'

it does

cannot be

token of

S’

proposition with one truth-value be

said to be capable of replacing a token of S in some context

without loss of meaning, if the token of S expresses

proposition with

a

a

different truth-value.

This is bad news for TLa, but it is not necessarily bad

news for the claim that tensed sentence types can be

eliminated. All that the above shows is that the elimination
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1

.

cannot be carried out by means of

a

type-for-type

translation scheme. An approach that will
fare much better
than TLa, and that is perhaps closer
to what Smart had in
mind when writing the above passage, is the
following:
TLb For every utterance, u, there is
some
tenseless sentence-type, T, such that a token
of T in the context of u would have had
the
same meaning as u.
:

Consider Tom's uttering, in Amherst at tl,
It s raining'

sentence type,
(i.e.,

.

a

token of

TLb implies that there is some tenseless

such that a token of T in this context

T,

one uttered by Tom in Amherst at tl)

would have

expressed the same proposition as Tom's utterance of
of

'It's raining'

a

token

.

Is there such a tenseless sentence type,

i.e.,

one that

Tom could have tokened in the place of his actual utterance
in order to express the same proposition as the one he in

fact expressed? This is an easy question to answer.

If the

tenseless view of propositions is true, then the answer is
'Yes';

if the tensed view of propositions is true,

answer is

then the

'No'

For suppose the tenseless view of propositions is true.

Then the proposition expressed by Tom's actual utterance is
the tenseless proposition

< be inq- rainy- at -t

.

Amherst>. This

proposition could have been expressed by Tom in the same
context by his uttering a token of 'It rains in Amherst at
tl'

This latter sentence type is a tenseless one

-

if it

can ever be used to express a true proposition, then it can
50

always be used to express

true proposition. Hence, there

a

is some tenseless sentence type that would have served
Tom

just as well in this context as
But,

on the other hand,

'It's raining'.

if the tensed view of

propositions is true, then the proposition expressed by
Tom's token of 'It's raining'
rainy

,

Amherst>. This is

a

is the proposition c beinq-

tensed proposition with different

truth-values at different times. Because of this, and for
the reasons mentioned above,

it is a proposition that can

never be expressed by an utterance that is

tenseless sentence type. Certainly
tl'

a

'It rains

token of

a

in Amherst at

can't be tokened in order to express the proposition

< beinq-rainv

Amherst>,

,

type will express
or always false,

utterance

a

since any token of this sentence

proposition that is either always true

whereas the proposition expressed by Tom's

according to the tensed view of propositions,

is,

one that is sometimes true and sometimes false.
But just as it is clear that the existence of

propositions with different truth-values at different times
entails that TLb is false, and that tensed sentence-types
are thus ineliminable

,

so it is also clear that if there

exist no tensed propositions

(i.e.,

if the tenseless view of

propositions is true), then TLb is true. For consider any
utterance that is

a

token of

a

tensed sentence-type. The

proposition expressed by this utterance is

a

tenseless

proposition, according to the tenseless view of

propositions

.

But there is a sort of algorithm for
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4

;

constructing,

out of any tenseless proposition,

tenseless

a

sentence type that may be used on any occasion to express
that proposition. This is the case in virtue of the fact
that,

as

I

mentioned above, it is

a

consequence of the

tenseless view of propositions that there must be some time
element or other built into each proposition. The algorithm
is this:

take the time element that is contained in the

a)

proposition;

b)

combine it with the property or relation

that is contained in the proposition,
so combined,

red-at-t
find

a

(e.g.,

make

a

,

if it is not already

thereby getting something like the property

or the relation

loves

at t2

;

c)

predicate that expresses this property or relation
'is red at t4',

or

'loves so-and-so at t2'

sentence with the appropriate subject

)

and

d)

and

(s)

object (s), a tenseless copula, and this predicate. The

sentence type represented by the resulting sentence is the

required tenseless sentence type.
At this point the debate has reached an impasse.

Supporters of LP, who say that tensed sentence types are
ineliminable, will base their claim on an appeal to the

tensed view of propositions. Supporters of LNP

,

who say that

tensed sentence types are eliminable, will base their claim
on an appeal to the tenseless view of propositions.

not at all clear what sort of arguments,

if any,

It is

would count

in favor of one or the other of these semantical views. Are

there any such arguments?
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sentence token may be said to have, on the other hand.
Sentence tokens, we can say (or anyway tokens of declarative
sentence types)

meanings

.

,

express propositions, which are their

Sentence types, on the other hand, can not be said

to have propositions as their meanings,

since different

tokens of a single sentence type may express different

propositions. This does not mean that sentence types must be
without meanings, however. The meaning of

a

(declarative)

sentence type, we can say, is something like

function from

a

contexts to propositions. The meaning of 'It's raining',
example,

for

is a function that goes from different contexts to

different propositions. The meaning of 'The date of the
Battle of Hastings is 1066'

,

on the other hand,

function that goes from different contexts to

a

is a

single

proposition. That, according to one who holds the tenseless

view of propositions,

is the difference between tensed and

tenseless sentence types. On this view, then, our intuition
according to which sentence types may be said to have
meanings,

as well as our intuition according to which

different tokens of

a

single sentence type may be said to

have some meaning in common, can both be preserved.
In fact,

is the tensed view of propositions that

it

might be in a precarious position here. For in light of the

distinction between the kind of meaning that
may have

(i.e.,

a

a

sentence type

function from contexts to propositions,

hereafter referred to as the sense of the sentence type) and
the kind of meaning that

a

sentence token may have (i.e.,
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the proposition expressed by that token)

,

it seems that an

argument can be developed against the tensed view of

propositions. The argument is based on close analogies

between tensed sentence types and what might be called

personally indexed and spatially indexed sentence types.
Consider the sentence type 'Washington slept here'
This is what

I

call a spatially indexed sentence type; it

may have different tokens that have different truth-values
in virtue of the fact that they occur at different places.
It is very natural to treat this sentence type in a way

analogous to the way the tenseless view of propositions
treats tensed sentence types: the sense of the sentence type
is a function from contexts to propositions.

In this case

the crucial element of the contexts involved will be their

locations in space

-

the function goes from contexts

including Valley Forge to the proposition that Washington
slept in Valley Forge,

and it goes from contexts including

Amherst to the proposition that Washington slept in Amherst.
In keeping with the analogy to tensed sentence types,

say that propositions have truth-values simpliciter

,

we can

and

merely add that propositions have spatial elements built
into them,

just as propositions have temporal elements built

into them.

Consider the sentence type 'I'm Wayne Gretzky'. This is
what

I

call

a

personally indexed sentence type; it may have

different tokens that have different truth-values in virtue
of the fact that they are uttered by different people.
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It is

also very natural to treat this sentence type
in

a

way

analogous to the way the tenseless view of propositions
treats tensed sentence types: the sense of the sentence
type
is a function from contexts to propositions. But in
this

case,

the crucial element of the contexts involved will be

the people uttering the tokens

context in which

I

-

the function goes from any

am the utterer to the proposition that

Ned Markosian is Gretzky, and it goes from any context in
which Gretzky is the utterer to the proposition that Gretzky
is Gretzky. Again,

we can continue to say that propositions

have truth-values simplici ter, merely adding that some

propositions, at least, are about people

13
.

It does indeed seem that there are close analogies to

tensed sentence types here. But one who holds the tensed
view of propositions must be wary of taking such analogies
too seriously. If such

a

one is willing to accept such

analogies wholeheartedly, then he or she may well be forced
to admit that we should treat spatially indexed sentence

types and personally indexed sentence types in the manner of

tensed sentence types, and this, it seems, will lead to
saying that some propositions, at least, are the kinds of
things that can have different truth-values at different
places,

or else different truth-values at different people.

But these latter claims,

a

proponent of the tenseless view

of propositions might well argue,

are absurdities.

For discussions of these and related issues, see
Casteneda, "Indicators and Quasi-indicators," and Perry,
"The Problem of the Essential Indexical."
13
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The argument from analogy may be formulated as

follows

14

The Argument From Analogy
(1) The analogies among tensed, spatially
indexed, and personally indexed sentence types
are so close that we ought, in our semantical
analyses, to treat all of these kinds of
sentence types in the same manner.
(2) Treating tensed, spatially indexed, and
personally indexed sentence types in the same
manner semantically means saying either (a)
all propositions have truth-values
simplici ter, or else (b) propositions can have
different truth-values at different times, and
they can have different truth-values at
different places, and they can have different
truth-values
at different people.
(4)

(3) Alternative (b) is untenable; it would be
ridiculous to say that propositions can have
different truth-values at different places, or
that propositions can have different truthvalues at different people.

We must say that all propositions have

truth-values simpliciter

.

It seems to me that there are two effective responses

to this argument available to one who holds the tensed view
of propositions,

compatible,

and that these two responses are mutually

so that it is possible for such a one to make

them both. The first of these responses is simply to bite
the bullet and embrace the idea that some propositions can

Word and Object p. 173, for what appears to
be a passage suggesting at least the personal part of this
argument
14

Cf.

Quine,

,
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have different truth-values at different places, as well
as
the idea that some propositions can have different truth-

values at different people, thereby rejecting premise
the argument. A response of this kind will require

(3)

of

a

complication in our semantics, as it will be necessary to
say that the most fundamental semantical ascriptions of

truth-values are of the form "P is v at
the terms in place of

proposition,

a

'P'

,

truth-value,

'v'

't'

,

a time,

t at

's'

a

s

and

at r"

where

refer to

'r'

place and

,

a

a

person,

respectively. Still, complicated though such an account may
be,

there is nothing incoherent about it, as far as

tell. Nor are there,

as far as

arguments against it. So
(3)

I

I

know,

I

can

any convincing

think the rejection of premise

of this argument is a move that one who holds the tensed

view of propositions ought not to be afraid of making. 15
The other response available to such a person, however,
is a response that is considerably more plausible.

second response involves rejecting premise

(1).

This

People who

hold that tensed sentence types are ineliminable, and that
language cannot be detensed, are the people who hold various

metaphysical views that move them to say that time passes.
Exactly what these metaphysical views are, or might be, is

a

complicated question that will be taken up in the next
all the people who say that time passes

chapter.

In general,

believe,

or should believe,

that there are crucial

For discussions of some of these issues see Kaplan,
"Dthat," "On the Logic of Demonstratives," and
Demonstratives and Lewis, "General Semantics."
15

;
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disanalogies of some kind between time and the dimensions of
space. They believe that it makes sense to say that time

passes,

for example, but not to say that space passes. Hence

it makes sense for these people to point to these alleged

differences between time and space as reasons for rejecting
premise

(1)

of The Argument From Analogy. That is,

one who

holds metaphysical views according to which there are

profound differences between time and space can point to
these differences as reasons for maintaining that we ought
not to treat spatially indexed and personally indexed

sentence types in the manner in which we treat tensed
sentence types.
Of course, the appropriate rejoinder for the would-be

detenser of language to make at this point is that time and
space are essentially analogous, metaphysically speaking
(whatever he or she means by that)

so that we have good

,

reasons for treating them analogously when it comes to
semantics. Here we have again reached an impasse. The two
sides disagree on

a

semantical issue, and they each claim to

have good metaphysical reasons for holding their semantical
views. The matter cannot be decided without venturing

outside of the realm of linguistics.

We have seen that The Argument From Analogy fails to

show that the tenseless view of propositions is the correct
view.

If it had been successfull,

it would have constituted

true,
an excellent reason for maintaining that TLb is
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and

that tensed sentence types are therefore eliminable. From
this it would have followed that LNP is true. But The

Argument From Analogy results in an impasse. Are there any
arguments or counter-examples that can show that LNP is
false,

and,

hence, that LP is true?

I

think that there are

not. But is worth seeing why some of the alleged counter-

examples that have been proposed in fact fail. The best
attempt at such

a

counter-example is one that is presented

by Gale in his The Language of Time (in the following

passage Gale uses the term 'A-sentence' to mean roughly what
I

mean by 'tensed sentence type'

sentence' to mean roughly what
type'

)

I

;

similarly, he uses

'B-

mean by 'tenseless sentence

:

Joe is a scout for a machine-gun company. He
is strategically stationed so that he can
survey the battlefield, and when the enemy
approaches within 100 yards of their position
he must inform the company of this fact. The
company commander will then collate this piece
of information with other information, such as
whether enemy fighter planes are then overhead
and could spot their position if they fired,
and decide whether or not to give the company
the order to open fire.
The crucial question concerns whether Joe can
alert the company commander of the fact that
the enemy is now within a 100-yard range
through the use if a B-sentence. There is no
question of Joe being able to inform the
commander of this fact by the use of an Asentence, such as 'The enemy is now within 100
yards'... [Gale, The Language of Time p. 56.]
,

The issue may be stated in terms that fit into our

discussion of TLb in the following way. Suppose that at tl
the enemy advances within one hundred yards of the company.

Suppose that Joe does his job: he utters, at tl,
60

a

token of

s 1

.

The enemy is now within one hundred
yards'
is a token of a tensed sentence
type.

.

His utterance

Is there some

tenseless sentence type that Joe could have
tokened at tl in
place of what he in fact said, in order to
alert the
commander of he enemy's approach? TLb says
that there is.
Gale says that there isn't. 16
Suppose Joe uttered,

in place of his tl token of

enemy is now within one hundred yards',

a

enemy is within one hundred yards at tl'

'The

token of 'The

According to the

tenseless view of propositions, both utterances in
question
would express the same proposition: < beina-within-nnphu ndred-yards-at-t

.

the enemy>. This is, naturally,

tenseless proposition, with

a t rut h— va lue

a

s imp 11 ciier.

Since

it is the only proposition expressed by Joe's actual

utterance (the tl token of 'The enemy is now within one

hundred yards'), and since it is exactly the proposition
that would be expressed by a tl token of 'The enemy is

within one hundred yards at tl', the detenser will argue,
the case is not a counter-example to TLb.
Of course,

the tenser,

who believes the tensed view of

propositions, has a different story to tell about the

propositions that would be expressed by these two
utterances. Gale will say that the proposition expressed by
Joe's actual utterance is the tensed proposition

c being-

Prior has a similar example and accompanying argument. He
presents these in his paper "Thank Goodness That's Over." I
example and argument are equally
think that Prior'
I also think that the remarks I
plausible.
interesting and
apply, mutatis mutandis, to
example
Gale's
about
make below
example.
Prior's
16
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w ithin-one -hu ndred- yards

.

the enemy>. He will say that this

proposition, like any tensed proposition, cannot be

expressed by
It

a

token of

a

tenseless sentence type.

seems that we have again reached an impasse. One

side presents what it takes to be a counter-example to TLb,
making,

in the process,

an appeal to the tensed view of

propositions. The other side defends TLb against the alleged
counter-example, and in so doing makes an appeal to the

tenseless view of propositions.
But is that all there is to the matter? Can't the

tenser present

a

stronger case by making the very plausible

claim that something is lost in the translation to

a

tenseless sentence type? Gale points out that

token of

'The enemy is within one hundred yards at tl'

a tl

might fail

disastrously to convey the requisite information. Perhaps
the commander doesn't know the time. He hears Joe's token of
the tenseless sentence type, but this doesn't let him know
when the enemy is in range,
tl.

since he doesn't know when it is

Thus a token of a tensed sentence type has been

eliminated, but the result is that

a

crucial piece of

information has been left out. Men die. Battles are lost.
Empires fall. All in the name of preserving

a

misguided

linguistic thesis.
As a first response to this, the detenser can say the

following. Regardless of whether the commander knows that it
is tl,

and that Joe's token of 'The enemy is now within one

hundred yards' thereby expresses the tenseless proposition
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s

that the enemy is within one hundred yards at tl, this
is
still the proposition expressed. Similarly,

might not know

I

that Sylvanian is the Armenian ambassador, and thus when you

utter

token of 'The Armenian ambassador is

a

player',

I

won't know who is being said to be

player. Certainly

I

a

tiddleywinks

won't know that the proposition you

express is the proposition
Sylvanian>, even if

tiddleywinks

a

I

< beinq-a-t iddlevwinks-plaver

.

am well-acquainted with Sylvanian. And

the fact that this piece of information is not conveyed to
me might prove disastrous when

I

soon launch into a long

philippic degrading that curious game in Sylvanian'
presence. Does it follow from this that proper names cannot
be eliminated from our language, to be replaced by definite

descriptions?
I

I

don't know.

think, however, that there is a much more effective,

and much less controversial, response available to the
detenser. He or she need only point out that Joe's token of
in addition

'The enemy is now within one hundred yards'

is,

to being a token of a tensed sentence type,

also a token of

a

spatially indexed sentence type. For whether tokens of

this type express something true depends not only on when

they occur, but also on where they occur. But consider the

following thesis.
SLb For every utterance, u, there is some
non-spat ially indexed sentence type, T, such
that a token of T in the context of u would
have had the same meaning as u.
:
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This brings up the question, Could Joe have expressed what
he expressed by tokening a non - spat ially indexed sentence

type? Suppose the position of the company is 15 degrees
West,

50 degrees North.

that Joe'

s

The the proponent of SLb will say

utterance expressed the proposition

within-one-hundred-vards-of-15W-50N-at-tl

.

c beinq-

the enemy>. This

is a proposition that does not have truth-values at times,

or at places;

just has a truth-value simplici ter.

it

According to such

a

person, then,

the same proposition,

Joe could have expressed

in the same context,

by uttering a

token of 'The enemy is within one hundred yards of 15W-50N
at tl'

.

company'

But of course the commander might not know that his
s

position is 15W-50N,

just as he might not know

that the time is tl. Hence, this alternative utterance by
Joe would be disastrously lacking in informative content.

Now it should be clear that the tenser has failed to

provide the kind of counter-example that would disprove LNP
For,

although the tenser has succeeded in presenting what

appears to be

a

counter-example to TLb, the detenser has,

through the use of some parallel reasoning involving SLb,

managed to show that tensed sentence types are exactly on

a

par with spatially indexed sentence types, as far as

eliminability and Gale-type counter-examples are concerned
(it

could also be shown that personally indexed sentence

types are in the same boat)

.

are neither more nor less eliminable

informative content

-

tensed sentence types

That is,
—

without loss of

than spatially indexed (and personally
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indexed)

sentence types. What the tenser needed to prove, in

order to have an argument for LP, was that tensed sentence
types are uneliminable in

a

way that sets them apart from

spatially indexed (and personally indexed) sentence types.
It light of SLb

(and its personal analogue)

,

we can see that

this cannot be proven. This fact will be taken by the

detenser to be further evidence for LNP and the tenseless

view of propositions.
The tenser's only response to this will be to say that

there are profound metaphysical differences between time and
space

(and matters personal)

,

so that there is a good reason

for allowing time to play a special role in our semantics.
Thus,

tensed sentence types play

a

unique role in our

language, unlike that of their spatial and personal

counterparts, and, hence, LP is true. But now we have once
again reached an impasse. The debate over linguistic
matters,

i.e.,

the debate over LP and LNP, turns on

semantical considerations, and the relevant semantical
views,

namely, the tensed and tenseless views of

propositions, on which the tensers and detensers base their

arguments concerning the alleged necessity of time's special

treatment in our ordinary language, can only be supported

with non-circular arguments by raising metaphysical issues.
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.

6

Conclusion

In short,

the situation regarding language and the

passage of time is this. A person may consistently hold
either of the two views concerning time's special treatment
in our ordinary language,

LP and LNP,

provided that that

person also holds the appropriate view from among several
semantical views available. Each of these different
semantical views,
such

a

in turn,

can be consistently maintained in

way that it is not susceptible to arguments from the

other side, provided that these arguments do not appeal to

metaphysical considerations. But of course advocates of
either The Linguistic Argument For SPT or The Linguistic

Argument Against SPT may not appeal to metaphysical claims
in defense of either LNP or LP,

since these allegedly

linguistic theses are to be used in arguments designed to
prove just such metaphysical claims. Moreover,

if the

different parties to the dispute between LP and LNP do
appeal to metaphysical considerations, then they may be able
to develop non-circular,

non-question-begging arguments for

their respective linguistic theses. What those metaphysical

considerations might be, and what arguments might be

developed from them, are the topics of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER

3:

METAPHYSICAL MATTERS

3.1 Introduction

I

?i

i

i

In this chapter

I

turn to

a

consideration of SPT and

some related metaphysical issues. Following tradition,

begin with

a

I

consideration of the connection between such

two-place relations as earlier-than, on the one hand, and
such apparently monadic properties as pastness
hand.

In section 3.2,

,

on the other

questions about this connection are

spelled out in terms derived from McTaggart's distinction

betwen the A-series and the B-series. The primary issue to
be considered here is whether the so-called A-properties
(pastness,

B-relations

etc.)

can be analysed in terms of the so-called

(earlier-than,

etc.). But it will also be seen

that several other important issues arise here, and these

other issues lead to questions about such matters as the

relations between times, events and things; what we should
take to be the primary sense of the expression 'physical
object'

how many dimensions we should take physical objects

to have; and the ontological status of the past and the

future
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After spelling out all of these questions in section
3.2,

I

will propose,

in sections 3. 3-3. 7,

five distinct ways

of providing answers to these questions. Each such way will

constitute

a

package made up of several separate but related

metaphysical components. Each of these metaphysical packages
will itself constitute

a

good reason for holding one of the

three semantical packages discussed in Chapter

2;

consequently, each of the metaphysical packages will

constitute

a

good reason for holding either LP or LNP

linguistic theses discussed in Chapter

2.

Thus,

,

the

the

arguments from metaphysical premises to linguistic

conclusions alluded to above will each have the components
of one of the metaphysical packages as its premises,

and

either LP or LNP as its conclusion. Four of the metaphysical

packages will provide arguments for LP, and the other will
provide an argument for LNP. The former four metaphysical

packages will constitute four distinct ways of maintaining
that time passes,

and the latter metaphysical package will

constitute what

take to be the principal way of

I

maintaining that time does not pass.
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3.2 The Status of A properties a n d Related
Mptaphvsir^i

Issues

Today is Monday. Super Bowl XXIII was played yesterday.

Prima facie

at least,

,

it seems that Super Bowl XXIII is an

event that now has the property pastness

.

More specifically,

it seems that Super Bowl XXIII now has the property beina-

one-d ay-past

.

Likewise it seems that tomorrow Super Bowl

XXIII will have the property beinq-two-davs-past

during

that

certain time period yesterday it had the property

a

presentness
futurity

.

.

and that before that period it had the property

,

All of these properties appear to be monadic,

temporal properties that may be possessed by events.
It

seems that things, too, may be said to possess such

monadic temporal properties. The boat in which Washington
crossed the Delaware,
pastness

,

for example,

now has the property

and the first child born in the twenty-first

century now has the property futurity

Similarly for times;

.

prima facie, at least, the 1920s, the present moment, and
the twenty-fifth century all seem to have monadic temporal

properties of this kind.
Following McTaggart and others,

I

will refer to the

seemingly monadic temporal properties pastness
and futurity

,

as A-properties

1
.

And

I

,

presentness

will also refer to any

1
McTaggart, "The Unreality of Time." See also Gale,
Language of Time.
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,

The

.

property that is the result of adding

number and

a

unit to an A-property (e.g., one-dav-pastness

days-past

)

.

a

time

or beina-two-

as an A-property

A properties may,

it seems,

be distinguished from such

binary temporal relations as earlier— than
simultaneous -with

2
.

to these relations,

days -ear lie r-than

.

later-than and

,

Again following McTaggart,

I

will refer

along with their metric variants
etc.)

as B-relations

(

two-

3
.

The question that is traditionally raised in

discussions about time's alleged passage is this: What is
the correct analysis of talk that appears to be about A-

properties? Is such talk to be analyzed in terms of

fi-

liations, or

do

events

is such an analysis impossible? I.e.,

(and/or things and/or times)

possess A-properties in

such a way that the possession of these properties by these

entities can be analyzed solely in terms of B-relations
among the relevant entities, or not? When
Bowl XXIII has the property pastness

.

I

say that Super

for example,

am

I

attributing to Super Bowl XXIII an irreducibly monadic
property,

or am

I

really just saying that Super Bowl XXIII

bears the relation earlier-than to my utterance?
There is a related question that arises concerning the

various verbal tenses that abound in natural languages,
including, especially,
2

such tenses as the simple past and

These are interdef inable

McTaggart,
Time

3

.

See Chapter

1

above.

"The Unreality of Time;" Gale,

.
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The Language of

the simple future. Are these to be taken as primitive,
or
are they to be somehow analyzed away? When

I

say that Johnny

Unitas was the top quarterback in football, for example, is
my use of the past tense to be taken as primitive, or is it
to be understood as a shorthand way of sayinp that occasions
on which Unitas is the top quarterback in the game are

earlier than the occasion of my utterance? I.e., would

a tl

token of 'Occasions on which Johnny Unitas is the top

quarterback in football are earlier than this utterance'
express exactly what

a tl

token of 'Johnny Unitas was the

top quarterback in football' would express? If so, then it

would seem that we can, in an important way, analyze away
the past- and future-tenses; if not, then it would seem that
the past- and future-tenses are somehow primitive.

Notice that what is at issue here is not the same

question that was raised in Chapter

2.

There the question

was whether tokens of tensed sentence types could somehow be

eliminated in favor of tokens of tenseless sentence types.
The answer was that whether or not one thinks this can be

done in

a

way that is relevant to the dispute between LP and

LNP depends on one's semantical views about propositions,

truth and time. One who holds the tensed view of

propositions will say that tokens of tensed sentence types
cannot be eliminated in such

a

relevant way; one who holds

the tenseless view of propositions will say that they can.
Now,

however, the question is whether or not we can somehow

analyze all past- and future-tensed sentences in terms of
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present-tensed sentences, even if the present-tensed
sentences are tokens of tensed sentence types.
There is

a

good deal of metaphysics lurking behind

these guestions about A— properties and verbal tenses. one'

s

answers to these questions will be largely determined by
one's answers to various other questions about various

metaphysical matters. Among these various other questions
are questions about the nature of physical objects and the

manner in which these exist at different times. To begin
with,

there is this question: In the most fundamental sense

of the expression

'physical object', how many dimensions do

physical objects have? Three? Or four? I.e., are the things
that will count as physical objects in our ontology, after
all analyses and reductions are completed, three-dimensional

entities or four-dimensional entities?
A related question is this: what exactly does the

persistence through time of

a

physical object consist in?

Are physical objects three-dimensional things that may exist
at different times in virtue of the fact that they may be

wholly present at more than one time? Or are they four-

dimensional things that may exist at different times in
virtue of the fact that they may have different temporal
parts at different times, even though no single part of any

physical object can be present at two different times ?

Peter van Inwagen, in "Four-dimensional Objects,"
discusses similar issues.
4
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4

An example will perhaps help to shed some light on
the
issue raised by these questions about physical objects.

Consider some ordinary, run-of-the-mill object:

a

chair,

say. How many dimensions does this object have? Well,

it

seems clear enough that the chair has at least three

dimensions, namely, the familiar dimensions of space. The

chair has height,

it has depth,

and it has width. In

addition, we may want to say, the chair has duration in
time; thus altogether it has,

in some sense,

four

dimensions. Who would deny that?
No one. But now suppose that it is tl and someone uses

the expression 'the chair'

.

What is referred to? Is it an

object that is wholly present at tl, or is it an object that
is,

at tl,

merely represented by

a

temporal part? Suppose we

say the latter. Then the chair is a four-dimensional object;
it has various one-,

parts,

two-,

three- and four-dimensional

including the three- (spatial) -dimensional part that

occupies tl; but all talk about such parts is to be analysed
in terms of the four-dimensional object that is the chair.

Suppose,

on the other hand,

we say that the thing

referred to at tl is an object that is wholly present at tl.
Then the chair is a three-dimensional object; it has various
one-,

two-,

and three-dimensional parts, but all of these

parts are spatial parts; the chair has no temporal parts,
and it has no four-dimensional parts. Of course, it exists
at different times.

This is because the chair

-

all of it

endures through time; it is wholly present at each time at
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which it exists. Thus, talk of the chair's extension in time
is to be analysed in terms of talk of its continued

existence at different times.
David Lewis provides

a

clear formulation of what is at

issue here.
Let us say that something persists iff,
somehow or other, it exists at various times;
this is the neutral word. Something perdures
iff it persists by having different temporal
parts, or stages, at different times, though
no one part of it is wholly present at more
than one time; whereas it endures iff it
persists by being wholly present at more than
one time. Perdurance corresponds to the way a
road persists through space; part of it is
here, and part of it is there, and no part is
wholly present at two different places.
Endurance corresponds to the way a universal,
if there are such things, would be wholly
present wherever and whenever it is
instantiated. Endurance involves overlap: the
content of two different times has the
enduring thing as a common part. Perdurance
does not. [On the Plurality of Worlds, p.
202
.

]

If the physical objects of our world,

in the most

fundamental sense of the expression 'physical object'

,

are

three-dimensional, then they persist in virtue of the fact
that they endure. If the physical objects of our world, in
the most fundamental sense of the expression 'physical
object',

are four-dimensional objects, then they persist in

virtue of the fact that they perdure.
The 3D and 4D views may be formulated as follows:

Physical objects endure
The 3D View (3D)
through time; they do not have temporal parts.

:

The 4D View (4D)
Physical objects perdure
through time; they have temporal parts.

In addition to the above questions,

there are also

questions about how similar time is to the three spatial
dimensions. One important way in which such comparisons can
be made concerns the respective directions of the dimensions

involved. It seems that there is no intrinsic direction to
any dimension of space; space, we want to say,

is isotropic.

Yet it at least seems that time is not in the same way

isotropic; it appears that there is
time,

since,

Indeed,

a

definite direction to

after all, causes always precede their effects.

it seems that the future is the very realm of

possibility, whereas the past is in some important sense
fixed. Does this appearance reflect a genuine difference

between time and the dimensions of space? Or is time in fact
symmetrical in exactly the way space is?

Another question that concerns apparent dissimilarities
between time and space has to do with the apparent
ontological inequities of the dimension of time. It matters
not at all,

ontologically speaking, whether

a

particular

thing be north or south, up or down; but it at least seems
that there are important,

objective,

ontological

distinctions to be drawn between the different regions of
time

enjoy

things and events in the present, we want to say,

-

a

different ontological status from things and events

that are confined to the past; and things and events that
are past,

for their part,

enjoy some ontological advantage
75

over things and events that are merely
future. Is this
appearance veridical? What, indeed, should we
say is the
ontological status of the past? Of the future?
Should we

countenance talk of objects that are merely past
or merely
future as on a par with talk of objects that are
present? Or
should we say that there are no non-present objects?
Are

there,

in fact,

objective,

ontological distinctions to be

drawn between the different regions of time, or is time
like
the dimensions of space in this regard?

Hsre it is useful to draw an analogy with

a

certain

issue in the metaphysics of modality, namely, the dispute

between modal realists and modal actualists. Roughly
speaking, the modal debate is over the ontological status of

merely possible objects, and merely possible worlds. Modal
realists,

such as David Lewis,

really exist,

5

believe that such things

in exactly the same sense in which actual

objects and the actual world really exist; they're concrete
objects, with physical properties, taking up space and time

(although not,

says Lewis,

any space or time that is

reachable from the space and time of the actual world)

William Lycan has put

it,

.

As

modal realists believe that other

possible worlds are "blooming, buzzing worlds

"
.

6

Moreover,

modal realists are willing to quantify directly over merely

possible objects and merely possible worlds; they will
It is perhaps a mistake to speak of modal realists; it
appears that Lewis is the only one. He offers a sustained
defense of his view in On the Plurality of Worlds.
5

6

Lycan,

"The Trouble with Possible Worlds," p. 287.
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accept,

for example,

that x is

a

that the sentence

purple cow'

,

'There is an x such

where the existential quantifier is

taken in its broadest sense, is true, since there is indeed
a

world (no doubt not this one)

,

in which there is a purple

cow

More generally, modal realists are willing to allow
that quantifying expressions, when used in their broadest,

most unrestricted senses, range over all of the things in
all of the possible worlds. Thus,

the expressions

'every thing'

in the broadest senses of

and 'some thing'

,

these

expressions range over all of the things in this world, and
all of the things in every other possible world, too.

Closely related to this component of modal realism is
certain claim about singular propositions

In order to make

this clear, allow me to indulge once again in the practice
of talking about propositions as ordered sets. A singular

proposition, then,

is,

roughly speaking,

a

proposition that

has at least one constituent that is a concrete object;

general proposition, on the other hand,
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is a proposition

a

a

.

.

.

.

that has only abstract objects as constituents

7
.

Thus,

for

example, the following would be singular propositions;
c being-white
The White House>
< being-taller-than
Manute Bol,
.

.

and
Spud Webb>;

whereas these would be general propositions;
< beinq-a- color
beinq-white >
c beinq- instantiated
beinq-white > and
< beinq-univer sally- instantiated
beinq-madeof- iello > 8
.

.

,

it is a consequence of the modal realist's

Now,

ontology that there are some singular propositions with
These definitions are actually inadequate as they stand.
Consider the proposition < beinq-believed-bv- someone c beinqover-six-feet-tall Ronald Reagan>>. It is an ordered set
with two constituents, each of which is an abstract object.
Thus, on the definitions I have just given, it is a general
proposition. But it should be considered a singular
proposition, because one of its constituents is a singular
proposition. Similarly, the proposition c beinq-exemplif iedbv-Reagan be inq-over- s i x- feet -tall > is a general
proposition according to the definitions above; but it
should be considered a singular proposition, because one of
its constituents is a property that involves a concrete
object. I think that the following definitions will
adequately capture the intended notions.
7

.

.

,

x is a

constituent of

S

=df

[]

(S

exists --> x

exists)
is a singular proposition =df Ex[x is a
concrete object & x is a constituent of P]
P is a general proposition =df ~Ex[x is a
concrete object & x is a constituent of P]
P is a proposition about x =df x is a
P

constituent of P.
P is a proposition directly about
a member of P.

x

=df x is

8
Notice that these are all examples of the kind of
propositions that a proponent of the tensed view of
propositions would accept.
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that has only abstract objects as constituents.'' Thus,

for

example, the following would be singular propositions:
c beinq-white
The White House>
< being-taller-than
Manute Bol,
.

.

and
Spud Webb>;

whereas these would be general propositions:
< beinq-a- color
beinq-white >
< beinq- instantiated
beinq-white > and
< beinq-uni vers ally- instantiated
beinq-madeof- iello > 8
.

.

,

it is a consequence of the modal realist's

Now,

ontology that there are some singular propositions with
These definitions are actually inadequate as they stand.
Consider the proposition < beinq-believed-bv- someone c beinqover-six-feet-tall Ronald Reagan>>. It is an ordered set
with two constituents, each of which is an abstract object.
Thus, on the definitions I have just given, it is a general
proposition. But it should be considered a singular
proposition, because one of its constituents is a singular
proposition. Similarly, the proposition c beinq-exemplifiedby-Reagan be inq-over- s ix- feet -tall > is a general
proposition according to the definitions above; but it
should be considered a singular proposition, because one of
its constituents is a property that involves a concrete
object. I think that the following definitions will
adequately capture the intended notions.
7

.

.

,

x is a

constituent of

S

=df

[]

(S

exists --> x

exists)
P is a singular proposition =df Ex[x is a
concrete object & x is a constituent of P]
P is a general proposition =df ~Ex[x is a
concrete object & x is a constituent of P]
P is a proposition about x =df x is a
constituent of P.
P is a proposition directly about x =df x is
a member of P.
.

.

Notice that these are all examples of the kind of
propositions that a proponent of the tensed view of
propositions would accept.
8
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constituents that are concrete, but merely possible,
objects. Among these propositions are singular
propositions

about such merely possible objects as the present king
of

France and the eighth Marx brother.
I

said above that modal realists are willing to

quantify over all of the things in all of the possible
worlds. Indeed, modal realists are not only willing to

quantify directly over merely possible objects and worlds;
they believe that the correct analysis of modal discourse is
that such discourse really just is disguised quantification
of this kind.

9

I.e.,

modal realists say that

'It's possible that there is a purple cow'

there is

a

a

sentence like

just means that

possible world in which there is an object that

is a purple cow.

Modal actualists,

10

on the other hand, believe that

there are no merely possible (i.e., non-actual) objects;

everything that exists, according to them, is in the actual
world. There are,

according to modal actualism, no merely

possible cows of any color, nor are there any concrete,
merely possible worlds. According to modal actualism,
sentences like 'There is an x such that x is

a

purple cow'

Cf. Lewis, "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic"
and On the Plurality of Worlds.
9

There are a lot of these. See, for example, Prior, Papers
on Time and Tense, esp. p. 143; Plantinga, "Actualism and
Possibility, " and The Nature of Necessity; Fine, "Prior on
the Construction of Possible Worlds and Instants;" Adams,
"Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity, " and "Actualism
and Thisness;" and Forbes, The Metaphysics of Modality. For
a good general discussion of this issue see Loux,
"Introduction: Modality and Metaphysics."
10
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and 'There is an x such that

x

is non-actual',

even when the

existential quantifiers therein are taken in their broadest
senses,

are false. Still, modal actualists will admit that

we can,

in some fashion,

talk about merely possible things.

We can talk about possible worlds,
these,

in general,

because

according to the modal actualist, are abstract

objects that exist in the actual world. Here there are some

different ways to go; some modal actualists, for example,
take possible worlds to be maximal, consistent

propositions

11
.

Then any modal proposition of the form it's

possible that such-and-such is said to be true just in case
the proposition that such-and-such is entailed by some

possible world. Hence the modal actualist can say that the

proposition that it's possible that there is

a

purple cow is

true, without ontological commitment to any non-actual
for there are many possible worlds

objects;

(i.e.,

maximal,

consistent propositions) that entail the proposition that
there is

a

purple cow.

According to the modal actualist, then, quantifying
expressions like 'every thing' and 'some thing'

,

when they

are taken in their broadest, most unrestricted senses,

over all and only objects in the actual world. Thus,

range

it is a

consequence of the modal actualist's ontology that there are
Fine, "Prior on the Construction of
Worlds and Instants." We can say that a proposition, p, is
maximal just in case for every proposition, q, either p
entails q or else p entails not-q. We can say that a
proposition, p/ is consistent just in case it is possible
that p be true.
11

See,

for example,
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no singular propositions with constituents that are

concrete, but merely possible, objects; there are no

singular propositions about such merely possible objects as
the present king of France and the eighth Marx brother.
In addition to this metaphysical component of modal

actualism there is

a

semantical component. For the correct

analysis of modal discourse, according to the modal
actualist,

is not that such discourse is really disguised

quantification over possible worlds and objects, including
various non-actual entities. Rather, such discourse is to be

analysed solely in terms of certain appropriate actual
entities

-

namely, maximal,

consistent propositions

-

and

things entailed by them.
In short,

actualism is

a

the dispute between modal realism and modal

dispute over the manner in which we are to

analyse modal discourse. There are two main questions here:
(i)

Will we allow quantification over, and propositions

about, things that are not actual? and (ii) Will we analyse

away modal notions like the notions of possibility and

necessity? The modal realist answers Yes to both questions;
for he is willing to quantify directly over merely possible

objects and worlds, and he thinks that there are singular

propositions about non-actual objects

(I

will refer to this

part of the view as the metaphysical thesis of modal
realism)

12
;

and he makes use of such quantification in order

consequence of the metaphysical thesis of
'M(Ex($x))' entails 'Ex(M(Sx))', where
that
realism
modal
'Ex'
standing for 'possibly'
operator
modal
the
'M' is
for
the
(but
not
that'
such
an
x
is
'there
for
stands
12

It is thus a

,
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to analyse away the notions of possibility and
necessity in

giving explanations of modal discourse

(I

will refer to this

part of the view as the semantical thesis of modal realism
The modal actualist,

on the other hand,

)

answers No to

b°th guestions. For he or she insists that we can guantify
only over things that exist in the actual world, so that

there are no singular propositions about merely possible
objects

(I

will call this part of the view the metaphysical

thesis of modal actualism)

13
,

This is why,

according to the

modal actualist, we must take possible worlds to be entities
like maximal,

consistent propositions. And this in turn is

why the modal actualist says that we cannot analyse away the

modal notions

(for a notion like consistent cannot be

analysed without appealing to the notion of possible)

;

the

modal notions must, according to the modal actualist, be
taken as primitive

(I

will refer to this part of the view as

the semantical thesis of modal actualism

14
)

restricted guantifier 'there is in the actual world an
such that') and '$' is any predicate.

x

But according to the metaphysical thesis of modal
actualism we can guantify indirectly - i.e., within the
scope of a modal operator - over mere possibilia; such
guantif icat ion, however, does not entail the existence of
anything actual. So it is a conseguence of the metaphysical
thesis of modal actualism that 'M(Ex($x))' does not entail
(even if the existential guantifier in the
'Ex (M £x)
latter sentence is taken in the broadest possible sense)
13

)

(

There would be nothing inconsistent in taking at least
one of the two middle of the road positions with regard to
modal actualism, namely, allowing guantif ication over mere
possibilia while taking the modal notions to be primitive;
but it is hard to imagine why anyone would want to take such
a position. If we allow mere possibilia into our ontology,
then we have available the resources for analyzing away the
modal notions in terms of guantif ication over these
14
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Corresponding to the dispute between modal realism and
modal actualism is

a

dispute between two views that

I

will

call temporal realism and temporal actualism. As with
the

modal controversy, the temporal controversy is
over ontology, and the correct way to analyse

a
a

dispute

certain

fragment of natural language. Whereas the former controversy

revolves around the ontological status of mere possibilia,
snd the analysis of modal discourse, the latter controversy

revolves around the ontological status of things that are

merely past, or merely future, and the analysis of temporal

discourse
Temporal realism is, roughly, the view that merely past
and merely future things really exist, in exactly the same

sense in which present objects really exist.

15

For temporal

realism is the view that there are no ontological
distinctions to be drawn between the different regions of
time. Ontologically speaking, present objects, past objects,

and future objects are all on

a par;

none of them exists any

more or less than any of the others. As Lycan might put

it,

temporal realism is the view that the denizens of other
entities. There would then be no reason not to do so; once
we have paid a price, after all, we might as well get what
we've paid for. The other middle of the road position,
namely, not allowing quantification over mere possibilia but
attempting to analyze away the modal notions, seems
untenable. See, in this regard, Fine, "Postscript," pp. 116117

.

This is rough because temporal realism is made up of two
components - a metaphysical component and a semantical
component - the former of which may be held independently of
the latter. More will be said about this below.
15
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times are blooming and buzzing no less vividly than
are the
denizens of the present time.
Moreover, temporal realists are willing to quantify

directly over objects that are merely past or merely future;
they will accept,

for example,

that the sentence 'There is

an x such that x was a Trojan horse'
is indeed a time

16

is true,

(no doubt not the present one)

there is a Trojan horse.

17

since there
,

at which

More generally, temporal realists

are willing to allow that quantifying expressions, when used
in their broadest,

most unrestricted senses,

of the things that have ever,

Thus,

thing'

do now,

range over all

or will ever exist.

in the broadest senses of the expressions

and 'some thing'

,

'every

these expressions range over all

past, present and future objects.

It of course follows that

16
By 'Trojan horse' I mean an enormous, wooden model of a
horse, which model is designed to be filled with soldiers
for the purpose of sacking Troy.
17

This is tricky because, as will be seen in section 3.5
below, it is possible, and even plausible, to hold one of
the middle of the road positions in this dispute, namely,
the position consisting of both the semantical thesis of
temporal actualism and the metaphysical thesis of temporal
realism. Thus, as will be seen in Chapter 4 below, one- who
holds both of the components of temporal realism would
analyze a tl token of 'There is an x such that x was a
Trojan horse' as expressing the same tenseless proposition
as 'There is a thing, x, and there is a time, t, such that x
is a Trojan horse at t and t is earlier than tl', where all
of the verbs in the latter sentence are to be taken as
tenseless (cf. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism, p.
133, and also Quine, Quiddities, pp. 197-198); but one who
holds the metaphysical thesis of temporal realism together
with the semantical thesis of temporal actualism would
analyze this token as expressing the tensed proposition that
would be expressed by a tl token of 'There is a thing, x,
such that it has been the case that x is a Trojan horse',
where the latter is taken to be an irreducibly past-tensed

sentence
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temporal realists think that there are, at any given time,
singular propositions about objects that are merely past, as
well as singular propositions about objects that are merely
future,

relative to that time.

In fact,

temporal realists are not only willing to

quantify directly over merely past and merely future
objects; they believe that the correct analysis of past- and

future-tensed discourse is that such discourse really just
is disguised quantification of this kind.

realists say that

a

such that
and

x

t

temporal

sentence like 'It has been the case that

there is an x such that x is
same thing as

I.e.,

a

'There is a time,

Trojan horse'
t,

just means the

and there is a thing,

x,

is earlier than the present time and x is at t

is a Trojan horse'
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Temporal actualism,

18

on the other hand,

is the view

that there are no merely past or merely future objects;

everything that exists, in the fundamental sense of the
word,

according to this view, exists now. That

is,

to temporal actualism, quantifying expressions like

thing

and

some thing'

,

according
'every

when they are taken in their

broadest, most unrestricted senses, range over all and only

objects that exist at the time the expressions are used.
There are, according to temporal actualism, no merely past

horses of any description, nor are there any concrete,

merely past or merely future times. According to temporal
actualism, the sentence 'There is a time,
thing,

x,

such that

t

t,

and there is a

is earlier than the present time and x

is at t and x is a Trojan horse'

is simply false. Moreover,

temporal actualists do not allow the existence, ever, of any
18

Cf. Prior, Time and Modality, p. 31, Past, Present and
Future, ch. VIII, "Changes in Events and Changes in Things,"
78-80,
pp. 12-14, "Time, Existence and Identity," pp
"Quasi-Propositions and Quasi-Individuals," esp. pp. 143ff.,
"The Notion of the Present," and "Tense Logic for NonPermanent Existents, " p. 147; also Lukasiewicz, "On
Determinism;" Stalnaker, "Counterparts and Identity," p.
135; Mellor, Real Time, p. 23 and p. 30; Moore, "Being., Fact
and Existence," and "Necessity;" Ryle, "It Was to Be," p.
321-322; and Fine,
27; Adams, "Time and Thisness, " pp
"Prior on the Construction of Possible Worlds and Instants,"
pp. 116ff. Prior doesn't seem to have any name for the view;
and Adams
Fine calls it "tense-logical Actualism" (p. 154)
Mellor and Stalnaker call
calls it "presentism" (p. 321)
the view they discuss, which is at least akin to temporal
actualism, "presentism". I prefer "temporal actualism", not
only because it is easier to pronounce than "presentism",
but also because (a) it serves to emphasize the fact that
the view is analogous to modal actualism; and (b) it
provides a simple way of naming the view's rival (neither
Adams, Mellor, nor Stalnaker suggests a name for the view
that rivals "presentism", but "past-, present- and futureism" seems unwieldy)
.

.

,

.
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singular propositions about objects that are either
merely
past or merely future.
Still

temporal actualists will admit that we can, in

,

a

sense,

talk about merely past and merely future things. Here

again,

as in the case of modal actualism,

the actualist has

several different ways to go. In general, he or she will

analyze temporal discourse without ever appealing to the

existence of non-present objects. Such
for example,

a

person might say,

that we can talk about world— states, because

these are abstract objects that exist at every time. For

world-states can be taken by temporal actualists to be
maximal,

consistent states of affairs

19
.

Then any tensed

proposition of the form it has been the case that such-andsuch is said to be true just in case the proposition that

such-and-such is entailed by some world-state that has
19

To say that a state of affairs, S, is maximal is to say
that for every state of affairs. S'
either S entails S' or
else S entails not-S'
To say that a state of affairs, S, is
consistent is to say that it's possible that S obtains. To
say that a state of affairs, S, entails another state of
affairs, S'
is to say that, necessarily, if S obtained then
S' would obtain. To say that a state of affairs, S, entails
a proposition, p, is to say that, necessarily, if S obtained
at a time, then p would be true at that time. (Notice that
all of this assumes the tensed view of propositions, and a
similar view of states of affairs; for the states of affairs
required to make the above definitions work would have to be
what might be termed "momentary states of affairs," i.e.,
states of affairs (consisting of ways for the world to be at
an instant of time) that obtain - or fail to obtain - at
times; and the propositions entailed by such states of
affairs would have to have truth-values at times, as per the
tensed view of propositions.) For a somewhat different
definition, in terms of propositions and tense operators, of
entities that can play the same role as world-states, see
Fine, "Prior on the Construction of Worlds and Instants," p.
,

.

,

154

.

87

obtained. Hence the temporal actualist can say that
the

proposition that it has been the case that there is

a

Trojan

horse is true, without ontological commitment to any non-

present objects; for there is

proposition that there is
assuming)

a

world-state that entails the

Trojan horse and that has

a

(I

am

obtained.

According to the temporal actualist, the correct
analysis of past- and future-tensed discourse is not that
such discourse is really disguised quantification over past
and future objects. Rather, the tenses involved in such

discourse are to be taken as primitive, and whatever

explications are given of such discourse must be parsed
solely in terms of appropriate present entities
for example, maximal,

-

consistent states of affairs

such as,
-

and

things entailed by them.
In short,

the dispute between temporal realism and

temporal actualism is

a

dispute over the manner in which we

are to analyse temporal discourse. There are two main

questions here:

(i)

Will we allow quantification over, and

singular propositions about, things that are non-present?
and

(ii)

Will we analyse away the past- and future-tenses in

favor of the present-tense? The temporal realist answers Yes
to both questions;

for he or she is willing to quantify

directly over, and allow singular propositions about, nonpresent objects ; 20 and he or she makes use of such
20

it is thus a consequence of the metaphysical thesis of

temporal realism that 'P(Ex($x))' and 'F(Ex($x))' entail
respectively, where 'P' is the
and 'Ex (F $x)
'Ex (P £x)
has been the case that', 'F'
'it
for
standing
tense operator
'

(

)

'

(

)

,
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'

,'

(

'

quantification and such propositions in order to analyse
away the past- and future-tenses in giving explanations of

temporal discourse.
The temporal actualist,

on the other hand,

answers No

to both questions. For he or she insists that we can,

at any

given time, quantify over, and allow singular propositions
only things that are present at that time; so that we

about,

are limited,

in giving explanations of temporal discourse,

to whatever present resources are available to us
why,

21
.

This is

according to the temporal actualist, we cannot analyse

away the past- and future-tenses

(for a notion like has

obtained cannot be analysed without our making use of the
past-tense)

;

these tenses must, according to the modal

actualist, be taken as primitive

22
.

is the tense operator standing for 'it will be the case
that', and '$' is any predicate. Similarly, it is a
consequence of the metaphysical thesis of temporal realism
and 'Fn (Ex Sx)
entail 'Ex (Pn £x)
that 'Pn (Ex $x)
and
'Ex (Fn £x)
respectively, where 'Pn' and 'Fn' are metric
tense operators standing for 'it has been the case n time
and 'it will be the case n time units hence
units ago that'
that', respectively.
)

)

'

(

)

(

(

'

)

(

'

But according to the metaphysical thesis of temporal
actualism we can quantify indirectly - i.e., within the
scope of a tense operator - over merely past and merely
future objects; such quantification, however, does not
entail the existence of anything present. So it is a
consequence of the metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism
does not entail 'Ex(P(£x))', and
that 'P (Ex £x)
Similarly, it is a
does not entail 'Ex (F Sx)
'F (Ex ($x)
temporal actualism
of
thesis
metaphysical
consequence of the
and
-$x)
'Ex
(Pn
entail
not
does
that 'Pn (Ex ($x)
$x)
(Fn
'Ex
entail
not
does
'Fn (Ex Sx)

21

)
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)
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)
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(

there seems to be nothing
least one of the middle of the
at
taking
with
inconsistent
adopting both the metaphysical
namely,
here,
positions
road
the semantical thesis of
and
realism
temporal
thesis of
could allow quantification
one
is,
That
actualism.
temporal
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As in the modal dispute,
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Here,

:

then,

are the components of temporal
realism and
temporal actualism, respectively.
The semantical thesis of temporal
realism
(STR)
The past and future tenses of our
language are to be analysed away.
The semantical thesis of temporal
actualism
(STA)
The past and future tenses of our
language are, like the present tense, to be
treated as primitive.
The metaphysical thesis of temporal realism
(MTR)
For any time, t, we can, at t, quantify
directly over objects that are merely past or
merely future, as well as objects that are
present, relative to t. Also, for any time, t,
there are, at t, singular propositions about
objects that are present, relative to t, as
well as singular propositions about objects
that are merely past or merely future,
relative to t.
:

The metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism
(MTA)
For any time, t, we can, at t, quantify
directly only over objects that are present,
relative to t. Also, for any time, t, there
are, at t, singular propositions about objects
that are present, relative to t, but there are
no singular propositions about objects that
are merely past or merely future, relative to
:

t

There are two respects in which the controversy between

temporal realism and temporal actualism is not analogous to
the controversy between modal realism and actualism. The

over merely past and merely future objects, while at the
same time maintaining that the past- and future-tenses are
primitive. This position will be discussed below. The other
middle of the road position with regard to temporal
actualism, namely, restricting quantification to present
objects while at the same time attempting to analyze away
the past- and future-tenses, seems unworkable; for there
would then not be adequate resources for carrying out the
required analysis.

90

first difference between the two controversies is that in

the temporal case, but not in the modal case, there is room
for a weakened version of the metaphysical component of the

actualist view. For it seems quite plausible to maintain
that there is in fact an important ontological distinction
to be drawn along temporal lines, but that the relevant

distinction is between the past and the present, on the one
hand,

and the future,

on the other hand.

Someone who takes

this line will allow, at any given time, quantification
over,

and singular propositions about, only objects that are

either past or present, relative to that time; such

a

person

will not allow, at a time, quantification over, or singular

propositions about, any objects that are merely future,
relative to that time

23
.

This modified version of the metaphysical thesis of

temporal actualism can be formulated as follows.
The modified metaphysical thesis of temporal
For any time, t, we can, at
actualism (MMTA)
t, quantify directly only over objects that
are either past or present, relative to t.
Also, for any time, t, there are, at t,
singular propositions about objects that are
past, relative to t, as well as singular
propositions about objects that are present,
relative to t, but there are no singular
propositions about objects that are merely
future, relative to t.
:

Adams endorses this view in his "Time and Thisness;" and
Prior, in a notable departure from his usual endorsement of
the unmodified metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism,
seems to endorse the modified metaphysical thesis of
temporal actualism in his "Identifiable Individuals."
23
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The second difference between the modal and
temporal

actualist/realist controversies is that in the temporal
case, but not in the modal case,

of the road position.

I

there is

a

plausible middle

noted above that it would not make

sense to allow mere possibilia into one's ontology, and
yet

choose not to analyze away the modal operators; for once the

ontological price has been paid, it makes sense to take
advantage of the conceptual reduction thereby made feasible.
I

don't think analogous considerations tell, however,

against the position consisting of the metaphysical thesis
of temporal realism and the semantical thesis of temporal

actualism. This is because mere possibilia were originally

conceived solely for the purpose of analyzing modal
discourse; whereas there may be independent, pre-

philosophical reasons for thinking that there are merely
past and merely future objects.
Finally, there are,
above,

in addition to the issues mentioned

questions about two reductionist controversies that

bear on our controversy over the analysis of A-properties
The first of these reductionist controversies revolves

around the two views that

I

referred to in Chapter

1

as

temporal reductionism and temporal Platonism. Temporal

reductionism says, basically, that temporal items and the
time-series are ontologically dependent on things in time
and the event-series, while temporal Platonism denies this.
If we ask whether temporal items

(such as the twenty-first

century) possess A-properties in some way that is not
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:

analysable solely in terms of B-relations, then we must say
something,

in our answer to the question,

about the

ontological status of temporal items; for if they are just
constructions out of things in time and the event-series,
then our question is really

a

question about these latter

entities
The second reductionist controversy that bears on the

above issues has to do with the ontological status of events

and the event-series

The two views available in response to

this issue may be formulated as follows.

Event Reductionism Events are ontological
constructions out of things; all talk about
events is analysable in terms of talk about
things 24
Event Platonism: It's not the case that events
are ontological constructions out of things;
it's not the case that all talk about events
is analysable in terms of talk about things.

If we ask whether events possess A-properties in some

way that is not analysable solely in terms of B-relations,

then we must say something, in giving an answer to this
question,

about the ontological status of events; for if

they are just constructions out of things, then our question
is really a question about whether things possess A-

properties in some primitive way.

24 Cf. Prior, Past, Present and Future,
Time and Tense, pp. 10-11.
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18,

and Papers on

.

These,

then,

are some of the questions that must be

addressed by any attempt to give an account of such putative
properties as pastness

,

presentness and futurity:

Do times possess A-properties in some way
that is not analysable in terms of Brelations? Do events? Do things?
Ql:

How should we analyse the verbal tenses of
natural languages?
Q2

:

In the most fundamental sense of the
expression 'physical object'
how many
dimensions do physical objects have?

Q3:

,

How is it that physical objects persist?
Is it that they perdure, or is it that they

Q4

:

endure ?
How similar is time to the three
dimensions of space?

Q5

:

Is time ontologically symmetrical? What is
the ontological status of non-present objects?

Q6:

What should we take to be the domain of
our quantifiers? Only presently existing
objects, or all past, present and future
objects?

Q7

:

Q8: Are there ever any singular propositions

about objects that are merely past? Are there
ever any singular propositions about objects
that are merely future?
Q9: What is the ontological status of events

and the event-series?

In the next five sections

I

will spell out five

different ways of providing answers to all of these

questions
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3.3 The 4D View

It is not difficult to find examples of recent analytic

philosophers who hold the 4D view. Here are some typical
passages
What I advocate as the 'doctrine of the
manifold
I should now more specifically
state, is simply a philosophical acceptance,
as an ultimate literal truth about the way
things are’ in themselves, of the conception
that nature, all there is, was, or will be,
"is" (tenselessly
spread out in a fourdimensional scheme of location relations...
[Donald C. Williams, "Physics and Flux:
Comment on Professor Capek's Essay," p. 465.]
,

)

The world.
is a four-dimensional manifold
of events. Time is one dimension of the four,
like the spatial dimensions except that the
prevailing laws of nature discriminate between
time and the others... Enduring things are
timelike streaks: wholes composed of temporal
parts, or stages, located at various times and
.

.

places. Change is qualitative difference
between different stages - different temporal
parts - of some enduring thing, just as a
"change" in scenery from east to west is a
qualitative difference between the eastern and
western spatial parts of the landscape. [David
68->
Lewis, "The Paradoxes of Time Travel," pp
.

69

25
.

]

an enduring solid is seen as spreading out in
four dimensions: (1) up and down, (2) right
and left, (3) forward and backward, (4) hence
and ago. Change is not thereby repudiated in
favor of an eternal static reality, as some
have supposed. Change is still there, with all
its fresh surprises. It is merely
incorporated. To speak of a body as changing

Lewis, were he using, at the time he wrote this passage,
the terminology that he later introduced in On the Plurality
of Worlds, would have said 'perduring' here rather than
'enduring'
25

95

is to say that its later stages differ from
its earlier stages, just as its upper parts
differ from its lower parts. Its later shape
need.be no more readily inferred from its
earlier shape than its upper shape from its
lower. [W.V. Quine, Quiddities, p. 197.]
It is perfectly possible to think of things
and processes as four-dimensional space-time
entities. The instantaneous state of such a
four-dimensional space-time solid will be a
three-dimensional 'time slice' of the fourdimensional solid. Then instead of talking of
things or processes changing or not changing
we can now talk of one time slice of a fourdimensional entity being different or not
different from some other time slice. (Note
the tenseless participle of the verb 'to be'
in the last sentence.)
When we think f our-dimensionally therefore,
we replace the notions of change and staying
the same by the notions of the similarity or
dissimilarity of time slices of fourdimensional solids. [J.J.C. Smart, Philosophy
and Scientific Realism, p. 133.]
,

Of course, these writers,

the 4D view,

26

and others who have asserted

mean to claim more than just that physical

objects can be thought of, and spoken of, as four-

dimensional entities, with extension in the three dimensions
of space as well as extension in time. They want to say that

physical objects should be thought of, and spoken of, in
this way; indeed, they want to say that this way of thinking
and speaking captures the way physical objects really are.

Williams and Lewis, in the passages quoted above, say this
explicitly, whereas Quine and Smart,

somewhat more cagily,

Cf. also, for example, Russell, The Principles of
Mathematics; Smart, "The River of Time"; Lewis, On The
Plurality of Worlds Heller, "Temporal Parts of Four
Dimensional Objects;" and Grunbaum, "The Meaning of Time."
26

;
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merely suggest it. It is clear that they all agree on this
point,

however;

for they all claim to be saying something

interesting and controversial, and to say merely that
physical objects can be thought of in this way, or that it
is sometimes handy to speak of them so,

is hardly

controversial
What the 4D view asserts, then, is

a

combination of 4D

plus MTR. For in order to say that objects perdure, and have

temporal parts, the 4D theorist must be

a

realist about the

merely past and merely future temporal parts of the world
and of the objects in the world.
Must the 4D theorist also subscribe to STR?

I

don't

think so; but two points are important here. The first is
that each of the 4D theorists quoted above does subscribe to
STR,

so that there is some historical reason for aligning

the 4D view with STR. The second is that,

since 4D theorists

must subscribe to MTR, they have available the ontological

resources to analyze away the past- and future-tenses;
hence,

there is a philosophical reason for aligning the 4D

view with STR.
As

I

see it,

then,

the 4D view implies MTR, which in

turn constitutes a good reason for holding STR. So the 4D

view can properly be thought of as

a

package containing

these three components.
Now,

the 4D theorist can admit that we often talk of

objects as if they were merely three-dimensional entities;
we normally speak of change,

for example,
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in this way. But

.

the 4D theorist will insist that all such talk is ultimately
to be analyzed in terms of talk about four-dimensional

entities. As Smart says of the notion of change, this notion
is to be replaced by the notion of dissimilarity between

temporal parts. The idea, then, is that the four-dimensional
way of thinking and speaking enjoys some primacy over the

three-dimensional way. Four-dimensional talk is fundamental,
while three-dimensional talk is derivative. Three-

dimensional talk is for loose speaking; in the end, it is to
be analyzed away in favor of four-dimensional talk.
The 4D view'

s

answer to Q4 provides an instance of the

manner in which we are to analyze talk about threedimensional objects in terms of talk about four-dimensional
entities. According to the 4D view, all talk of objects

persisting,

including talk that appears to be about certain

three-dimensional objects enduring, is to be analyzed in
terms of talk of the perdurance of various four-dimensional
entities. Thus,

for example, when we say of some chair that

it persists through time,

what we are really saying is that

the chair is a four-dimensional entity with different

temporal parts occupying different regions of time.
The next question to consider is Q5. Here there are

different versions of the 4D view. A 4D theorist can say
that time is exactly similar in every way to each dimension
of space,

27

or he or she can allow that there are some

Richard Taylor has argued at some length for the thesis
that time is like the dimensions of space in various
respects. See his "Spatial and Temporal Analogies and the
Concept of Identity" and Chapter Seven of his Metaphysics
27
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.

dissimilarities between time and the dimensions
of space
Williams remarks that
The theory of the manifold leaves
abundant
room for the sensitive observer to record
any
describable difference he may find, in
intrinsic quality, relational texture, or
absolute direction, between the temporal
dimension and the spatial ones. He is welcome
to mark it so on the map. ["The Myth of
Passage, " p. ill
.

Most proponents of the 4D view seem to take the line
that
time is in some, not always specified, ways different from

space to some degree or other. 28 Williams, however,

want to go the other way,

seems to

for he goes on to say the

following
The theory has
emphasized that
other respects,
it was right to

generally conceded or
time is unique in these and
and I have been assuming that
do so. In working out this
thesis, however, and in considering the very
lame demurrals which oppose it, I have come a
little uneasily to the surmise that the idea
of an absolute or intrinsic difference of
texture or orientation is superfluous, and
that the four dimensions of the manifold
compose a perfectly homogenous scheme of
location relations, the same in all
directions, and that the oddity of temporal
28

Lewis, for example, says that "time is one dimension of
the four, like the the spatial dimensions except that the
prevailing laws of nature discriminate between time and the
others - or rather, perhaps, between various timelike
dimensions and various spacelike dimensions." ["The
Paradoxes of Time Travel," p. 68.] For more detailed
discussions of this issue see Smart, Philosophy and
Scientific Realism, pp. 142-148; Grunbaum, Philosophical
Problems of Space and Time, Chapters 8 and 9; Reichenbach,
The Direction of Time; Schrodinger, "Irreversibility;" and
Horwich, Asymmetries in Time.
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d t nCes is altogether a function
of feature s
i? ? occupy
which
them - a function of de facto
pattern like the shape of an arrow, like
difference between the way in and the way the
out
trap, and like the terrestrial
°7 a
difference between up and down. ["The Mvth of
Passage, " p ill
.

.

Whatever the 4D theorist says about the question
of
various other alleged similarities between time

and space,

he or she will say that time is perfectly
similar to space
in at least one respect: time is,

just like space,

onto logically symmetrical. That is, as far as existence
is
concerned, past and future objects are exactly on

present objects,
on a par,

a

par with

just as east and west objects are exactly

ontologically speaking, with objects that are

right here. So the 4D view's answer to Q6 is Yes; the

ontological status of non-present objects is the same as
that of present objects.
Similarly, the 4D view's answer to Q7 is that we should

take as the domain of our quantifiers all past, present and
future objects. That is, the 4D view includes acceptance of
the metaphysical thesis of temporal realism. The world is
giant,

a

four-dimensional object, and we may quantify over

anything in it, anywhere. 29 We may quantify over all of the
"timelike streaks" that are the tables, rocks and people of
the world

-

i.e.,

the four-dimensional objects,

time worms, of the world

-

or space-

without any restrictions

regarding the locations of those things. And we may quantify
29

See,

for example,

Quine,

Quiddities
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,

pp.

197-198.

over all of the different parts of such objects,
also

without restrictions regarding the locations of
those parts.
Thus,

for example,

legs are wooden'

spatial parts of

we may say of some chair,

'All of its

thereby quantifying over some of the

,

a

temporal part

(namely,

the present one)

of the chair; or we may say of the same chair,

always been wooden'

,

'It has

thereby quantifying over all of the

previous temporal parts of the four-dimensional object that
is the chair.

The 4D view's answer to Q8, then,

is that there are

singular propositions about objects that are merely past or

merely future. Thus, right now there are singular

propositions about Socrates, according to the 4D view, and
there are singular propositions about the future denizens of
the world. This,

of course,

does not commit the 4D theorist

to the claim that people are always in a position to express

singular propositions about merely future objects; depending
on the 4D theorist's views about reference,

he or she may

want to say that the only singular propositions we can

express at a time are ones about objects that are past or
present,
I

relative to that time.

said above that the 4D theorist is willing to

quantify directly over merely past and merely future
objects. Indeed, the 4D view's answer to Q2 is that it is

through the use of such quantification that we must analyze
the verbal tenses of natural languages. A sentence token of
the type

'x

was

F'

is to be analyzed as expressing the
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proposition that some temporal part of the object denoted by
x
which part is earlier than the token in question, has
'

the property denoted by

handled in

a

'F '

similar way:

was F two days ago'

a

.

Metric variants are to be
sentence token of the type

'x

is to be analyzed as expressing the

proposition that the temporal part of the object denoted by
that is two days earlier than the token in question has

'x #

the property denoted by

'F'

30

Future-tensed sentences are

to be handled in an analogous way.
In general,

according to the 4D view, the past-tense

and the future-tense are to be analyzed away; all sentences
are to be analyzed by purely present-tensed sentences,

in

accordance with the semantical thesis of temporal realism.
Some of the resulting present-tensed sentences will ascribe
a

property to some four-dimensional object, or some part of

some four-dimensional object. Others will assert of some

four-dimensional objects, or parts of some four-dimensional
objects,

that they stand in some relation to one another.

In any case,

all of these sentences will express

propositions that can be taken to be tenseless propositions,
in accordance with the tenseless view of propositions

outlined in Chapter
a

2.

For none of them will turn out to be

proposition that ever could have different truth-values at

Some predicates will have to be analyzed in a similar
way. 'x was 500 years old two days ago', for example, will
be taken by a 4D theorist to be equivalent to 'the temporal
part of x that is two days earlier than this token is such
that it is 500 years later than the first temporal part of
30

x'

.
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ffsrent times, even if it did have truth-values at times.

ever true that

^

3
a

a

certain four— dimensional object,

certain temporal part of

a

four— dimensional object, has

certain property, then it will always be true that that

four-dimensional object, or temporal part of

four-

a

dimensional object, has that property. Likewise if it is
ever true that some four-dimensional objects, or temporal

parts of some four-dimensional objects, stand in

a

certain

relation to one another, then it will always be true that
those four-dimensional objects, or temporal parts of four-

dimensional objects, stand in that relation to one another.
What about the 4D view's response to Q9? And what about
the 4D view'

s

response to the temporal

Platonism/reductionism dispute? Here again there are
different options available to the 4D theorist. The 4D
theorist can say that events are constructions out of
things,

or he or she can say that events are ontologically

independent of things. Similarly, the 4D theorist can hold

either temporal Platonism or temporal reductionism

flexibility should, of course, be seen as

a

.

Such

virtue of the 4D

view
It should be clear by now what the 4D view' s answer to

Q1 will be.

There are no genuine A-properties

,

according to

the 4D view. All talk that appears to be about such

properties is to be analyzed in terms of B— relations. To
say,

for example,

that Super Bowl XXIII is past is to say

that it stands in the binary relation earlier-than to the
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utterance in question. Similarly for the metric variants of
pastness, as well as futurity and its metric variants. In
general,

any sentence,

S,

that appears to ascribe an A-

property to some entity will be analyzed by

a

sentence,

that instead asserts that that entity stands in some B-

relation to

S'

(or,

These, then,

perhaps, to the time of S').

are the 4D view's answers to the nine

questions posed in section 3.2:

The 4D View'

s

Answers to Q1-Q9

Neither times, events nor things possess
A-properties in any unanalysable way. All talk
that appears to be about these entities
possessing A-properties is to be analyzed in
terms of B-relations among the relevant
entities

A1

:

The past- and future-tenses are to be
analyzed away, in favor of the present-tense.
This is to be achieved through the use of
quantified sentences about various fourdimensional entities and their parts.
Furthermore, all of these present-tensed
sentences express propositions that can be
taken to be tenseless propositions.

A2

:

A3:

In the most fundamental sense of the

physical objects
expression 'physical object'
with spatial as
entities
four-dimensional
are
world
The
is such a
parts.
temporal
well as
four-dimensional entity; objects in the world
are four-dimensional, "timelike streaks"
through the four-dimensional entity that is
the world; all talk of objects that appears to
be about three-dimensional objects is to be
analyzed in terms of talk about such fourdimensional entities and their parts.
,
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A4: A physical object that exists at different
times perdures; i.e., it is a four-dimensional
entity that has different temporal parts at

different times.
A5 Time is more or less like the dimensions
of space.
:

A6: Time,

like space, is ontologically
symmetrical; there are no objective,
ontological distinctions to be drawn between
the different regions of space-time. The
ontological status of non-present objects is
exactly the same as the ontological status of
present objects.
A7 We should take the domain of our widest,
most unrestricted quantifiers to be the set of
everything, everywhere, at every time. Of
course, restricted quantification is always
:

possible
There are, at any given time, singular
propositions about objects that are merely
past, relative to that time, as well as
singular propositions about objects that are
merely future, relative to that time.

A8

:

The 4D view is neutral with regard to the
question of the ontological status of events
and the event-series.

A9:

3

.

4

The 3DRR View

Arthur Prior has been the most notable and resourceful
proponent of the 3D view. Over
years,

a

period of about fifteen

and in the course of three major books and some forty
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papers, he carried out a sustained explication and defense
of the view. Here is a typical passage from Prior:
In a logic with tenses, it is natural to let
[the individual variables] stand for the
'things' of ordinary speech, that is,
'substances' in the old sense, or what w.E.

Johnson calls 'continuants'
objects such that
we can say of each of them that once it had
such and such properties and did and suffered
such and such things, that now it - the very
same object - has such and such properties and
does and suffers such and such other things,
and in the future it - the very same object will have different properties again, and do
and suffer different things. Tables and chairs
and horses and men are typical 'individuals'
of the sort intended; we may say of such-andsuch a man, for example, that once he was a
boy and now he is grown-up and some day he
will be old, or that yesterday he was ill and
now he is on the mend and tomorrow he will be
quite better. And while in general these
individual objects have parts - men have arms
and legs and so on - and these parts are
themselves objects of a sort, we do not say
that they have temporal parts or phases, in
the way that processes and histories do. My
boyhood, for example, is not a part of me,
though it is a part of my history; and it is
not the case that one part of me was a boy in
New Zealand while another part of me is a man
in England; it is I who was that boy, and I the same I - who am the man. ["Time,
Existence, and Identity," pp. 78-79.]
,

The 3D view's answer to Q3 is that the physical objects

that make up our world are three-dimensional objects; they
do not have temporal parts. And this is to be understood in

combination with the 3D view's answer to Q4. How is it that
physical objects persist through time, according to the 3D
view? Endurance.
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;

:

;

Thus the 3D view is, as Prior points out above, very

close to the way we talk about "things" in ordinary speech.

Whereas the 4D view says that
and

a

a

chair we look at at one time

chair we look at at another time cannot really be

identical

-

they can at most be two different, three-

dimensional slices or stages of
object that is

a

chair

look at at one time and

a

single four-dimensional

the 3D view says that a chair we

-

a

chair we look at at another time

may really be the same (three-dimensional) object. 31

Where should the 3D theorist stand on the various

controversies between temporal realists and temporal
actualists?

I

think that there are several different options

available to the 3D theorist in this connection. In order to
discuss these matters, let us adopt the following

abbreviations
"3DRR" stands for the 3D view plus the
semantical thesis of temporal realism plus the
metaphysical thesis of temporal realism

"3DRMA" stands for the 3D view plus the
semantical thesis of temporal realism plus the
modified metaphysical thesis of temporal
actualism
"3DRA" stands for the 3D view plus the
semantical thesis of temporal realism plus the
metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism;
"3DAR" stands for the 3D view plus the
semantical thesis of temporal actualism plus
the metaphysical thesis of temporal realism;
In addition to the writings of Prior, statements of the
3D view's answers to Q3 and Q4, and some discussion of
related issues, can be found in van Inwagen, "Four-

31

Dimensional Objects."
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"3DAMA" stands for the 3D view plus the
semantical thesis of temporal actualism plus
the modified metaphysical thesis of temporal
actualism; and
"3DAA" stands for the 3D view plus the
semantical thesis of temporal actualism plus
the metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism.

These six combinations exhaust the possibilities for

combining the 3D view with the relevant theses from the
r ea 1 i s t

/

act ual i s t dispute, but two of the six can be

immediately ruled but as untenable. These two are 3DRMA and
3DRA. For one who holds that the past- and future-tenses are

to be analyzed away in favor of quantification over past and

future objects must have,

in his or her ontology,

the past

and future resources for carrying out the required analysis.
3DRR,

however,

view will say

(i)

is a live option.

One who holds this

that the physical objects in the world are

three-dimensional objects that endure;

(ii)

that the past-

and future-tenses are to be analyzed away; and (iii) that
this analysis can be carried out because it is always

possible to quantify over, and there always exist singular

propositions about, all of the past, present and future
objects that ever did exist, exist now, or will exist. Such
a

person will hold,

in addition to the three components that

make up 3DRR, the tenseless view of propositions; for it

would be implausible to say both that past- and futuretensed sentences can be analyzed in terms of present-tensed
sentences and that the resulting present-tensed sentences
express tensed propositions.
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An example will help to clarify this.
Consider a tl
token of the sentence type 'Socrates was
snub-nosed'

According to 3DRR, this token could be
translated, at tl, by
a token of the tensed sentence type
'Socrates is snub-nosed
at a time earlier than this token', or
by a token of
the

tenseless sentence type 'Socrates is snub-nosed
at a time
earlier than tl'. Both of these tokens would,
according

to

3DRR,

—

express the tenseless proposition

isr—t han~ 1 1

,

Socrates>,

a

tenseless,

proposition about an individual that
In general,

< beina-snub-nospd-

is,

singular
at tl,

merely past.

the 3DRR theorist will take tokens of past-

snd future— tensed sentence types to express propositions
that attribute time— indexed properties

nosed-ear lier- than- tl

-

—

such as beino— snub-

to three-dimensional objects.

The 3DRR theorist's answer to Q5 will be that time is
not very similar at all to any dimension of space,

for the

simple reason that physical objects endure through time,

whereas they don't do anything of the kind through any

dimension of space.
Meanwhile, the 3DRR theorist will answer Q6-Q8 as

befits one who holds MTR

.

What about the 3DRR view's

response to Q9? And what about the 3DRR view'

s

response to

the temporal Platonism/reduct ionism dispute? Here there are

different options available to the 3DRR theorist. The 3DRR

theorist can say that events are constructions out of
things,

or he or she can say that events are ontologically

independent of things. Similarly, the 3DRR theorist can
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consistently hold either temporal Platonism
or temporal
reductionism. Such flexibility should,
of course,

a

be seen as

virtue of the 3DRR view.
How,

finally, will the 3DRR theorist answer
Ql? Well,

since the 3DRR theorist believes that
past- and futuretensed sentences can be analyzed in terms of
present-tensed
sentences that express tenseless propositions,
he or she

will have no truck with A-properties

.

sentence type like 'Socrates is past',

A tl token of
for example,

expresses, according to this view, the proposition

earlier-than-tl

,

a

c beina-

Socrates>. In general, sentences that

appear to ascribe A-properties will be analyzed in this
way,
i.e.,

in terms of B-relations.

Here,

then,

is how the 3DRR theorist will answer the

nine questions posed in section 3.2 above:

The 3DRR View'

s

Answers to Q1-Q9

A1
Times (if there are any), events (if there
are any) and things do not possess Aproperties in some way that is not analyzable
in terms of B-relations. Insofar as there are
true sentence tokens that appear to ascribe Aproperties to times, events or things, these
tokens express tenseless propositions about Brelations obtaining among the relevant
:

entities
The past- and future-tenses are to be
analyzed in terms of the present-tense.

A2

:
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In the most fundamental sense of the
expression 'physical object'
physical objects
have three dimensions, and they do not have
temporal parts.

A3:

,

Physical objects persist in virtue of
their endurance.

A4

:

A5 Time is in general not similar to the
three dimensions of space; it is a one-of-akind dimension. The fact that physical objects
endure through time, but do not do any
analogous thing through any dimension of
space, ensures this.
:

A6 Time is ontologically symmetrical, because
all past, present and future objects are on
the same ontological footing.
:

We should take the set of all past,
present and future objects to be the domain of
our widest, most unrestricted quantifiers.

A7

:

There are singular propositions about
objects that are merely past, as well as
singular propositions about objects that are
merely future.

A8

:

A9: 3DRR is neutral with regard to the issue
of event Platonism/reduct ionism

Ill
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5

The 3DAR View

Next consider 3DAR, the combination of the 3D view with
the semantical thesis of temporal actualism and the

metaphysical thesis of temporal realism. One who holds this

view will say

(i)

that the physical objects in the world are

three-dimensional objects that endure;

(ii)

that the past-

and future-tenses are primitive; and (iii) that it is always

possible to quantify over, and there always exist singular

propositions about, all of the past, present and future
objects that ever did exist, exist now, or will exist. Such
a

person will hold,

in addition to the three components that

make up 3DAR, the tensed view of propositions; for anyone
who holds the semantical thesis of temporal actualism must
also hold the view that propositions have truth-values at
(because otherwise it would be possible to analyze

times

past- and future-tensed sentences in terms of present-tensed
sentences)
If the past- and future-tenses are not to be analyzed

away,

then how are they to be treated? Prior has shown that

they can be treated in the manner of such sentential adverbs
and modal operators as
for example,

'allegedly'

the sentence type

and 'possibly'.

32

Thus,

'Socrates was snub-nosed'

will be treated as equivalent to

'It has

been the case that

(Socrates is snub-nosed)'. This is of course a tensed
32

See,

for example,

Prior,

"Changes in Events and Changes

in Things."
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sentence type whose tokens express

a

namely, the proposition

< beincr-snub— nosed

< was~t rue

.

tensed proposition,
.

Socrates>>
In general,

the 3DAR theorist will take tokens of past-

and future-tensed sentence types to be unanalyzably tensed

tokens that express tensed propositions attributing various

properties

(but not necessarily time— indexed properties)

to

other tensed propositions and to three-dimensional objects.
The 3DAR theorist's answer to Q5,

like the 3DRR

theorist's answer to that question, will be that time is not
very similar at all to any dimension of space,

for the

simple reason that physical objects endure through time, but
not through any dimension of space.

Meanwhile, the 3DAR theorist will answer Q6-Q8 as

befits one who holds MTR. What about the 3DAR view's
response to Q9? And what about the 3DAR view'

s

response to

the temporal Platonism/reductionism dispute? Here, as with
the 4D and 3DRR theorists,

there are different options

available to the 3DAR theorist. The 3DAR theorist can say
that events are constructions out of things, or he or she
can say that events are ontologically independent of things.

Similarly, the 3DAR theorist can consistently hold either

temporal Platonism or temporal reduct ionism
How,

finally, will the 3DAR theorist answer Ql? Well,

since the 3DAR theorist believes that past- and future-

tensed sentences cannot be analyzed in terms of present-

tensed sentences that express tenseless propositions, but,
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rather must be taken to involve primitive tense
operators,
and,

thus,

to express tensed propositions that attribute

properties like was-true to other tensed propositions, the
3DAR theorist is committed to the claim that A-properties
cannot be analyzed in terms of B-relations.
hsre,

then,

is how the 3DAR theorist will answer the

nine questions posed in section 3.2 above:

The 3DAR View'

s

Answers to Q1-Q9

A1
Times (if there are any), events (if there
are any) and things possess A-properties in a
way that is not analyzable in terms of Brelations. For insofar as there are true
sentence tokens that appear to ascribe Aproperties to times, events or things, these
tokens are best understood as involving
primitive tense operators, and they express
tensed propositions that cannot be analyzed
merely in terms of B-relations obtaining among
the relevant entities.
:

The past- and future-tenses cannot be
analyzed in terms of the present-tense.

A2

:

In the most fundamental sense of the
physical objects
expression 'physical object'
have three dimensions, and they do not have
temporal parts.

A3:

,

Physical objects persist in virtue of
their endurance.

A4

:

A5 Time is in general not similar to the
three dimensions of space; it is a one-of-akind dimension. The fact that physical objects
:
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endure through time, but do not do
any
analogous thing through any dimension of
space, ensures this.
A6. Time is ontologically symmetrical,
because
all past, present and future objects
are on
the same ontological footing.

A?

:

A8

:

We should take the set of all past,
present and future objects to be the domain of
our widest, most unrestricted quantifiers.

There are singular propositions about
objects that are merely past, as well as
singular propositions about objects that are
merely future.

A9: 3DAR is neutral with regard to the issue
of event Platonism/reductionism.

3

.

6

The 3DAMA View

Now consider 3DAMA, the combination of the 3D view with
the semantical thesis of temporal actualism and the modified

metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism. One who holds
this view will say

(i)

that the physical objects in the

world are three-dimensional objects that endure;

(ii)

that

the past- and future-tenses are primitive; and (iii) that it
is always possible to quantify over,

and there always exist

singular propositions about, all of the past and present
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objects that ever did exist or exist now, but that it is

never possible to quantify over, and there never exist

propositions about, objects that are merely future.

s

i

£"

Such

a

person will hold, in addition to the three components

that make up 3DAMA, the tensed view of propositions; for, as
I

said above, anyone who holds the semantical thesis of

temporal actualism must also hold the view that propositions
have truth-values at times

(because otherwise it would be

possible to analyze past- and future-tensed sentences in
terms of present-tensed sentences)
In general,

the 3DAMA theorist will take tokens of

past- and future-tensed sentence types to be unanalyzably

tensed tokens that express tensed propositions attributing
various properties

(but not necessarily time-indexed

properties) to other tensed propositions and to past and

present three-dimensional objects,

in something very much

like the manner of the 3DAR theorist.
The 3DAMA theorist's answer to Q5,

3DAR theorists'

like the 3DRR and

answer to that question, will be that time

is not very similar at all to any dimension of space,

for

the simple reason that physical objects endure through time,
but not through any dimension of space. But the 3DAMA

theorist will have an additional reason for saying that time
is not similar to space:

the 3DAMA theorist,

time,

unlike space, according to to

is ontologically asymmetrical.

For the

3DAMA theorist will answer Q6-Q8 as befits one who holds the

modified metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism. Hence,
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he or she will hold that there is an enormous difference

between the past and the present, on the one hand, and the
future,

on the other hand,

whereas there is no analogous

distinction to be drawn between any of the regions of space.
What about the 3DAMA view's response to Q9? And what

about the 3DAMA view'

s

response to the temporal

Platonism/reductionism dispute? Here, as in the case of the
other views, there are different options available to the

3DAMA theorist. The 3DAMA theorist can say that events are

constructions out of things, or he or she can say that
events are ontologically independent of things. Similarly,
the 3DAMA theorist can consistently hold either temporal

Platonism or temporal reductionism. Notice, however, that
even

a

3DAMA theorist who holds both event and temporal

Platonism will have to find some way of analyzing away talk
that appears to be about merely future events and/or times;
for the 3DAMA theorist thinks that there are really no such

entities
How,

finally, will the 3DAMA theorist answer Ql? In

exactly the manner of the 3DAR theorist. Since the 3DAMA
theorist believes that past- and future-tensed sentences
cannot be analyzed in terms of present-tensed sentences that

express tenseless propositions, but, rather must be taken to
involve primitive tense operators, and, thus, to express

tensed propositions that attribute properties like was -tru e
to other tensed propositions, the 3DAMA theorist is
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committed to the claim that A-properties cannot be analyzed
in terms of B-relations.

Here,

then,

is how the 3DAMA theorist will answer the

nine questions posed in section 3.2 above:

The 3DAMA View'

s

Answers to Q1-Q9

A1
Times (if there are any), events (if there
are any) and things possess A-properties in a
way that is not analyzable in terms of Brelations. For insofar as there are true
sentence tokens that appear to ascribe Aproperties to times, events or things, these
tokens involve primitive tense operators, and
they express tensed propositions that cannot
be analyzed merely in terms of B-relations
obtaining among the relevant entities.
:

The past- and future-tenses cannot be
analyzed in terms of the present-tense.

A2

:

In the most fundamental sense of the
physical objects
expression 'physical object'
they
do not have
and
have three dimensions,
temporal parts.

A3:

,

Physical objects persist in virtue of
their endurance.

A4

:

Time is in general not similar to the
three dimensions of space; it is a one-of-akind dimension. The fact that physical objects
endure through time, but do not do any
analogous thing through any dimension of
space, ensures this. So does the fact that
there are enormous ontological differences
between the past and the present, on the one
hand, and the future, on the other hand.

A5

:
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A6:

Time is ontologically asymmetrical;
past and the present are real, but the the
future
is not.

A7

We should take the set of all past and
present objects to be the domain of our
widest, most unrestricted quantifiers.
:

Ad:

There are singular propositions about
objects that are merely past, but there are no
singular propositions about objects that are
merely future.

A9: 3DAMA is neutral with regard to the issue
of event Platonism/reductionism.

3.7 The 3DAA View

Finally,

consider 3DAA, the combination of the 3D view

with the semantical thesis of temporal actualism and the

metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism. One who holds
this view will say

(i)

that the physical objects in the

world are three-dimensional objects that endure;

(ii)

that

the past- and future-tenses are primitive; and (iii) that it
is always possible to quantify over,

and there always exist

singular propositions about, all of the present objects that
exist, but that it is never possible to quantify over,

and

there never exist singular propositions about, objects that
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are either merely past or merely future. Such a person will
hold,

in addition to the three components that make up 3DAA,

the tensed view of propositions; for,

as

I

said above,

anyone who holds the semantical thesis of temporal actualism
must also hold the view that propositions have truth-values
at times

(because otherwise it would be possible to analyze

past- and future-tensed sentences in terms of present-tensed
sentences)
In general,

the 3DAA theorist will take tokens of past-

and future-tensed sentence types to be unanalyzably tensed

tokens that express tensed propositions attributing various

properties

(but not necessarily time-indexed properties)

to

other tensed propositions and to present three-dimensional
objects,

in something very much like the manner of the 3DAMA

theorist

(with,

of course,

the notable difference that the

3DAA theorist will not allow quantification over, or

singular propositions about, merely past objects)
The 3DAA theorist's answer to Q5 will be that time is

not very similar at all to any dimension of space,

for the

simple reason that physical objects endure through time, but
not through any dimension of space. But the 3DAA theorist,

like the 3DAMA theorist, will have an additional reason for

saying that time is not similar to space. For the 3DAA

theorist will answer Q6-Q8 as befits one who holds the

metaphysical thesis of temporal actualism. Hence, he or she
hold that there is an enormous difference between the
present,

on the one hand,

and the past and the future, on
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the other hand, whereas there is no analogous
distinction to
be drawn between any of the regions of
space.
What about the 3DAA view's response to
Q9? Here, as in
the case of the other views, there are different
options

available to the 3DAA theorist. The 3DAA theorist
can say
that events are constructions out of things, or
he
or she

can say that events are ontologically independent of
things.
It

is worth noting,

however, that Prior, who is the

leading proponent of 3DAA, has made it clear that he prefers
event reductionism

.

He says in "Changes in Events and

Changes in Things" that
(3)

that

It is now six years since it was the case
I

am falling out of

a

punt,

could be re-written as
(4) My falling out of a punt has receded six
years into the past.

He then says that

This suggests that something called an event,
my falling out of a punt, has gone through a
performance called receding into the past, and
moreover has been going through this
performance even after it has ceased to exist,
i.e. after it has stopped happening. But of
course (4) is just a paraphrase of (3), and
like (3) is not about any objects except me
and that punt - there is no reason to believe
in the existence either now or six years ago
of a further object called 'my falling out of
a punt'
What I am suggesting is that what looks like
talk about events is really at bottom talk
about things, and what looks like talk about
121

changes in events is really just slightly more
complicated talk about changes in things.
["Changes in Events and Changes in Things,"
pp.

10-11.]

In terms of the kind of propositions that

have been

I

talking about, Prior's position is that the sentences in
question, at the time Prior wrote the passage, both

expressed the proposition

< was-t rue- six- year s-aao

out-of-a-punt

tensed,

,

Prior>>,

a

.

< f allina-

singular proposition about

Prior that was, at 'the time, true. They did not, however,

express any proposition like the following
past

,

Prior's falling out of

a

punt>,

c beino-six-vears-

simply because Prior

doesn't think there really is any such entity as Prior's

falling out of
Still,

a

punt.

although

I

think that it makes sense for an

advocate of 3DAA to accept event reductionism, and although
I

myself am inclined toward both 3DAA and event

reductionism, and although Prior, the most famous proponent
of 3DAA, happened to hold event reductionism,

I

think that

3DAA is basically neutral with regard to this issue.

I.

don't

think it can be shown that one who holds 3DAA must, or even
should,

accept event reductionism. Similarly,

I

think that

3DAA is basically neutral with regard to the temporal

Platonism/reductionism controversy. It is worth noting,
however, that even a 3DAA theorist who holds both event and

temporal Platonism will have to find some way of analyzing
away talk that appears to be about merely past or merely
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future events and/or times; for the 3DAA theorist thinks
that there are really no such entities.
How,

finally, will the 3DAA theorist answer Ql? in

something very much like the manner of the 3DAMA theorist.
Since the 3DAA theorist believes that past - and future-

tensed sentences cannot be analyzed in terms of present-

tensed sentences that express tenseless propositions, but,
rather must be taken to involve primitive tense operators,
and,

thus,

to express tensed propositions that attribute

properties like was-true to other tensed propositions, the
3DAA theorist is committed to the claim that A-properties
cannot be analyzed in terms of B-relations.
Here,

then,

is how the 3DAA theorist will answer the

nine questions posed in section 3.2 above:

The 3DAA View'

s

Answers to Q1-Q9

A1
Times (if there are any), events (if there
are any) and things possess A-properties in a
way that is not analyzable in terms of Brelations. For insofar as there are true
sentence tokens that appear to ascribe Aproperties to times, events or things, these
tokens involve primitive tense operators, and
they express tensed propositions that cannot
be analyzed merely in terms of B-relations
obtaining among the relevant entities.
:

The past- and future-tenses cannot be
analyzed in terms of the present-tense.

A2

:
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A3:

In the most fundamental sense of the
expression 'physical object', physical objects
have three dimensions, and they do not have
temporal parts.

Physical objects persist in virtue of
their endurance.

A4

:

A5 Time is in general not similar to the
three dimensions of space; it is a one-of-akind dimension. The fact that physical objects
endure through time, but do not do any
analogous thing through any dimension of
space, ensures this. So does the fact that
there are enormous ontological differences
between the present, on the one hand, and the
past and the future, on the other hand.
:

A6 Time is ontologically symmetrical; the
present is real, but the past and the future
are not
:

We should take the set of all present
objects to be the domain of our widest, most
unrestricted quantifiers.

A7

:

There are singular propositions about
objects that are present, but there are no
singular propositions about objects that are
merely past, or merely future.

A8

:

A9: 3DAA is neutral with regard to the issue
of event Platonism/reductionism (but we note
that Prior, to name one notable 3DAAist, held
event reduct ionism)
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Conclusion

8

If what

have said above is correct, then there are

I

five different packages of views that one may hold in

response to the question 'Does time pass?'
five should count as affirmative,

.

Which of these

and which should count as

negative, answers to this question?
Well,

I

think it's clear that the 4D view constitutes

a

negative answer to the question. One who holds the 4D view
will hold TLVP and LNP

.

Also,

such a person will have good

reasons for maintaining something like SPT. In general, such
a

person will have good reasons for saying that there is no

important distinction between time and space in virtue of

which it is true to say that time passes but space does not.
What about 3DRR? Here

I

must admit to some uncertainty

about how to classify 3DRR. It seems to me that

a

3DRR

theorist can justifiably deny SPT, even though he or she
holds TLVP and may or may not hold LNP. After all, one who
holds 3DRR thinks that there is an important difference

between time and space: objects endure through time, but
they do not do the analogous thing through space. Thus, if

rejection of SPT is what characterizes the view that time
passes,

then

I

think it is appropriate for

a

3DRR theorist

to maintain that time passes. But as will be seen in Chapter
5

below, there is at least one other way of characterizing

the view that time passes, and according to this other way
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it is not appropriate for a 3DRR theorist to maintain that

time passes.
The 3DAR theorist can add to the claim about objects

enduring through time the claim that the temporal tenses are

unanalyzable

Given this latter claim, he or she will also

.

hold TDVP; so there are, on this view, plenty of differences

between time and space in virtue of which it is true to say
that time passes but space does not.
The 3DAMA and 3DAA theorists will of course have still

more reasons for claiming that time passes.
All told, then, there is one principal way of

maintaining that time does not pass (the 4D view)
that may or may not count as

passes

(3DRR)

,

time does pass

a

,

one view

way of maintaining that time

and three distinct ways of maintaining that
(3DAR,

3DAMA and 3DAA)
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CHAPTER

4

.

1

4

:

FORMAL MATTERS

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to consider,

each of the views formulated above,

a

in the case of

formal language and

semantics that would be suited to that view.

I

a

have two main

reasons for wanting to do this. First, doing so will,

I

help to make clear what are some of the differences

hope,

among the alternative views. And second,
reasons,

I

will present my

for preferring 3DAA over the

in the final chapter,

other views, and those reasons will depend upon, among other
things,

certain differences between the semantics that

propose for the language of 3DAA and the semantics that

I

I

propose for the languages of its 3D rivals.
In the case of each of the five views formulated above
I

will

(a)

describe some formal language that would be

suited to that view,

(b)

give

a

that also suits the view, and

semantics for that language

(c)

say something about the

way in which sentences of English would be translated into
the formal language. Each of the formal languages considered
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will be a first order, predicate logic; some will
involve

tense operators. But

I

won't get into questions about axiom

schemata or rules of inference in any case. Moreover, in the
case of each view that

semantics that

I

I

will consider, the language and

propose as suitable for that view will be

just one of several such possibilities.

Since each of the formal languages

consists of

a

1

I

will consider

predicate logic, each language will

necessarily be meant to correspond to just

fragment of

a

English; in particular, each of the formal languages

considered will be incapable of capturing our use, in
English,
'I'

of indexicals such as

'here'

,

'there'

,

'you'

and

.

4.2 A Formal Language,

with Semantics,

for 4D

The 4D theorist's ontology consists of

(i)

all of the

4D objects and temporal parts of 4D objects in the 4D world;
(ii)

all kinds of properties of,

and relations obtaining

among, those objects and parts; and

(iii)

ordered sets

composed of things in the 4D theorist's ontology, some of
which ordered sets will be propositions. In addition, the 4D
theorist may have, in his or her ontology, such entities as
1

Counting an infinite number as several.
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times,

depending on his or her view with regard to the
temporal Platonism/reductionism dispute. For our
purposes it
will be convenient to assume that the 4D ontology does
indeed contain times, and that the set of times is ordered
by the relation earlier than

2
,

because the prima facie 4D

analyses of many English sentences will involve

quantification over such times. It of course remains open to
the 4D theorist to analyze away this apparent quantification

over times,
events,

in favor of quantification over such entities as

or temporal parts,

which are themselves ordered by

the relation earlier than. The 4D language that

propose,

then,

I

will

will have as its domain of discourse the set

consisting all of the things in the 4D theorist's ontology,
including times.
Among the constraints on what the 4D language can be
like are the 4D theorist's commitments to TLVP and STR. The

commitment to STR means that the 4D language will contain no
tense operators,

i.e.,

no special,

intensional operators for

the purpose of handling temporal discourse. The commitment
to TLVP means that all of the propositions expressed by the

sentences of the 4D language will be tenseless propositions.
These two factors, plus the absence of indexicals, mean that
the 4D language can be composed exclusively of tenseless

sentence-types, so that each such sentence-type of the

language expresses some tenseless proposition, if it

proposition at all.

expresses

a

2

11-12 above

See pp.
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The 4D language that

I

}

,

,

will propose will be a simple

predicate calculus with identity, and it
will contain
predicates corresponding to virtually all

ordinary, common-

3

sense properties and relations. In addition,
translations of
sentences about temporal matters from English
into the 4D
language will make use of the following
primitive, temporal
predicates (to be understood according to their
English
readings
)

T!x

P^xy
E^xy
L 2 xy

(x is a time)
(x is a temporal part of
y)
(x is (completely) earlier than
y)
(x is (completely) later than
y) .4

Translations from English into the 4D language will also
flasks

use of the following temporal predicates defined in

terms of the primitive ones

(also to be understood according

to their English readings)
C 2 xy =df

~Ez

A 2 xy =df

[P 2 zx

(z<y v z>y)
&
v
zy & (z<x v z>x)
is co-extensive with y)
T!y & C 2 xy
(x is at y)
[P
(x

{

]

2

]

I am here adopting what amounts to the temporal analogue
of the method by which David Lewis uses special modal
predicates
'x is a possible world'
'x is in possible world
y'
and 'x is a counterpart of y'
in order to analyze modal
discourse in his "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal
Logic." An alternative way of doing roughly the same thing
would be to make use of a two-sorted language, with one sort
of variable ranging over things and another ranging over
times
3

(

,

,

)

For the sake of convenience I will adopt the following
notational conventions: 'x=y' will stand for 'I 2 xy' (to be
'x<y' will stand for 'E 2 xy'
read as 'x is identical to y'
2
and 'x>y' will stand for 'L xy'
4

)

.
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C

}

P 3 xyz

=df P 2 xz
(x

&

.

,

A 2 xy

is the y-temporal part of

z)

5

Each sentence token of English will be translated into
some sentence type of the predicate calculus of the 4D

language; some of the latter sentence types will involve

special temporal predicates, and contants that refer to such

entities as temporal parts and times, but no sentence type
of the 4D language will involve any tense operator. Then in

A full-blown logic in which the 4D theorist could handle
temporal discourse would of course involve, in addition to
some typical logical axioms and some special axioms
governing identity, some additional special axioms governing
the temporal predicates of the 4D language. Such a logic
might include the following temporal axioms:
5

AxAyAz (A 2 xy & A 2 xz) --> (y=z)
(Nothing is at two times)
A2 AxAy[P 2 xy --> Ez (A 2 yz)
(Whatever has a temporal part is at a time)
A3: AxAyAz (A 2 xy & A 2 zy & P 2 xz) --> x=z]
(Nothing is a temporal part of anything else at

A1

:

]

[

:

]

[

its time)

Ax(P 2 xx)
(Each thing is a temporal part of itself)
v
A5 AxAy 2 xy v Ez[P 2 zx & (z<y v z>y)
2
v
z>x)
(z<x
zy
Ez[P
&
(Each pair of things is temporally related
to one another)
A6: Ax(C 2 xx)
(Each thing is co-extensive with itself)

A4

:

:

{

]

]

in addition to axioms that make the relations earlier than
and later than transitive, asymmetrical and irreflexive, as
well as axioms that make the relation co-extensive with

transitive, symmetrical and reflexive.
In keeping with the analogy between this way of
analyzing temporal discourse and the way in which Lewis
analyzes modal discourse, the 4D theorist who holds temporal
reductionism may want to say that, just as possible worlds
are (according to Lewis) maximal mereological sums of
compossible individuals, so times are maximal mereological
sums of co-extensive individuals.
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the semantics for the 4D language,

sentence types will be

assigned truth-values simpliciter, as per TLVP
There is

a

possible complication here. When

philosophers do formal semantics in the normal way, they
specify truth-conditions for sentences, not propositions.
Some semant icists

no doubt,

,

do not believe in propositions,

and for them it is thus appropriate to give truth-conditions
for sentences rather than propositions.

however,

In this essay,

am assuming that there are propositions,

I

and that

they are the primary bearers of truth and falsity. Does this

mean that
I

I

should not be doing semantics in the normal way?

don't think so.

I

think that it can make sense to talk

about assigning truth-values to sentences, even if we have

agreed that propositions are the primary bearers of truth
and falsity. For we can say that the truth-value assigned to
a

sentence is

(really)

determined by the truth-value of the

proposition expressed by that sentence.
Accordingly, the 4D semantics will be such that in each
4D model,

constants of the language will be assigned values

from among the objects in the 4D ontology, while predicates

will be assigned values from among sets constructed out of
the objects in the 4D ontology. Then the truth-values of

sentences will be determined in the normal, set-theoretic
way,

i.e.,

in the manner suggested by Tarski.

6

Note that it will greatly simplify things if we allow
the 4D theorist to assume that there are no vague
6

Tarski,

"The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages."

132

.

predicates.

I

think that there

is

no harm in so doing; in

any case the 4D theorist's opponents will
be happy enough
about granting him or her this assumption,
provided that
they are also allowed to make it (they will
be, in the

following sections)

.

The 4D language,

then,

can simply be an old-fashioned,

purely extensional, predicate calculus; and the semantics
for the 4D language can be of the familiar kind suited
to

such

a

language. What follows is such

semantics

a

language and such

a

7

THE 4D LANGUAGE

Primitive Vocabulary
(i)

u lf

(ii)
...

Sentential letters: S x
Individual constants:

Predicate letters: A

(iii)

B

1

!,

.

,

S2 ,
...
a, b, ...,

1
,

B1

A
B ,,
(iv) Variables: x, y, z, x lf y x
(v)
Quantifiers: A, E.
(vi) Logical connectives: ~, &,
(vii) Parentheses: (, ).
2

.

2

X

,

.

.

,

...,

u,

A2

,

a,,

b lf

B2

...,

,

...,

A 1 ,,

.

,

z lt

v,

...

-->,

<-->.

Syntax
(i)

Each individual constant and each variable is

a

term.
(ii)

expression

Any finite string of primitive symbols is an
.

No element of what follows is original. Each element is
pirated; some elements are pirated from Dowty, Wall and
Peters, Introduction to Montague Semantics; some from Mates,
Elementary Logic; and some from lectures by Michael Jubien.
7
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Any sentential letter is an atomic formula and
predicate letter and t lr ..., t L are terms, then
A (t lr
is an atomic formula.
.., t t
(iv) If A is an atomic formula, then A is a wellformed
formula (wff)
(v)
If A is any wff, then ~ (A) is a wff.
(vi) If A and B are any wff, then (A & B) is a wff.
v |i) If A and B are any wff, then (A v B) is a wff.
(viii) If A and B are any wff, then (A
> B) is a wff.
(ix) If A and B are any wff, then (A <--> B) is a wff.
(x)
If A is any wff, and v is any variable, then Av(A)
and Ev(A) are wffs.
(xi) An expression is a wff only if it can be obtained
by a finite number of applications of steps (iii)-(x) above.
(xii) An occurrence of a variable, v, in a wff, A, is
bound if it is (a) immmediately after an occurrence of a
quantifier, or (b) in a wff of either the form A v(B) or
Ev(B), for some wff B; otherwise v is free.
(xiii) A sentence is a wff in which no variable occurs
1

A

(iii)
is a
.

,

)

.

(

free

—

8

Semantics
M is a 4D model =df M is an ordered pair, <D, f>, that
meets the following conditions:
(i) D is a non-empty set; and
(ii) f is a function whose domain is the set of all
sentential letters, constants and predicate letters of the
4D language, and which meets the following conditions:
(a) if S is a sentential letter then f (S) is one
of the truth-values, truth and falsity;
(b) if a is a constant then f(a) is either some
member of D or else nothing; and
is a
(c) if A 1 is a predicate letter then f (A
subset of D 1 (i.e., the i-nary Cartesian product of D)
1

)

In order to give truth-conditions for sentences of the

4D language,

it is

first necessary to define the following

notions
Let some model, M, be given. Then g is

assignment for M =df g is

a

a

value

function assigning to each

Sometimes in what follows I will use square brackets
and/or curly brackets in place of parentheses; also I will
sometimes drop off the outermost pair of parentheses of some
wf f
8
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variable of the 4D language some value from the domain
of
Further, let g and g' be two value assignments for M,
and
let u be some variable. Then g is a u-variant of

and

g'

differ at most in what they assign to

M.

=df g

g'

u.

Next we define the notion of the semantic value of

a

constant, predicate letter or variable of the 4D language,

relative to
follows:

model, M,

a

(a)

and

a

value assignment,

g,

as

if a is a constant then the semantic value of

relative to M and g is

f (a)

(b)

if A 1

a

is a predicate

letter then the semantic value of A 1 relative to M and g is
f (A 1 )

u

;

and

(c)

if u is a variable then the semantic value of

relative to M and g is g(u)
It will be convenient to adopt the following notational

convention: if M is a model, g a value assignment for
@

a constant,

(?

'[@] M,g

'

relative to M and
Now,

and

predicate letter, or variable of the 4D

language, then
of

M,

is to be read as
g'

'the semantic value

.

our goal is to be able to say what is required in

order for some sentence,

S,

to be true with respect to some

model, M. As an intermediate step along the way toward

specifying such
conditions for
M,

truth-condition, we must first specify the

a
a

wff's being true with respect to

and a value assignment,

g.

a

model,

These intermediate truth-

conditions are as follows:
(i)

if S is a sentential letter, then S is true with
f (S) is truth; otherwise S is false with

respect to M,g if
respect to M,g;
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if S is an atomic formula, i.e., if s is AMt
for some predicate and terms, then S is true with
respect to M,g if
..., [t i ]M.g> i s a member of
[A 1
otherwise 5 is false with respect to M,g ;
(ii)

.

.

•

t

]

(iii) if s is ~A for some sentence, A, then S is
true
with respect to M,g if A is not true; otherwise S is false
with respect to M, g;
(iv) if S is A v B for some sentences, A and B, then
s
true with respect to M , g if either A is true or else B is
true; otherwise S is false with respect to M,g;

is

(v) if S is A & B for some sentences, A and B, then S
is true with respect to M, g if both A and B are true;
otherwise S is false with respect to M,g;

—

(vi) if S is A
> B for some sentences, A and B, then
S is true with respect to M,g if either A is false or else B
is true; otherwise S is false with respect to M,g;

(vii) if S is A <--> B for some sentences, A and B,
then S is true with respect to M,g if either A and B are
both true or else A and B are both false; otherwise S is
false with respect to M,g;

(viii) if S is Au (A) for some wff, A, and variable, u,
then S is true with respect to M, g if for every g' such that
g' is a u-variant of g, A is true with respect to M, g' ;
otherwise S is false with respect to M,g ; and
(ix) if S is Eu(A) for some wff, A, and variable, u,
then S is true with respect to M g if for some g' such that
g' is a u-variant of g, A is true with respect to M, g'
otherwise S is false with respect to M,g.
r

;

Now,

finally, we can specify the truth-condition for

sentence with respect to

a

4D model simpliciter

Accordingly, let some 4D model,
sentence,

S,

assignment,

a

M,

be given. Then for any

S is true with respect to M if for every value
g,

for M,

S is true with respect to M, g;

otherwise S is false with respect to
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Some examples will help to illustrate a few important

points about the 4D language and its relationship to
English. Consider the following sentence tokens

time of their occurrence "tl")

(call the

.

Joe Montana is a quarterback.
Johnny Unitas was a quarterback.
Socrates was wise.
Woody Allen will be president of the U.S.
The president of the U.S. in one hundred
years will be wise.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

According to the 4D view, these are to be analyzed in
terms of quantification over times and temporal parts of
objects. In order to see how this will work, consider some
model, Ml,

of the 4D language that represents the actual,

four-dimensional world; that is, some model whose first

member (i.e., whose domain)
concrete,

is the set of all of the

four-dimensional objects of the concrete,

four-

dimensional world (and all of the temporal parts of those
objects)

,

together with all of the times of that world, and

whose second member is

a

function,

f,

such that for each

actual n-place property or relation, R n

predicate letter,
...,

xn ,

...,

x

<x t

,

...,

$n ,

,

there is some

such that for any actual objects, x lf

x n > is a

member of f($ n

)

just in case x lf

stand in the relation R n to one another in the

actual world.

According to the 4D view,

proposition that Montana has

a
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(1)

expresses the tenseless

tl-temporal part that is

a

:

,

quarterback. So

(1)

..

can be translated into 4D-style English

as follows:

(la) There is an x such that
temporal part of Montana and
quarterback)

is the tl-

(x

x is a

Note that, given what has been said above about
it

'P 3

'

and Ml,

follows that Ml assigns to that predicate the three - place

relation that relates

a

temporal part,

four-dimensional object,
part of

o.

Hence

(la)

p,

time,

a

t,

and

a

just in case p is the t-temporal

o,

can go into the following sentence of

the 4D language,
(la')

Ex(P 3 xt x m

&

Q 3 x)

,

which will be true relative to Ml provided that Ml makes the
appropriate assignments to
(

{

<x>

x is a

'm'

(Montana)

,

't

'

:

(tl)

,

and

quarterback}).

Similarly,

(2)

according to the 4D view, expresses the

tenseless proposition that Unitas has

earlier than tl that is

a

a

temporal part

quarterback. Thus

(2)

can be

translated into 4D-style English as follows:
There is an x and there is a y such that
is a time earlier than tl and x is the ytemporal part of Unitas and x is a
(2a)
(y

quarterback)

(2a)

'Q 1 '

can then go into the following sentence of the 4D

language,
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(2a')

ExEy

.

(T 1 y

&

y<t x

&

P 3 xyu

.

&

Qi X )

.

,

which will be true relative to Ml provided that
Ml also
makes the appropriate assignments to '<' ({<x,y>:
x
is

earlier than y})
(3),

and

'u'

(Unitas)

according to the 4D view, expresses the tenseless

proposition that Socrates has

a

temporal part ealier than tl

that is wise; thus it can be translated into 4D-style

English as follows:
There is an x and there is a y such that
is a time earlier than tl and x is the ytemporal part of Socrates and x is wise)
(3a)
(y

(3a)

can then go into the following sentence of the 4D

language.
(3a')

ExEy

(T 1 y

&

y<t x

&

P 3 xys

&

W 3 x)

,

which will be true relative to Ml provided that Ml also
makes the appropriate assignments to
(

{

<x>

:

x is

(4)

a

wise

}

's'

(Socrates)

and

'W 1

)

expresses the tenseless proposition that Allen has

temporal part later than tl that is president, according

to the 4D view; hence it can be translated into 4D-style

English as follows:
There is an x and there is a y such that
is
a time later than tl and x is the y(y
temporal part of Allen and x is president)
(4a)
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,

(4a)

can then go into the following sentence of the 4D

language,

ExEy

(4a')

(T 1 y

&

y>t x

&

P 3 xya & P 3 x)

,

which will be true relative to Ml provided that Ml also
makes the appropriate assignments to
than y}),

(Allen)

'a'

and

'P

1

'

({<x>:

'>'

({<x,y>: x is later

x is

president of the

U.S.}).
Finally,

(5)

according to the 4D view, expresses the

tenseless proposition that the person who is president of
the U.S. one hundred years later than tl is wise; hence

(5)

can be translated into 4D-style English as follows:
(5a) The person who is president of the U.S.
one hundred years later than tl is wise.

(5a)

can then go into the following sentence of the 4D

language,

(

5a

'
)

W 1 p^oo

•

which will be true relative to Ml provided that Ml also
makes the appropriate assignment to

'p

'

100

(the person who is

president of the U.S. one hundred years later than

tj_)

Note that the propositions expressed by the above

sentences of the 4D language (relative to Ml)

are all

singular propositions; for each of those propositions
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entails the existence of some concrete,
four-dimensional
object. In general, each meaningful, declarative
sentence
token of English expresses some tenseless
proposition,

according to the 4D view. And each tenseless proposition
can,

acording to that view, be expressed by some sentence

type of the 4D language, which sentence type will then
be

true relative to any one of the appropriate class of models
(i.e.,

those that represent the actual world, and also give

appropriate assignments to the predicate letters and
constants of the sentence type in question)

4.3 A Formal Language, with Semantics,

for 3DRR

The 3DRR theorist's ontology consists of
3D objects that have ever existed,

exist in the 3D world;

(ii)

(i)

all of the

exist now, or will ever

all kinds of properties of,

relations obtaining among, those objects

time-indexed properties and relations)

;

and

(including many

and (iii)

ordered

sets composed of things in the 3D theorist's ontology,

some

of which ordered sets will be propositions. The 3DRR

language that

I

will propose, then, will have as its domain

of discourse the set consisting all of the things in the

3DRR theorist's ontology.
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Among the constraints on what the 3DRR
language can be
like are the 3DRR theorist's commitments
to STR and
TLVP

The commitment to STR means that the 3DRR
language will

contain no tense operators, i.e., no special,
intensional

operators for the purpose of handling temporal discourse.
The commitment to TLVP means that all of the
propositions

expressed by these sentences will be tenseless propositions.
These two factors, plus the absence of indexicals, mean that
the 3DRR language can be composed exclusively of tenseless

sentence -types

,

so that each such sentence— type expresses

some tenseless proposition,

if it expresses a proposition at

all

The 3DRR language that

I

will propose will be

a

simple

predicate calculus, in form and structure exactly like the
4D language.

Unlike the 4D language, however, the 3DRR

language will not contain predicates corresponding to most
ordinary,

common-sense properties and relations; rather, the

3DRR language will contain predicates corresponding to all
sorts of time-indexed properties and relations.

9

Moreover,

translations of sentences about temporal matters from
English into the 3DRR language will not make use of the
special temporal predicates of the 4D language; rather,

translations of such sentences into the 3DRR language will
make use of predicates corresponding to time-indexed
There is no special need for the 3DRR language to contain
a predicate for identity, but no doubt various
considerations unrelated to the issues discussed in this
essay will lead the 3DRR theorist to include such a
predicate in the 3DRR language.
9
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properties and relations. Then the truth-values of 3DRR
sentence types will be determined in the normal way.
In short,

the 3DRR theorist wants a language and

semantics that are,

in form,

exactly like the language and

semantics of the 4D theorist. The only disagreement between
these two theorists will be over the domains of the models
that they think represent the real world. Whereas the 4D

theorist thinks that each of the models that represents the
real world is one whose first member

(i.e.,

the set consisting of all of the concrete,

objects of the concrete,

whose domain)

is

four-dimensional

four-dimensional world (plus all of

the temporal parts of those objects,

and all of the times)

together with various common-sense properties and relations,
the 3DRR theorist thinks that each such model is one whose
first member is the set of all of the three-dimensional

objects from throughout history, together with various time-

indexed properties and relations.
Some examples will help to make this clearer. Consider

again
that,

(

1

)

—

(

5

above. Let M2 be a model of the 3DRR language

according to the 3DRR theorist, represents the actual,

three-dimensional world. According to 3DRR,

(1)

expresses

the tenseless proposition that Montana has the time-indexed

property beinq-a-auarterback-at-t

.

Hence it could be

translated into 3DRR-style English as follows:
(lb)

Montana is

a t 1-quarterback
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can then go into the following
sentence of the 3DRR
language.
(lb)

Q 1 1 m,

(lb')

which will be true relative to M2 provided that
M2 makes the
appropriate assignments to 'Q
({<x>: x is a quarterback
1

at t 1

}

and

/

(Montana)

'm'

according to the 3DRR view, expresses the

(2)

tenseless proposition that Unitas has the time-indexed

property being— a-gu art rback -be fore- t

:

hence it could be

translated into 3DRR-style English as follows:
Unitas is

(2b)

(2b)

a

quarterback-bef ore-tl

can then go into the following sentence of the 3DRR

language,

(2b')

Q 1 2 u,

which will be true relative to M2 provided that M2 makes the
appropriate assignments to
before t 1

}

and

'u'

'Q 1

/

({<x>:

x is a

quarterback

(Unitas).

On the 3DRR view,

(3)

expresses the tenseless

proposition that Socrates has the time-indexed property

beinq-wise-bef ore-t

.

So

(3)

could be translated into 3DRR-

style English as follows:

(3b)

Socrates is wise-bef ore-t 1
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(3b)

1

.

can then go into the following sentence of the 3DRR

language,

W\s,

(3b')

which will be true relative to M2 provided that M2 makes the
appropriate assignments to
tl})

and

'W 1 /

({<x>:

x is

wise before

(Socrates).

's'

according to the 3DRR view, expresses the

(4),

tenseless proposition that Allen has the time-indexed

property beincr-president-after-t

;

hence

(4)

could be

translated into 3DRR-style English as follows:
(4b)

(4b)

Allen is president-after-t 1

can then go into the following sentence of the 3DRR

language,
P 1 1 a,

(4b')

which will be true relative to M2 provided that M2 makes the

appropriate assignments to
after tl})

and

Finally,

({<x>:

x is a

president

(Allen).

'a'
(5)

'P 1 1 '

according to the 3DRR view, expresses the

,

tenseless proposition that the person who will be president
in one hundred years has the time-indexed property being-,

gp-a fter-t

;

so

(5)

could be translated into 3DRR-style

English as follows:
145
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(5b)

The person who will be president in 2090

is wise-after-t 1
(5b)

can then go into the following sentence
of the 3DRR

language,

(5b')

W^p,

which will be true relative to M2 provided that M2 makes
the
appropriate assignments to
and

'W 1 /

({<x>:

x is wise after tl})

(the person who will be president in 2090)

'p'

4.4 A Formal Language,

with Semantics,

for 3D AR

The 3DAR theorist's ontology consists of
3D objects that have ever existed,

exist in the 3D world;

(ii)

(i)

all of the

exist now, or will ever

all kinds of properties of,

relations obtaining among, those objects

(although,

as.

and

will

be seen, the 3DAR theorist does not need to appeal to time-

indexed properties and relations)

;

and (iii)

ordered sets

composed of things in the 3D theorist's ontology, some of

which ordered sets will be propositions. The 3DAR language
that

I

will propose will have as its domain of discourse the

set consisting all of the things in the 3DAR theorist's

ontology
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Among the constraints on what the 3DAR language can
be
like are the 3DAR theorist's commitments to STA and
TDVP

These two factors entail that the 3DAR theorist's
language

will consist of sentences of different tenses, which

sentences express tensed propositions if they express

propositions at all. Thus, the 3DAR language will have to
include tense-operators

i.e.,

special,

intensional

operators that stand for the past - and future - tenses
will have to be

tense logic,

a

i.e.,

a

and it

,

language designed to

accomodate the idea that the bearers of truth and falsity
have truth-values at times.
These differences will require several complications in
the 3DAR semantics. For one thing, these new operators,
which,

following Prior,

10

can be considered as behaving very

much like the modal sentential operators 'necessarily' and
'possibly', will of course require truth-conditions. Thus,
in addition to truth-conditions for the logical connectives

and quantifiers, the 3DAR semantics will have to include

truth-conditions for whatever tense-operators are
incorporated into the language. Typically, these include
'P'

,

'F'

,

'H'

,

'G'

and 'Pn'

,

which are to stand for
be the case that'

,

and 'Fn'

'it has

units ago that',
that',
10

,

for any number,

been the case that',

'it has always

will always be the case that'

,

'it will

been the case that'

,

'it

'it has been the case n time

and 'it will be the case n time units hence

respectively.

Prior,

n,

"Changes in Events and Changes in Things."
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is a further

inclusion in the

3 DAR

complication made necessary by the

language of tense-operators, and that

is that some provision will have to be made for assigning

truth-values to the sentences of the language at times.
There is

a

standard way of doing this

11
.

The easiest and

most intuitive variation of this standard way of doing

semantics for
follows,

a

tense logic, which

I

will adopt in what

is to specify that each model must include,

addition to

a

domain and

a

in

function that assigns semantic

values to the constants, predicates and sentential letters
of the language,

a

line that represents the different points

in time.

Then the function that assigns the semantic values will
be one that takes,

as arguments,

not just individual

constants, predicates and sentential letters, but,

rather,

ordered pairs, each of which is composed of one of those
linguistic entities plus some point on the line. Thus, each
pair consisting of some constant plus some point on the line
will be assigned either nothing or else some member of the

domain (to be thought of as the thing that that constant
refers to at that time)

;

each pair composed of some

predicate letter plus some point on the line will be
assigned some ordered set constructed out of the members of
the domain

(to be

thought of as the extension of that

predicate at that time)

;

and each pair composed of some

see, for example, Prior, Time and Modality Chapters II
and III; and Past , Present and Future, Chapters II, III and
11

,

VII
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sentential letter plus some point on the line will be

assigned

a

truth-value (the truth-value of that sentence at

that time)

Intuitively, the line in any such model represents
time,

and each point on the line represents some moment in

history. The idea is that the truth-values of sentence types
that contain tense operators can then be determined,

in

truth- functional ways, by the truth-values of sentence types
that do not contain tense operators. For example,
line shown in figure
'FS 1

1

is part of a model,

('It will be the case that

/

)

then the sentence

is true at tl,

there is some point to the right of tl at which
similarly, the sentence 'P2S 1

true;

time units ago that

S1/

)

'

if the

'S x '

because
is

('It was the case two

is true at t5,

because

'

is true

at the point two time units to the left of t5.

Si

pi

Figure

1:

p2

p4

p3

p5

A 3DAR Line Segment

The following, then,

is a formal language and semantics

that would be well-suited to 3DAR.

149

,

THE 3DAR LANGUAGE

Primitive Vocabulary
The primitive vocabulary will consist of the primitive
vocabulary of the 4D language, plus:
(viii
Tense operators:
any number, n.
)

P,

F,

H,

G,

and Pn and F n,

for

Syntax
The syntactical rules will be the same as in the 4D
language, with the’ following addition:
(xiv) If A is any wff and T is any tense operator,
TA is a wff.

then

Semantics
M is a 3DAR model =df M is an ordered triple, <L, D,
that meets the following conditions:
(i) L is a non-branching line;
(ii) D is a non-empty set;
(iii) f is a function whose domain is the set of all
ordered pairs, <p, @> such that p is a point on L and @ is
either a sentential letter, a constant, or a predicate, and
which function meets the following conditions:
for each sentential letter, S, and point, p,
(a)
f (<p, S>) is one of the truth-values;
(b)
for each constant, a, and point, p, f (<p, a>)
is either nothing or else a member of D; and
for each predicate, A 1 and point, p, f (<p,
(c)
i
A >) is a subset of D -.
f,>,

,

1

In the 3DAR language,

predicated, relative to

points on

L,

a

truth and falsity are to be

particular model, of sentences at

the line in the model. But,

as in the 4D

semantics, to say what is required in order for
to be true

(at a point)

with respect to

a model,

a

sentence
we must

first say what is required in order for a sentence to be
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;

true

(at

a point)

with respect to

a

model and a value

assignment for that model, and to do this
we shall need to
make use of the notions value assignment,
u-variant and
semantic value. Accordingly, let the notions value

assignment and u-variant be defined as before. Then
we can
define the notion of the semantic value of a constant,

predicate letter or term of the 3DAR language, relative
to
model, M, value assignment,

and point, p, as follows:

g,

if a is a constant then the semantic
g, and p is f (<p, a >)
(k)
if A is a predicate letter then the
value of A 1 relative to M, g, and p is f (<p, A*>) ;
(c) if u is a variable then the semantic
u relative to M, g, and p is g(u)
(a)

a

relative to

a

M,

value of

semantic
and
value of

.

Now the intermediate truth-conditions for the 3DAR
language relative to

a

model, M,

first member of M, point, p,

assignment,

g,

line,

such that L is the

L,

such that p is on

such that g is

a

L,

and value

value assignment for

M,

are

as follows:

(i) if 5 is a sentential letter, then S is true at p
with respect to M,g if f (<p, S>) is truth; otherwise it is
false at p with respect to M,g;

if S is an atomic formula, i.e., if S is A i (t 1/
for some predicate and terms, then S is true at p
..t i
with respect to M,g if <[t M 3'P, ..., [t i M 3-p> is a member
of [A i M '9'P; otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g ;
(ii)

.

)

-

1

<

'

<

]

]

]

(iii) if S is ~A for some sentence A, then S is true at
with
respect to M,g if A is not true at p with respect to
p
M, g; otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g;

if S is
p with
with respect to M,
M, g; otherwise it
(iv)

is true at

A v B for some sentences A and B, then S
respect to M,g if either A is true at p
g or else B is true at p with respect to
is false at p with respect to M,g;
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.
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(V) if S i s A & B for some sentences
A and B,
true at p with respect to M,g if both A and B are then 5 is
true at p
with respect to M,g; otherwise it is false at
with respect
p
to M, g ;

(vi) if S is A --> B for some sentences A
and B, then S
true at p with respect to M, g if either A is false at
p
with respect to M, g or else B is true at
p with respect to
Mr gt otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g
;

is

—

(vii) if S is A <
>
5 is true at with respect
true at p with respect to
at p with respect to M,gi
respect to M,g ;

B for some sentences A and B, then
to M,g if either A and B are both
M,g or else A and B are both false
otherwise it is false at p with

(viii
if S ig Au (A) for some wff, A, and variable, u,
then S is true at p with respect to M g if for every g' such
that g' is a u-variant of g, A is true at p with respect to
M,g'
otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g;
)

r

;

(ix) if S is Eu (A) for some wff, A, and variable, u,
then S is true at p with respect to M,g if for some g' such
that g' is a u-variant of g, A is true at p with respect to
M, g' ; otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g
(x)

if S is PA for some sentence. A,

then S is true at

such that
p with respect to M,g if there is some point, p'
p' is to the left of p on L, and A is true at p' with
respect to Mf g
otherwise it is false at p with respect to
,

M, g ;

12

The truth-conditions I've given for the tense operators
of the 3DAR language presuppose that it's not the case that
the reference of any constant ever changes over time. In
this respect the semantics here proposed do not accurately
reflect the semantics for natural languages such as English.
For in English it sometimes happens that a thing has one
name at one time, and another name at another time (the man
now called "Kareem Abdul Jabbar" is an example of such a
thing) ; and it also sometimes happens that a name refers to
one thing at one time, and another thing at another time
(the name 'The Dalai Lama' is an example of such a name)
The semantics for the 3DAR language could be formulated
in a way that allows for such changes of reference over
time. To do so would require a distinction between two
different types of tense operators. Grabby tense operators
would have truth-conditions like the following: P g n($a) is
true at a point, p, just in case f (<p, a>) is a member of
Searchy tense operators would have truthf (<p-n, $>)
conditions like the following: P s n($a) is true at a point,
member of f (p-n, $>)
p, just in case f(<p-n, a>) is a
us to grab the thing named
tell
effect,
in
Grabby operators,
12

.
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if s is FA for some sentence A,
then S is true a t
to M, g if there is some point, p'
such that
is to the right of p on L and A is
true at p' with
(xi)

P^ith respect
p’

,

,

respect to M,
M, g;

g;

otherwise it is false at p with respect to

(xii) if s is HA for some sentence, A,
then S is true
at p with respect to M, g if for every point, p'
such that
p is to the left of p on L, A is true at p'
with respect to
M, g; otherwise it is false at
p with respect to M,
,

g;

(xiii) if S is G A for some sentence, A, then S
is true
at p with respect to M,g if for every point, p'
such that
p is to the right of p on L, A is true at p' with respect
to M, g, otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g
;
,

if S is P nA for some number, n, and sentence, A,
then S is true at p with respect to M, g if A is true at' the
point n units to the left of p with respect to M,g;
otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g and
;

(xv) if S is F nA for some number, n, and sentence, A,
then S' is true at p with respect to M,g if A is true at the
point n units to the right of p with respect to M,g;
otherwise it is false at p with respect to M,g.

Now,

finally, we can specify the truth-condition for a

sentence at

a

point with respect to

a

3DAR model

simpliciter. Accordingly,

let some 3DAR model, M,

Then for any sentence,

and point, p,

the line contained in

S,

M,

be given.

such that p is on

S is true at p with respect to M if

for every value assignment,

g,

for M,

S is true at p with

by a constant at the point of evaluation of the sentence in
question, and then proceed to the relevant point on L to see
if that thing has the relevant property there. Searchy
operators, on the other hand, tell us to go to the relevant
point on L, search for whatever thing is there named by the
constant in question, and then check to see if that thing
has the relevant property there. (I am grateful to Tom
Ryckman for suggesting the incorporation of two kinds of
tense operator into the 3DAR language, and also for
suggesting the terms 'grabby' and 'searchy'.)
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respect to

M,

gr;

.

a

.

t

~

otherwise S is false at p with respect
to

M.13

in Ch P

r 3 above
f T?f
1
Platonism or

that the 3DAR theorist can hold
temporal reductionism Suppose
?
onao ??
I am a 3DAR
theorist who holds temporal reductionism; how
can I analyze away talk that appears to be
about times’ One
way would be the following. First, I define
'present-tensed
ea
proposition' as follow:
0

^

.

Q is a present-tensed proposition =df for any
number, n, Q does not have Fn will-be-true-nt ime—units-hence
Pn
was~t rue~ n— t ime~un i t s
-^£ 0
£ (will-be-true^ p was-t.rup
G willalways-be-true
or H ha s ~ 1 wa v s ~been— rue
as a constituent
(

-

)

)

I

(

/

(

,

)

Then

,

,

)

,

(

(

^

define the present moment,

t

Q

,

as follows:

t 0 =df the set of all true, present-tensed
propositions

And finally I define all of the other times in terms of the
present time, as follows:
For any positive number, n, t n =df the set of
all true propositions whose first member is Fn
and whose second member is a present-tensed

proposition
For any positive number, n, t_ n =df the set of
all true propositions whose first member is Pn
and whose second member is a present-tensed

proposition
The idea here, as usual, is to draw an analogy with
modal actualism. The modal actualist typically has two
actual worlds: the concrete actual world ("@1"), and the
unique maximal, consistent set of propositions that happens
to have only true members ("@2"). Other possible worlds are
of the same kind as 02; i.e., they're maximal, consistent
sets of propositions. (Are they purely qualitative? Are they
perhaps singular, but with only actual concrete objects as
concrete constituents? These are excellent questions that
are beyond the scope of this essay.)
Analogously, the 3DARist has two present times: the
current 3D, concrete world ("3Dw"), and the unique maximal,
consistent set of present-tensed propositions that happens
to have only members that are true right now ("t 0 "). Other
(Are they purely
times are of the same kind as t 0
qualitative? Are they perhaps singular, but with only
present concrete objects as concrete constituents? These are
.
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)

Some examples will help to illustrate a few important

points about the 3DAR language and its relationship to
English. Consider once again the sentence tokens

(

l

)

—

(

5

above. According to the 3DAR view, these cannot be analyzed
in terms of quantification over times and temporal parts of

nor can they be analyzed in terms of the possession

objects,

by three-dimensional objects of time-indexed properties.
Rather,

must be analyzed in terms of irreducibly

(l)-(5)

past-, present- and future-tensed sentence types,

and these

can be thought of as attributing common sense properties and

relations to ordinary, three-dimensional objects.
In order to see how this will work,

model, M3,

theorist,
that is,

of the 3DAR language that,

according to the 3DAR

represents the actual, three-dimensional world;
some model whose first member,

that for every pair of times,

earlier than

t

t

and

t

'

,

L,

is a line such

such that

in the history of the world,

'

points, p and p

'

,

of the concrete,

(i.e.,

whose domain)

p'

essay

and

three-dimensional objects that have ever

exist now, or will ever exist in the concrete,

f,

a

such that for each point p on L and

corresponding time,
^]_50

on L,

is the set of all

three-dimensional world, and whose third member is
function,

is

t

there are two

such that p is to the left of

whose second member

existed,

consider some

t'

,

in the history of the world,

and for

excellent questions that are beyond the scope of this
.
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each actual n-place property or relation,

predicate letter,
< Xl ,

x„,

X1 '

***'

Xn

5",

stand

in

there is some

such that for any actual objects,

x„> is a member of

...,

R",

f«p, >>)

j

x,,

ust in case

the relation R n to one another at

t

in

the actual world. Let us further stipulate
that pi is the
point on L that corresponds to tl in the history
of the
actual world.

According to the 3DAR view,
tensed,

Hence

(1)

expresses the present-

singular proposition that Montana is

(1)

a

quarterback.

can be translated into 3DAR-style English as

follows

(lc)

(lc)

Montana is

a

quarterback.

can then go into the following sentence of the 3DAR

language,

(lc')

0%,

which will be true at pi relative to M3 provided that f(<pi,
'm'>)
x

= Montana,

and for any point, p,

is a quarterback at p}

Hence

(2)

=

{<x>:

expresses the past-

singular proposition that Unitas was

(2)

'Q lr >)

.

According to the 3DAR view,
tensed,

f (<p,

a

quarterback.

can be translated into 3DAR-style English as

follows
(2c) It has been the case that
quarterback)
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(Unitas is a

.

,

)

.

can then go into the following sentence
of the 3DAR
language,
(2c)

P(Q 1 u),

(2c'

which will be true at pi relative to M3 provided that,
in
addition to the above, f <!p 1
= Unitas.
'u
/

(

(3),

tensed,

,

^>

)

according to the 3DAR view, expresses the past-

singular proposition that Socrates was wise; hence

can be translated into 3DAR-style English as follows:

(3)

It has been the case that

(3c)

wise)

(3c)

(Socrates is

.

can then go into the following sentence of the 3DAR

language,

(3c')

P(W s),
x

which will be true relative to M3 provided that f(<pl,
= Socrates,

and for any point, p,

f (<p,

'W x, >)

=

{<x>:

's'>)
x is

wise p}
(4)

tensed,
So

(4)

according to the 3DAR view, expresses the futuresingular proposition that Allen will be president.

can be translated into 3DAR-style English as follows:
(4c) It will be the case that
president)
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(Allen is

.

.

<40 can then go into the following sentence
of the 3DAR
language.

F(P a),

(4c')

1

which will be true relative to M3 provided that
f(<pl,
:

Allen,

and for any point,

president at p
Finally,

future- tensed,

p,

'pi'>)

f(<p,

=

{< x >:

'a'>)

x is

}

(5),

according to the 3DAR view, expresses the

singular proposition that the person who will

be president in 2090 will be wise,’ hence

(5)

can be

translated into 3DAR-style English as follows:
It

(5c)

will be the case that

(the president

in 2090 is wise)

(5c)

can then go into the following sentence of the 3DAR

language,

(5c')

F^p),

which will be true relative to M3 provided that, in addition
to the above,

f(<pl,

'p'>)

= the

person who will be

president in 2090.
In general,

according to the 3DAR view, each token of

an English sentence expresses a tensed proposition if it

expresses

a

proposition at all; and each such token can be

translated by some sentence type of the 3DAR language that
expresses the appropriate tensed proposition at the time of
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that token. Then the truth value of such a sentence
type at
a

time is determined by the reference of the constants and

the extensions of the predicates of that sentence type at
some relevant time.

4.5 A Formal Language, with Semantics,

The 3DAMA theorist's ontology,

consists of

(i)

for 3DAMA

at any given time,

all of the 3D objects that either have

existed or else do exist, as of that time;

(ii)

all kinds of

properties of, and relations obtaining among, those objects;
and (iii)

ordered sets constructed out of things in the

3DAMA theorist's ontology,

some of which ordered sets will

be propositions. Accordingly, the 3DAMA language that

I

will

propose will have as its domain of discourse, at any given
time,

the set of all of the things that are either past or

present at that time; and the truth-conditions for the

tensed sentences of the language will be such that, at any
given time, the only things involved in determining the

truth-value of any sentence at that time are things that are
either past or present at that time.

Among the constraints on what the 3DAMA language can be
like are the 3DAMA theorist's commitments to STA and TDVP

These two factors, plus the absence of indexicals, mean that
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the 3DAMA language,

like the 3DAR language,

is to be a

language composed of tensed sentence-types (some of which
tense operators)

,

so that at each time,

each such

sentence-type expresses some tensed proposition, if it
expresses

proposition at all. Then, as with the 3DAR

a

semantics, the 3DAMA semantics will involve ascriptions of

truth-values to sentence-types at times. Thus, the 3DAMA
theorist

'

s

formal language will be

a

tense logic just like

the 3DAR language.
Can the 3DAMA semantics be just like the 3DAR

semantics?

I

don't think so,

for two different reasons. The

first is simply that the 3DAMA theorist does not have

available the future objects that are contained in the 3DAR

theorist's ontology. The second reason is that the laws of
nature may be indeterministic. Let me explain.
First, note that the 3DAMA semantics can be just like

the 3DAR semantics as far as sentences about the past and

the present are concerned. For the 3DAMA theorist has

exactly the same past and present 3D objects in his or her

ontology as the 3DAR theorist. Hence the 3DAMA sentences
about these objects can be treated in the same was as the

3DAR sentences about the same objects:

tensed sentence that contains

a

past- or present-

certain predicate and

certain constants will be true at
given 3DAMA model,

a

a time,

relative to

a

just in case the appropriate ordered set

containing the objects assigned to those constants by the
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model is a member of the extension assigned to that

predicate by the model, at the relevant point in time.
What of future-tensed sentences? Here we must

distinguish between two different kinds of sentence,
singular sentences, i.e., those that contain one or more
constants,

and general sentences,

i.e.,

those that contain

no constants. Consider first future-tensed,

singular

sentences. These may be of two kinds: future-tensed,

singular sentences that contain at least one constant that
fails to refer to any past or presently existing objects;

and the rest. Consider one of the former variety; it

contains some constant that does not refer to any past or

presently existing object. Then what does that constant
refer to? Well, to say of some constant that it does not
refer to any past or presently existing object is, according
to 3DAMA,

to say that it refers to nothing;

on that view,

for there are,

no merely future objects.

Depending on one's semantical tastes, one ought to
assign to sentences that fail to refer either no truth-value
or else the value falsity.

which

I

prefer the latter approach,

I

have adopted in the case of each semantical system

described above. In the semantics provided below for the
3DAMA language, then,

future-tensed,

singular sentences that

contain some constant that does not refer to any past or

presently existing object, at

a

particular time, will be

considered false at that time; there will be no true,
future-tensed,

singular sentences about merely future
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objects. In this respect, the 3DAMA semantics will differ

from the 3DAR semantics.
What about future-tensed, singular sentences that

contain only constants referring to past or presently

existing objects? And what about future— tensed, general
sentences? Such sentences will require the 3DAMA theorist to
make an even more radical departure from the 3DAR semantics.

Because of the possibility that the laws of nature may be
indeterministic, the 3DAMA semantics will have to allow

3DAMA models that contain lines that branch in the direction
of the future

(i.e.,

toward the right). Here is why.

Suppose that there is

a

semi-omniscient god, who is so

smart that he never fails to make

a

valid inference from

premises that he knows, and who also happens to know, at any
given time, everything there is to know about the past and

present states of the world, relative to that time, but

nothing about future states of the world, relative to that
time

(except,

of course,

what he can infer from what he

knows about the past and present states of the world)
What is this god able to infer right now about the
future,

from his knowledge of the past and present states of

the world? Well, he has a complete knowledge of every aspect
of every thing that either has existed or does exist; so,

in

particular, he knows the entire past history, as well as the

current position, velocity,

spin,

etc.,

of every particle or

bit of stuff that there is right now. In addition, he knows
all of the laws of nature. Can he figure out from all of
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this just what the future will be like? Only if the laws
of

nature are deterministic.
If they are then he can simply consider the way the

world is right now, apply the laws of nature, and infer
exactly how the world will be in the very next moment; then
he can consider how the world will be in the very next

moment,

apply the laws of nature, and infer exactly how the

world will be in the following moment; and so on for every
moment in the future.
If the laws of nature are not deterministic,

however,

then he is likely to be stuck. Insofar as the laws of nature
do not allow there to be utter chaos, he will be able to

know what is the range of different possibilities for the
very next moment; and it may well be that, because there

happens to be no indeterminateness looming on the horizon,
he will be able to infer exactly what things will be like in

the next moment. But in general he will not always be able
to do this.

In general,

he will only know,

in the case of

any one moment, what are the different possible successors

compatible with the combination of the way things are at
that moment

(and have been before it)

and the laws of

nature. He will know what are the different possible
futures, but he will not know which one of them will be

actual
Does it follow from all this that the 3DAMA semantics

must somehow allow for this kind of indeterminism? Yes, if
the 3DAMA theorist makes one very plausible assumption about
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truth,

namely,

sentence)

that a proposition

(and thus,

derivatively,

a

can only be true at a time if it corresponds
in

the appropriate way to past or present things
at that time.
An example will make this clearer. Suppose
that it is
an indeterministic matter whether it will rain
in Baltimore

tomorrow

-

everything about the way things are right now,

including all of the laws of nature governing our world,
is

consistent with its raining tomorrow in Baltimore, and also
consistent with its not raining tomorrow in Baltimore.

Consider the sentence

'It

will rain tomorrow in Baltimore'

Its 3DAMA translation is something like this:

'FI (A 1 33 b 19

(where the extension of the predicate is rainy places,

the constant refers to Baltimore)
true,

.

'
)

and

Should this sentence be

relative to some appropriate 3DAMA model

one

(i.e.,

that assigns the right semantic values to the predicate and
constant)

that represents the real world? Well, the sentence

expresses the proposition
< beinq-rainv

.

< wi 11 -be- true- one-da v-hence

.

Baltimore>>. Can this proposition be true

right now, according to 3DAMA?

I

don't see how it can be,

given our supposition about the indeterminism of this
matter. What could the proposition correspond to that would

make it true right now? No properties of any merely future
raindrops,

since such raindrops don't exist, according to

the 3DAMA theorist. Nor could it correspond to any

properties of presently existing raindrops, or any other

presently existing objects, since our assumption about the
indeterminism of this matter guarantees that no properties

164

of any such objects are sufficient to make
this proposition

true right now.
In short,

the difficulty of finding something for this

proposition to correspond to right now in virtue of which it
could be true is exactly analogous to the difficulty facing
the semi-omniscient god of the example above. Note that for
the 3DAR theorist there is no similar problem. For the 3DAR

theorist can say that, loosely speaking, propositions about
the future are true or false depending on the manner in

which they correspond to the future; but for the 3DAMA
theorist there is no future.
For this reason, the 3DAMA semantics will have to allow
for the possibility of lines that branch as they move from

left to right,
course,

i.e.,

from past to future

from right to left,

From any given point,

p,

i.e.,

(although not, of

from future to past).

on such a line,

14

the different

branches to the right of p will represent the different
possible futures that are compatible with the way things are
at p.

Since it seems appropriate to think of the laws of

nature that govern the world as part of what is true at
point,

a

it seems appropriate to think that these laws of

Various philosophers have considered this kind of
semantics. See, for example, Aristotle, De Interpretations
Chapter 9 (where he at least seems to recommend something
like a future-branching semantics, in order to avoid
fatalistic consequences); Richmond Thomason, " Indeterminist
Time and Truth-Value Gaps;” and Prior, Past, Present and
Future, Chapters II, III and VII.
14

,
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nature are part of what goes to determine the relevant
futures accessible from that point.
Thus,

15

the 3DAMA semantics will allow the line segment

shown in figure

2

to be included in a 3DAMA model, with

truth-values assigned to the sentential letter 'S/ as
indicated

Si

Figure

2:

A 3DAMA Line Segment

Now there is

a

choice to be made by the 3DAMA

semanticist. The choice concerns the truth-conditions for
the future-tensed operators. Consider the sentence 'FIS/

Should it be true at pi in

model that contains the above

a

line segment, with the indicated assignment of truth-values
to

'S/

,

or should it be false?

There are two principal ways of answering this
question. The 3DAMA theorist could, adopting a suggestion
Can the laws of nature change over time? If they can,
then how should this affect the 3DAMA semantics for futuretensed sentences? I don't know the answers to these
questions. For the purposes of this essay, then, I will
simply assume that the answer to the first question is No
15
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made by Aristotle in his famous discussion of future
contingents,

16

'FIS/

at p3,

say that,

since 'S/

is true at p2 but false

is neither true nor false at pi - its truth-

value at pi is indeterminate, or neutral. This approach
involves rejecting what is sometimes called the principle of

bivalence

(hereafter,

"BIV"),

are only two truth-values,

i.e.,

the principle that there

truth and falsity. If the 3DAMA

theorist adopts this approach then it will be natural for

him or her to say the following: since there are, in the
model represented above, different possible futures relative
(one in which

to pi

'S/

one in which it isn't),

is true one time unit later,

'FIS/

and

is neither true nor false at

pi; but if it had been the case in every possible future

relative to pi that 'S/ is true one time unit later than
then 'FIS/ would have been true at pi; and if it had

pi,

been the case in every possible future relative to pi that
'S/

then 'FIS/ would

is false one time unit later than pi,

have been false at pi. 17
The second way of handling such cases,

once the 3DAMA

theorist has allowed future-branching models, does not
involve rejecting BIV. On this alternative, the 3DAMA

theorist would say that,
at p3

,

'FIS.

'

since

'S/

is true at p2 but false

is simply false at pi. Note that if the 3DAMA

theorist adopts this approach then the result is that not
16

Aristotle, De Interpretations

,

Chapter

9.

the view Prior calls "Peircean" in Past, Present and
in
Future, Chapter VII; and the view advocated by Thomason
Truth-Value Gaps."
" Indeterminist Time and

n

cf.
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only is

'FIS/

false at pi, but so is 'F1~S/

.

For on this

view it can be false right now that it will be the case one
time unit hence that it is raining in Baltimore, say, and
also false that it will be the case one time unit hence that
it is not raining in Baltimore.

F1~S/ cannot be

a

This means that

'~F1S 1 -->

theorem of the 3DAMA theorist's tense

logic. Thus the tense operators will be analogous to modal

operators,

and certain other sentential operators,

'allegedly',

in this respect.

The choice to be made,

then,

is,

roughly speaking,

this: does the 3DAMA theorist want to say that

about

a

such as

a

sentence

matter that is both future and contingent, relative

to a point in a 3DAMA model,

is false at that point,

or does

he or she want to say that it is neither true nor false at

that point?
I

think that there is

a

good reason for keeping BIV:

I

think that truth and falsity are best thought of as
contradictories, and not mere contraries, because 'false'
just means not true. The 3DAMA semantics proposed below,
then,

as well as the 3DAA semantics proposed in the next

section, will opt for the choice that preserves BIV. But it

should be clear, in each case, how the alternative

rejecting BIV and including

a

third truth-value

-

i.e.,

would go.

-

It might seem that the 3DAMA theorist can generalize on

the truth-conditions suggested above for the model

represented in figure

2.

I.e.,

it might seem that the 3DAMA

theorist can say that, given any 3DAMA model,
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M,

containing

line,

relative to

if,

L,

a point,

p,

on L,

a

sentence,

true at every point n time units to the right
p,

for some number,
(or

it is false.

n,

P n'

)

is

S,

(or left)

of

then the sentence that results from
in front of S is true at p;

otherwise

Unfortunately this fairly simple approach won't

work. To see why,

consider again the model repreented in

figure 2. On the approach under consideration,

'P1F1S,'

would be false at p2, where 'S/ itself is true. This result
is undesirable,

I

think,

even for one who holds the 3DAMA

view. For there are things in the world at p2 in virtue of

which 'P1F1S 1

'

is true at that point,

even according to the

3DAMA view. Specifically, whatever it is that makes
true at p2 also suffices to make 'P1F1S 1
generally,

it seems clear that,

'

true at p2

'S.'

.

More

although the 3DAMA theorist

should say that there are never true propositions about

genuinely future, contingent matters, because there is never
anything for such propositions to correspond to, there

nevertheless can be true propositions about present,
contingent matters,

for such propositions can correspond to

present states of affairs.
Thus,

it seems that it would be desirable for the 3DAMA

theorist to have truth-conditions that ensured that for any
sentence,

S,

and number,

n,

if S is true at a point, p,

PnFnS is also true at p.
There is

Consider
figure

3,

a

a

more general desideratum relevant here.

model that contains the line segment shown in

with assignments to 'S/ as indicated.
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then

S

.

p3

Figure

3:

Another 3DAMA Line Segment

The 3DAMA theorist should want it to work out that
is true at p4 with respect to this model.

roughly,

'P2F1S

'

1

The reason is,

this. Every point that is two units to the left of

p4 on some route,

and then one unit back on the same route

-

every point one unit to the left of p4 that is in some

important sense accessible from p4, that is
'Sj/

is true there.

value of 'P2F1S

'

1

-

is such that

matter that to the truth-

It shouldn't

at p4 that there is a point,

to the left of p4 and then one unit back on

route

-

a

p3,

two units

different

on a branch that is in the same relevant sense

inaccessible from p4

-

where

'

'

1

is false.

Even

a

3DAMA

theorist will agree to this; after all, there are, at p4,
things in the world in virtue of which the state of affairs

represented by p3 will not be realized.
In general,

a

18

3DAMA theorist, who wants to allow models

with lines that branch in the direction of the future, will
18

Not,

in any case,

one time unit later than p2
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want to ensure that the only points relevant
to determining
the truth-value of a sentence at a point,
p, are points that
are accessible to p; and this goes for
sentences that are

purely past-

(or

future-)

tensed as well as sentences that

mix both past and future tenses. But the simplified
way of

providing truth-conditions suggested above would not ensure
this in the case of sentences that mix past past and future
tenses. That is why it is necessary to complicate the 3DAMA

semantics by introducing the notion of trut h-on-a-route
What follows, then,

is a formal language and semantics

that would be well-suited to 3DAMA

THE 3DAMA LANGUAGE

Primitive Vocabulary
The primitive vocabulary will be the same as the
primitive vocabulary of the 3DAR language.

Syntax
The syntactical rules will be the same as the
syntactical rules of the 3DAR language.

Semantics
M is a 3DAMA model =df M is an ordered quadruple, <L,
f>, that meets the following conditions:
(i) L is a line, through an infinite, two-dimensional
space, that may branch as it moves from left to right but
not from right to left;
(ii) D is a non-empty set;
(iii) df is a function that satisfies the following
conditions
D,

df,

171

;

;

;

the domain of df is the set of all points on

(a)

L

(b) the range of df is the set of subsets
of D, so
that for each point, p, on L, df (p) = some subset of D; and
(c)
for any two points, p and p'
on L, if p is to
the left of p'
then df (p) must be a subset of df (p'
and
(iv) f is a function whose domain is the set of all
ordered pairs, <p, @> such that p is a point on L and @ is
either a sentential letter, a constant, or a predicate, and
which function satisfies the following conditions:
(a)
for each sentential letter, S, and point, p,
f (<P, S>) is one of the truth-values;
(b) for each constant, a, and point,
p, f(<p, a>)
is either nothing or else a member of df (p)
and
for each predicate, A 1
(c)
and point, p, f(<p,
A 1 >) is a subset of df(p)i.
,

,

)

,

,

In the 3DAMA language,

as in the 3DAR language,

and falsity are to be predicated,
model,

of sentences at points on

Let the notions value assignment

relative to
L,

,

a

truth

particular

the line in the model.

u-variant and semantic

value be defined for the 3DAMA semantics as they are for the

3DAR semantics. Once again we will first say what is

required in order for
relative to

a

a

model and

sentence to be true at

a

point

value assignment for that model,

a

as an intermediate step toward specifying the condition for
a

sentence's being true at

simpliciter

a

point with respect to

a

model

.

These intermediate truth-conditions for the 3DAMA

language differ from the intermediate truth-conditions for
the 3DAR language only with respect to the tense operators.
But in order to state the truth-conditions for the tense

operators of the 3DAMA language,
the notion of

idea is that

a
a

route in
route is

a
a

it is necessary to define

3DAMA model. Intuitively, the

possible course of history,
172

,

represented by

a single,

,

non-branching line that passes

through the (possibly) branching line of the model.
More formally, we can say that
line,

that is a member of

L,

route through

r is a

3DAMA model =df

a

continuous, non-branching segment of

r

a

is a

L.

Next we define the notion of truth-on-a-route

.

We will

first define the notion for present— tensed sentences in

terms of the truth— conditions already given for such
sentences, and then we define the notion for past- and

future-tensed sentences of the language. In order to do
it is necessary to introduce some new notation.

some wff,
...,

tn '

t n /t n ')

let

...,

t lf

tn

be terms contained

be terms not contained in

Let

be

and let

$,

Then $(t l /t 1 ',

$.

$

so,

tx

ti'

.

,

...,

is the result of replacing each occurence of each

in $ with an occurence of the corresponding

'

t

1

Now the

required definitions can be formulated as follows.
For any present-tensed sentence, S, any point, p, and
any route, r, such that p is on r, S is true-on-r at p =df S
is true at p.
For any sentence, S, any point, p, and any route, r,
such that p is on r, if S is PA for some sentence, A, then S
is true-on-r at p with respect to M,g =df for each constant,
such that A contains a if
ak
there are some
a if ..., a k
variables, u ,..., u k such that Ui~u k are not contained in
such that g' is a u A, and for every value assignment, g
and Uj in a -a k and u^Ukf
u k -variant of g and for each a
there is some point, p'
respectively, g' (u^) = f (<p, a]>)
...,
such that p' is to the left of p on r, and A(a /u
is true-on-r at p' with respect to M, g'
a k /u k
.

.

,

.

.

,

,

;

'

,

i

i

j

,

,

i

i ,

.

)

For any sentence, S, any point, p, and any route, r,
such that p is on r, if S is FA for some sentence, A, then S
is true-on-r at p with respect to M,g =df for each constant,
there are some
ak
such that A contains a it
ak
a.,
.,
contained in
are
not
-u
such that u
uk
k
variables, u if
g' is a u ~
g'
that
such
A, and for every value assignment,
.

.

.

,

.

.

.

,

.

.

,

,

t

,

L
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,,

,

u k -vari n
9 snd for each a^ and
in
and u -u k
^
respectively, g' (u^) = f (<p, a.j>)
there is some point,
such that p' is to the right of p on r, and A{a. / u
if
a k /u k
is true-on-r at p' with respect to M, g'
t-

;

,

p'

,

.

.

.

,

,

r

)

.

For any sentence, S, any point, p, and any route, r,
such that p is on r, if s is HA for some sentence, A, then 5
is true-on-r at p with respect to M,g =df for every point,
p'
such that p' is to the left of p on r, and for each
constant, a ir ...
ak
such that A contains a if ..., a k there
are some variables, u.,
uk
such that Ui~u k are not
contained in A, and for every value assignment, g
such
that g' is a u i -u k -variant of g and for each a and
in a a k and u^u*, respectively, g' (Uj) = f(<p, a^>)
A{aju if
a k /u k
is true-on-r at p' with respect to M,g'
,

r

,

,

.

.

.

,

,

'

,

1

z

,

)

.

For any sentence, S, any point, p, and any route, r,
such that p is on r, if S is GA for some sentence, A, then 5
is true-on-r at p with respect to M, g =df for every point,
p'
such that p' is to the right of p on r, and for each
constant, a i ,..., a k such that A contains a if
ak
there
are some variables, u if
uk
such that Ui~u k are not
contained in A, and for every value assignment, g'
such
that g' is a u i -u k -variant of g and for each a and u in a respectively, g' (Uj) = f (<p, a >)
a k and u -u k
A(a /u i/
is true-on-r at p' with respect to M, g'
a k /u k
,

.

.

,

.

.

.

.

,

,

,

,

,

3

i

z

z
J

t

,

i

.

)

For any sentence, 5, any point, p, and any route, r,
such that p is on r, if S is PnA for some sentence, A, and
number, n, then S is true-on-r at p with respect to M,g =df
ak
such that A contains a if
for each constant, a
such that Ui~u k are
there are some variables, u if
uk
ak
such
not contained in A, and for every value assignment, g'
that g' is a u^-^-variant of g and for each a and Uj in a L A{a /u if
respectively, g' (Uj) = f (<p, aj>)
a k and Ui-u k
is true-on-r at the point n units to the left of p on
a k /u k
r with respect to M,g'
L ,

.

.

.

,

.

.

,

.

.

.

.

,

,

z

,

,

i

)

.

For any sentence, S, any point, p, and any route, r,
such that p is on r, if S is FnA for some sentence, A, and
number, n, then S is true-on-r at p with respect to M, g =df
for each constant, a i ,..., a k such that A contains a ir
there are some variables, u it ..., u k such that Ui-u k are
ak
such
not contained in A, and for every value assignment, g'
in
aLand
u
each
a
for
and
of
-variant
g'
a
u
-u
is
that
g
k
i
A^/ir,
and u^-uy, respectively, g' (Uj) = f (<p, aj>)
a
right of p
the
to
units
n
point
the
at
true-on-r
is
/u
ak
k
on r with respect to M,g'
.

,

.

.

,

,

,

3

3

,

k

)

.

With these definitions in hand, we can give

a

single

truth-condition that will suffice for all of the tense
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operators of the 3DAMA language relative to
a

value assignment,

g,

for that model.

a

model, M, and

It is as follows:

if 5 is TA for an V sentence, A, and
tense
then Sc is _true at p with respect to M,g if for operator,
every
route, r, such that p is on r, TA is true-on-r
at p with
respect to M, g; otherwise TA is false at
p with respect to
M, g
ji

T,

Now,

finally, we can specify the truth-condition for
a

sentence at
s implicit er

point with respect to

a

Accordingly,

Then for any sentence,

S,

a

3DAMA model

let some 3DAMA model, M,

and point, p,

S is true at p with

respect to M if for every value assignment,
true at p with respect to

with respect to M.

As before,

M, g;

be given

g,

for M,

5 is

otherwise S is false at p

19

some examples will help to illustrate

a

few

important points about the 3DAMA language and its

relationship to English. Consider once again the sentence
tokens

(l)-(5)

above. According to the 3DAMA view, these

must be analyzed in terms of irreducibly past-, present- and

future-tensed sentence types, and these can be thought of as

19
I said above in Chapter 3 that the 3DAMAist may hold
either temporal Platonism or temporal reduct ionism The
3DAMAist who holds temporal Platonism will include all past
times, as well as the present time, in his or her ontology.
Such a theorist may analyze away talk that appears to be
about future times in the manner suggested for doing so in
footnote 12 above. Likewise, the 3DAMAist who holds temporal
reductionism may analyze away talk that appears to be about
any times - past, present or future - in the manner
suggested for doing so in the same foootnote.
.
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attributing common sense properties and relations to
ordinary, three-dimensional objects.
In order to see how this will work,

model, M4

,

of the 3DAMA language that,

consider some

according to the

3DAMA theorist, represents the actual, three-dimensional
world, with the point pi corresponding to tl. According to

the 3DAMA view,

(l)-(3)

can be translated just as they were

above in the discussion of the 3DAR language and semantics,
and the truth of each sentence can be determined in just the

way it was above. For in M4 there is,

just as in M3,

exactly

one route back into the past from the point that corresponds
to 1 1

according to the 3DAMA view, expresses the future-

(4),

singular proposition that Allen will be president.

tensed,
So

can be translated into 3DAMA-style English as

(4)

follows
It will be the case that

(4d)

(Allen is

president)

(4d)

can then go into the following sentence of the 3DAMA

language,
(4d'

)

F(P 1 a),

which will be true relative to M4 provided that
'a'>)

= Allen,

(ii)

is president at p},

for any point, p,

and (iii)

f (<p,

'P 1; >)

on every route,

r,

f(<pl,

(i)

=

{<x>:

x

through pi,

right of pi on
there is some point, p, such that p is to the
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r,

and <Allen> is a member of

f (<p,

P 1 >,

i.e.,

provided that

on every route accessible from the present point, there is

some point at which Allen is president.

According to what was said above, then, this sentence
will be true relative to

model like M4,

a

i.e.,

a

model that

represents the actual world and makes appropriate

assignments to constants and predicates, provided that the

matter is, as of the present time,

deterministic matter. If it

is,

a

physically

then there are (past and)

present things for the relevant proposition to correspond to
in virtue of which it is true.

If not,

then the relevant

proposition is false, because there are no such things.
What about

(5)

3DAMA view, expresses

This sentence cannot,
a

according to the

future-tensed, singular proposition

about the person who will be president in 2090, given the

3DAMA theorist's ontological views. 20 So if the sentence is

translated into some sentence with the same form as (5c'),
then,

given our policy of treating sentences with names that

fail to refer as false,
(5)

could,

that sentence will be false.

however, be taken to express the general

proposition that there will be someone in one hundred years
who will be president and who will also be wise. If

(5)

is

taken to express this proposition, then it can be translated
into 3DAMA-style English as follows:

Assuming that there is no person in existence now who
will be president in 2090.
20
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5d) It will be the case one hundred, years
hence that (there is an x such that (x is
president and x is wise)
(

)

(5d)

can then go into the following sentence of the 3DAMA

language,

(5d'

)

F100 [Ex

(P x x

&

wix)

]

,

which will be true relative to M4 provided that on every
route,
'Ex (P 1 x

r,
&

such that pi is on
Wix)'

r,

the quantified sentence

is true at the point 100 years to the right

of pi on r.
In general,

there are two main differences between

3DAMA language and semantics and the 3DAR language and
semantics. The first is that there can be true sentences of
i

the 3DAR language that express singular propositions about

merely future objects, but there cannot be such sentences of
i

the 3DAMA language. The second is that there can be true
I

I

sentences of the 3DAR language that express propositions
about future, physically indeterministic matters, but there
i

cannot be such sentences of the 3DAMA language.

178

.

4

.6

A Formal Language, with Semantics,

for 3DAA

At any given time, the 3DAA theorist's ontology

consists of
time;

(ii)

(i)

all of the 3D objects that exist at that

all kinds of properties of,

and relations

obtaining among, those objects; and (iii) ordered sets

constructed out of things in the 3DAA theorist's ontology,
some of which ordered sets will be propositions.

Accordingly, the 3DAA language that
as its domain of discourse,

I

will propose will have

at any given time,

the set of

all of the things in the 3DAA ontology at that time; and the

truth-conditions for the tensed sentences of the language
will be such that,

at any given time,

the only things

involved in determining the truth-value of any sentence at
that time are things that are present at that time.

Among the constraints on what the 3DAA language can be
like are the 3DAA theorist's commitments to STA and TDVP

These two factors mean that the 3DAA language,
and 3DAMA languages,

sentence-types

like the 3DAR

is to be a language composed of tensed

(some of which contain tense operators)

,

so

that at each time, each such sentence-type expresses some

tensed proposition, if it expresses
Then,

a

proposition at all.

as with the 3DAR and 3DAMA semantics,

the 3DAA

semantics will involve ascriptions of truth-values to

sentence-types at times.
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Can the 3DAA semantics be just like the 3DAMA

semantics? No. Virtually all of the considerations involving
the ontological status of the future, according to the 3DAMA
view, that were raised above in order to show that the 3DAMA

semantics have to allow for future-branching lines also
apply to the 3DAA semantics; but exactly analogous

considerations about the ontological status of the past,
according to the 3DAA view, entail that the 3DAA semantics
have to be past- and future-branching, and this will call
for a departure from the traditional,

future-branching

semantics proposed above for the 3DAMA view.
The 3DAA semantics, then, will be like the 3DAMA

semantics, except that the 3DAA semantics will allow for
lines that may branch at any point in either direction. For
example, the line segment shown in figure

4

is one that may

be included in a 3DAA model.

Figure

4

;

A 3DAA Line Segment

As with the 3DAMA semantics,

ensure that from any given point,

contained in

a

the 3DAA semantics should
p,

on some line,

L,

3DAA model, the only points that are relevant
180

to determining the truth-value of
any sentence at p are
points that are on routes accessible from
Thus,

it would

p.

be desirable for the 3DAA theorist to
have truth-conditions

that ensured that for any sentence,
is true at a point, p,
5

—>

—>

FnPnS; S

—>

and S

HFS.

S,

and number,

n,

if s

then so are all if the following:

PnFnS; S

—>

FnPS; S

—>

PnFS; s

—>

GPS;

21

What follows is

a

characterization of

a

formal language

and semantics that would be well-suited to the 3DAA view.

THE 3DAA LANGUAGE

Primitive Vocabulary
The primitive vocabulary is the same as the primitive
vocabulary of the 3DAR and 3DAMA languages.

Syntax
The syntactical rules are the same as the syntactical
rules of the 3DAR and 3DAMA languages.

21

This means that instances of each of the following
schemas will be theorems of the 3DAA language:

—
—
—
—
—

> FnPnS;
S
> PnFnS;
S
FnPS;
>
S
> PnFS;
S
S --> GPS; and
> HFS.
S
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Semantics

Everything about the semantics for the 3DAA
language
will be as in the semantics for the 3DAMA
language, with
just three exceptions: there will be a
different condition

placed on the type of line that can be contained in any
3DAA
model (in order to allow for lines that branch in both
directions)

the definition of a route will have to be

,

changed in order to accommodate this first difference; and
the third constraint on df

P

,

on L,

if

subset of df

(that for any two points,

p is to the left of
(p'

p'

then df

,

(p)

p and

must be

a

will be waived.

)

The first difference, then, will consist in the fact

that the definition of a 3DAA model will be exactly like the

definition of

a

3DAMA model except in clause

(i)

Clause

(i)

of the definition of a 3DAA model will be as follows:
L is a system of connected lines through an

(i)

infinite,

two-dimensional space.

Then the definition of

contained in
through
a

a

a

line,

a

route through the line

3DAA model will be as follows:
L,

that is a member of

a

r

is a route

3DAA model =df

segment of L that is continuous and that occupies,

each position along the

occupied by

L,

x

r

for

axis of the two-dimensional space

no more than one point along the y axis of

that space.
The rest of the 3DAA semantics

definitions of truth on

a

is

route,
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including the

and both the intermediate

.

truth-conditions for
respect to

a

a

model and

sentence's being true at

a

point with

value assignment for that model, as

a

well as the final truth-condition for
true at a point with respect to

a

a

sentence's being

model simpliciter

-

will

be exactly as in the 3DAMA semantics. 22

As before,

we shall consider the 3DAA theorist's

treatment of sentences

(

1

)

— 5)

above in order to shed some

(

light on the 3DAA language and its relationship to English.

According to the 3DAA view, these must be analyzed in terms
of irreducibly past-,

present- and future-tensed sentence

types, which can be thought of as attributing common sense

properties and relations to ordinary, three-dimensional
objects
In order to see how this will work,

model, M5,

theorist,

of the 3DAA language that,

consider some

according to the 3DAA

represents the actual, three-dimensional world,

with the point pi corresponding to tl.

According to the 3DAA view,

proposition that Montana is

a

(1)

expresses the

quarterback; hence it can be

translated just as it was above in the discussion of the
3DAR language and semantics, and its truth can be determined
in just the way it was in that discussion.

said in Chapter 3 above that the 3DAAist may hold
either temporal Platonism or temporal reduct ionism, but
that, in any case, such a theorist must analyze away talk
that appears to be about merely past or merely future times.
Such a theorist may do so in the manner suggested in
footnote 12 above.
22

I
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)

(2)

according to the 3DAA view, expresses the pasttensed, singular proposition that Unitas was a
quarterback,
,

which is

singular proposition about an object that is

a

present right now. So this sentence can also be translated
into the 3DAA language in the way it was translated into
the

3DAR language. I.e.,
(2c'

P (Q x u)

)

can be translated into 3DAA as

(2

.

But the way in which the truth-value of this sentence is

determined,

according to the 3DAA theorist, is unlike the

way in which it was determined according to the 3DAR
theorist.

(2c'

will be true

case for every route,
point, p

'

,

is true at p'

.

such that pi is on

r,

such that p'
If what

(relative to M5)
r,

at pi

there is some

is to the left of p on r and
I

just in

'Q x u'

said above about indeterminism and

the truth-values of future-tensed sentences in the 3DAMA

language is correct, then it will also apply to the truth-

values(3)of past-tensed sentences of the 3DAA language. Hence
this past-tensed sentence about Unitas will be true

at-

pi

just in case current conditions and the laws of nature are

sufficient to ensure that the truth-condition described
above is satisfied; i.e.,

just in case the matter is a

physically deterministic one.
,

of course,

cannot be taken to express any singular

proposition about Socrates, according to 3DAA, for on that
view there are no such propositions. The best the 3DAA
theorist can do here is, in

a

move parallel to the 3DAMA

184

theorist

treatment of

s

'

to say that

(5),

(3)

may be taken to

express the past-tensed, general proposition
that there was
a man called "Socrates" who was
wise. This proposition could
be translated into 3DAA-style English as
follows:

Oe) It has been the case that (there is an x
such that (x is called "Socrates" and x is
wise)
)

.

This sentence can then go into the following sentence
of the

3DAA language,
(3e'

)

P [Ex (S x x &

W x x)

]

,

which will be true at pi relative to M5 provided that on
every route accessible to pi there is some point to the left
of pi at which there is such an x;

matter is

a

provided that the

deterministic one.

Finally,
language,

i.e.,

(4)

and

(5)

will be treated,

in the 3DAA

in exactly the manner in which they were treated

in the 3DAMA. language.

In general,

there are two main differences between the

3DAA language and semantics and the 3DAMA language and
semantics. The first is that there can be true sentences of
the 3DAMA language that express singular propositions about

merely past objects, but there cannot be such sentences of
the 3DAA language. The second is that there can be true

sentences of the 3DAMA language that express propositions

185
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about matters in the past that are not entailed by the

combination of the current state of affairs plus the laws of
nature, but there cannot be such sentences of the 3DAA

language

4

.

7

Conclusion

The 4D and 3DRR views can each be accomodated by

a

traditional predicate calculus, with the standard kind of
semantics for such a language. Each of the 3DAR, 3DAMA and
3DAA views requires

a

tense logic,

i.e.,

a

formal language

that includes special intensional operators that correspond
to the past- and future-tenses,

and whose semantics involve

assigning truth-values to sentences at times. The semantics
for the 3DAR language can be of the traditional kind for

such

a

tense logic,

so that the lines contained in models

for the language will all be non-branching. The semantics
for the 3DAMA language, however, must allow for models with

lines that branch in the direction of the future. Finally,

the semantics for the 3DAA language must allow for models

with lines that branch both in the direction of the future
and in the direction of the past.

186

CHAPTER

5:

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PASSAGE VIEWS

5.1 Introduction

In Chapter

3

I

considered several different views (each

one consisting of a package of metaphysical components)

about the passage of time. Four of the views constituted

ways of providing a positive answer to the question 'Does
time pass?'

.

In this chapter

I

will turn to a consideration

of the main arguments that may be brought against these

passage views. I'll begin by considering two versions of

well-known argument aimed at passage views, which
call "The Rate of Passage Argument." Then

I

a

will

I

will consider

version of McTaggart's famous argument that is relevant to
the views in question.

arguments

-

I

will conclude that none of these

neither McTaggart's Argument nor the first nor

the second version of The Rate of Passage Argument
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is a

a

;

good one. No 3D theorist needs to be
especially concerned by
these arguments, because in each one there
is some premise
that the 3D theorist can happily reject.

5

•

2

—The

Rate of Passage Arguments

In this section

I

will discuss two distinct but closely

related arguments that have been brought against the passage
views. As far as

I

can tell,

these arguments, or arguments

very much like them, were first suggested in the literature
by C.D Broad.

1

But J.J.C. Smart has probably been the most

earnest proponent of The Rate of Passage Arguments, and it
is to him that

I

will look for

In his famous article,

a

statement of the arguments.

"The River of Time," Smart

argues against the idea that time can properly be thought of
as something that flows like a river.

If time is a flowing river we must think of
events taking time to float down this stream,
and if we say 'time has flowed faster to-day
than yesterday' we are saying that the stream
flowed a greater distance to-day than it did
in the same time yesterday. That is, we are
postulating a second time-scale with respect
to which the flow of events along the first

Broad, "Ostensible Temporality," p. 124. See also Smart,
"The River of Time, " pp. 214-216; Smart, Philosophy and
Scientific Realism, p. 136; Prior, "Changes in Events and
Changes in Things;" Schlesinger, "How Time Flies," pp.
Zwart, About Time, chapter V.
507 ff
1

.
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time-dimension is measured. 'To-day'
'tomorrow'
'yesterday'
become systematically
ambiguous. They may represent positions in the
first time-dimension, as in 'to-day I played
cricket and to-morrow I shall do so again'
or
they may represent positions in the second
time-dimension, as in 'to-day time flowed
faster than it did yesterday'
Nor will it
help matters to say that time always flows at
the same rate. Furthermore, just as we thought
of the first time-dimension as a stream, so
will we want to think of the second timedimension as a stream also; now the speed of
flow of the second stream is a rate of change
with respect to a third time-dimension, and so
we can go on indefinitely postulating fresh
streams without being any better satisfied.
["The River of Time," pp. 214-215.]
,

,

,

,

.

As

see it,

I

the argument that Smart is suggesting here

begins with the claim that we can understand the idea of
time's flowing or passing only if we posit some second time-

dimension in terms of which we can explicate the flowing or

passing of normal time. This claim would presumably be
justified by an appeal to some principle about the meaning
of the words

'flow'

and 'pass' when applied to time. The

principle might be formulated as follows.
The passage principle: To say that some timedimension, T, flows or passes is to say that
such
there is some other time-dimension, T'
that T' is distinct from T, and the flow or
passage of events in T is to be measured with
respect to T'
,

The argument also involves the claim that if time flows
or passes,

then in order for any time-dimension to be

legitimate time-dimension,

it must

189

a

flow or pass. This claim

.

would presumably be defended by appeal to

a

principle that

could be formulated as follows.
The essentiality principle: If flowing or
passing is a characteristic of time, then
flowing or passing must be an essential
characteristic of any time-dimension.

More is needed, however, in order to ensure that, as
Smart says,

"we can go on indefinitely." It must also be

claimed that the passage of any time-dimension is to be

measured only with respect to some previously unmentioned
time-dimension. This principle might be formulated as
follows
The uniqueness principle: For any series of
time-dimensions, Tl, ..., Tn, such that the
passage of each member of the series is to be
measured with respect to the next member of
the series, the passage of Tn must be measured
with respect to some time-dimension, Tm, such
that Tm is distinct from each member of the
series Tl-Tn.

Now the argument can be formulated as follows.

.

.

.

The First Rate of Passage Argument

(1) If time flows or passes, then there is
some second time-dimension with respect to
which the passage of normal time is to be

measured
If there is some second time-dimension
(2)
with respect to which the passage of normal
time is to be measured, then the second timedimension must flow or pass.
If the second time-dimension flows or
(3)
passes, then there must be some third timedimension with respect to which the passage of
the second time-dimension is to be measured,
and, hence, some fourth time-dimension with
respect to which the passage of the third
time-dimension is to be measured, and so on

indefinitely
(5) It's not the case that there is some third
(4)
time-dimension with respect to which the
passage of the second time-dimension is to be
measured, and, hence, some fourth timedimension with respect to which the passage of
the third time-dimension is to be measured,
and so on indefinitely.

It's not the case that time flows or

passes

Whatever plausibility this argument has is due to
premises

(2)

-(4).

If any of the 3D views entailed some kind

of infinite series of time-dimensions in order to explicate

fully the claim that time passes, then that view would

surely be untenabe to any but the most wildly free-spending
of ontologists
(1)

.

But no 3D theorist needs to accept premise

of this argument.
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Let us first consider how 3DAR,

3DAMA and 3DAA

theorists should respond to this argument. In his lecture
"Changes in Events and Changes in Things," Prior shows how
one who holds the 3D view plus the semantical thesis of

temporal actualism can account for the truth in saying that
time passes, without thereby becoming committed to an

infinite series of time-dimensions. The explanation begins

with

a

consideration of the primitive tenses accepted by

such

a

theorist.

I

mentioned in Chapter

3

that these tenses

are to be understood as sentential operators,

'allegedly',

'possibly',

akin to

and 'it's not the case that'; they

make sentences out of sentences. Now, Prior points out that
talk about time'
talk about

a

s

flowing or passing can be understood as

special kind of change.

To say that a change has occurred is to say
at least this much: that something which was
the case formerly is not the case now. That
is, it is at least to say that for some
sentence p we have
It was the case that p,
is not the case that p.

and it

This sentence p can be as complicated as you
like, and can itself contain tense-adverbs, so
that one example of our formula would be
It was the case 5 months ago that
(it was the case only 47 years ago
and it is
that (I am being born)
)

not now the case that (it was the
case only 47 years ago that (I am
being born)
)

that is, I am not as young as I used to be.
This last change, of course, is a case of
precisely that recession of events into the
past that we are really talking about when we
say that time flows or passes, and the piling
192
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.

of time-references on top of one another, with
no suggestion that time-words must be used in
3different sense at each level, simply
reflects the fact that tense— adverbs are
adverbs, not verbs. ["Changes in Events and
Changes in Things," p. 9.]

The point here is that to say that time flows or

passes,

as the 3DAR,

3DAMA and 3DAA theorists say it does,

is simply to say that many instances of the form "It has

been the case that p and it is not the case that p" are
true. As Prior remarks at the end of the same lecture,

this formula continues to express what is
common to the flow of a literal river on the
one hand (where it was the case that such-andsuch drops were at a certain place, and this
is the case no longer) and the flow of time on
the other. ["Changes in Events and Changes in
Things, " p
14
.

.

To say that time passes,

in this sense,

does not

require different time-dimensions. It does, however, require
the tensed view of propositions,

and the claim that

different sentences or propositions are true at different
times. 3DAR,

3DAMA and 3DAA theorists can thus respond to

the above argument by denying premise

(1)

They can maintain

that the special sense in which it is correct to say that

time flows or passes is

a

metaphorical sense; it does not

require an additional time-dimension in which to measure the
rate of time's flow, because the views in question do not
2
involve saying that time literally flows.

Does this mean that the 3D theorist cannot say that time
literally flows or passes, even if he or she wants to, on

2
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What about the 3DRR theorist?

I

said in section 3.8,

somewhat hesitantly, that it seemed reasonable to call 3DRR
a

passage view, because on this view there is an important

difference between space and time, insofar as physical
objects endure through time but do not do anything analogous

through space. Hence 3DRR entials that SPT is false.
The reason

however,

I

hesitated to call 3DRR

a

passage view,

is that 3DRR does not entail that time passes in

the sense suggested by Prior in the passages quoted above.

For according to 3DRR, there are no true sentences of the
form "It was the case that p, and it is not the case that
p." Thus,

if saying that time passes means denying SPT,

then

3DRR is one way of saying that time passes; but if saying
that time passes also means saying that there are some true

instances of Prior's formula, then 3DRR is not

a

way of

saying that time passes.
In any case,

to accept premise

I

don't see any reason for

(1)

a

3DRR theorist

of The First Rate of Passage Argument.

Insofar as it is true to say that time passes, according to
3DRR,

i.e.,

insofar as SPT is false,

it certainly does not

follow that there is some second time-dimension with respect
to which the passage of normal time is to be measured.

Immediately after the passage quoted above from "The

River of Time," Smart goes on to say some things that

pain of succumbing to The First Rate of Passage Argument?
This question will be addressed below; I will argue that the
correct answer to it is No.
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suggest yet another argument against the claim that time

passes

A connected point is this: with respect to
motion in space it is always possible to ask
'how fast is it?' An express train, for
example, may be moving at 88 feet per second.
The question, 'How fast is it moving?' is a
sensible question with a definite answer: '88
feet per second'
We may not in fact know the
answer, but we do at any rate know what sort
of answer is required. Contrast the pseudoquestion 'How fast am I advancing through
time?' or 'How fast did time flow yesterday?'
We do not know how we ought to set about
answering it. What sort of measurements ought
we to make? We do not even know the sort of
units in which our answer should be expressed.
'I am advancing through time at how many
?' we might begin, and then we
seconds per
should have to stop. What could possibly fill
in the blank? Not 'seconds' surely. In that
case the most we could hope for would be the
not very illuminating remark that there is
just one second in every second. ["The River
of Time " p 215
.

,

.

.

]

The argument suggested here,

it seems to me,

is based

not on the claim that we shall need an infinite series of

time-dimensions in order to explain, or measure, the passage
of our original time-dimension, but,

rather,

that to say that time flows is to raise

a

on the claim

question that

cannot be coherently answered. The question is 'How fast
does time flow?'
That this question arises from the claim that time

flows would presumably be defended by an appeal to something
like the following principle.
The principle of change: For any thing,
x changes, then x changes at some rate.
195

x,

if

:

the question

'How fast does time flow?'

cannot be

coherently answered would presumably be defended in part by
an appeal to a definition like the following.

R is a rate =df there is some parameter, P,
and number, n, such that R = n units of P per
unit of time.

To this definition would be added two further claims:

(i)

the claim that the first parameter involved in the rate of
'

the flow of time would have to be time,

so that the rate of

the flow of time would be something of the form "n units of

time per unit of time”; and

(ii)

a

claim to the effect that

something of the form "n units of time per unit of time"
does not express
then,

a

coherent rate. The definition of 'rate',

together with these two claims, would justify the

premise that the question 'How fast does time flow?' cannot
be coherently answered.

Finally, the argument also depends on a principle about

coherency,

such as the following.

The principle of coherency For any thing,
if x flows, then it is possible to state
coherently the rate at which x flows.

x,

This second rate of passage argument can now be

formulated as follows.
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The Second Rate of Passage Argument

(1) If it makes sense to say that time flows,
then it makes sense to ask 'How fast does time

flow?'

If it makes sense to ask 'How fast does
(2)
time flow?', then it's possible for there to
be a coherent answer to this question.
(4)
(3) It's not possible for there to be
coherent answer to this question.

a

It doesn't make sense to say that time

flows

This,

it seems to me,

is a very interesting argument,

and one that raises several important issues about the ways
in which we talk about the passage of time,

and rates in general. But
issues are spelled out,
least four distinct,

I

in particular,

also think that once these

it can be shown that there are at

adequate responses to the argument

available to the 3D theorist.
In order to explain this it will first be necessary to

say some things about rates. As a paradigm case involving

the rate of some process,

let us suppose that it is 1964 and

we are watching Abebe Bikela run in the Olympic marathon in
Tokyo. For the sake of simplicity we will suppose that

Bikela'

s

rate is constant throughout the race. How exactly

can we determine what that rate is? I.e., what is the

procedure that we would go through in order to find out how
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fast Bikela is running? Well,

it might be something like

this: we first check Bikela'

s

position on the course by

noting that he is passing

certain mile-marker, and, at

a

roughly the same time, we check the time; then we note when

Bikela passes the next mile-marker, and again check the
time;

if we find that five minutes have passed while Bikela

has run one mile then we will know that he is running at the

rate of one mile per five minutes, or twelve miles per hour.
But how exactly do we check the time at the appropriate

moments during this procedure? Well, we simply consult

a

clock. Thus, our investigation reveals that while Bikela'

position on the course changed by one mile, the position of
the hands on the clock changed by the amount that marks off
five minutes. Since we assume that the rate of Bikela'

change in position is constant, and also that the rate of
the change in position of the hands on the clock is
constant, we are in effect comparing the rates of these two

changes to one another. But, of course, we really have no
special interest in the rate of the change in position of
the hands on that particular clock; our interest in the

clock is only due to the fact that we take it to be so

calibrated that it changes at
is,

a

constant rate;

rate,

a

that

that by convention we use to measure periods of time.

This conventional rate is,
5

of course,

not just any old rate;

supposed to be the rate at which the sun changes its

position in the sky. Really, then, the clock is

a

stand-in

carrying out
for the sun; and what we have really done in
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our procedure is to compare the rate of Bikela'

s

change of

position to the rate of the sun's change of position. Our
investigation has revealed that while Bikela'

s

position on

the course changed by one mile, the sun's position in the
sky changed by roughly one and one-quarter degrees.

These are the logistical facts of the matter, and they

capture the mechanics of our talk about the rates of such

physical processes as Bikela'

s

motion. It may seem, however,

that there is something deeper going on when we make the

appropriate investigations and find out that Bikela is

traveling at the rate of twelve miles per hour. While we
have in practice merely compared the rate of one physical

change to the rate of another, it seems that we have at
least attempted to do something quite different. For just as
we are not really interested in the rate of the change of

position of the hands on our clock, so we are not, it seems,
really interested in the rate of the change of position of
the sun; the latter change is also meant to be a stand-in
for a more important change,

itself.

namely the passage of time

it seems that our assumption that the sun's

Indeed,

position changes at

a

constant rate amounts to the

assumption that the sun's position changes at the rate of
fifteen degrees per hour,

i.e.,

that every time the sun

moves fifteen degrees across the sky, one hour of time
passes. So it at least appears that what we are after in

trying to determine the rates of various physical processes,
such as Bikela'

s

running of the marathon, are the rates at
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which those processes occur in comparison to the rate of the
passage of time.
Here,

it seems to me,

The issue is,

a very

interesting issue arises.

roughly, whether there is in fact some special

sort of change that always occurs while other changes are

occurring:

a

change that is entailed by any other change

whatsoever, but one that does not itself entail any other
change. Let us agree to call this putative kind of change
"the pure passage of time".

3

We can define it as follows:

is the pure passage of time =df x is a
change and for any y, if y is a change then,
necessarily, if y occurs then x occurs; but it
is not the case that there is some change, z,
such that z is distinct from x and,
necessarily, if x occurs then z occurs.
x

Then we can define what might be called "normal" or "run of
the mill" changes as follows:

normal change =df
it's possible that there
is a change and it's not
necessarily, if y occurs

x is a

x is a change and
is some y such that y

the case that,
then x occurs.

It may seem that the change in the position of the sun

is merely a stand-in for the pure passage of time.

I.e.,

it

may seem that when we compare the rate of the marathoner to
the rate of the change in the sun'

s

position, what we are

really doing, or attempting to do, is comparing the rate of
It is sometimes called "pure becoming"
Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, pp. 73ff.
3
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See,

for example,

.

the marathoner to the rate of the pure passage
of time, so

that a statement to the effect that Bikela'

miles per hour means that he runs

a

s

rate is twelve

mile during every hour

of the pure passage of time.
On the other hand,

it may seem that there is no such

change as the pure passage of time,
above.

I.e.,

in the sense defined

it may seem that it's false that there is some

underlying change that is entailed by every other change in
the world but that itself entails no other change. In what
follows

I

will call the thesis that there is such

the pure passage of time "PPT"

,

and

a

thing as

will refer to the

I

denial of this thesis as "NPPT"
What reasons are there for asserting PPT?

I

can think

of two main reasons. The first is that this claim fits the

way we ordinarily speak about time. We talk as if there is
more to the concept of an hour than merely

a

change of

fifteen degrees in the sun's position in the sky. As far as
I

can tell,

our ordinary modes of speaking suggest that talk

about the change in the position of the sun is really just

a

stand-in for talk about real hours, which are units of time
quite independent of the sun's motion in the sky. If this

kind of talk is to be taken seriously then we must commit

ourselves to the pure passage of time.
The second reason

I

can think of for asserting PPT is

the close connection between this claim and the view that

have been calling temporal Platonism.

PPT should properly be thought of as
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a

I

don't know whether

component of temporal

Platonism, or, instead, as

a

separate view. But it seems

clear that at the very least PPT and temporal Platonism

entail one another. For if the ontological thesis of

temporal Platonism is true then it is possible for there to
be a period of empty time,

i.e.,

a

period of time during

which nothing happens except that time passes; thus the only
change that would be occurring would be the kind of change
that fits the definition of the pure passage of time. It

would be very implausible to maintain that this kind of
change is possible, but that it does not actually occur. And
if PPT is true,

so that there is a special kind of change

that underlies every other change but does not entail any

other change, then this change could no doubt occur all by
itself; i.e., there could be a period of empty time. So

anyone who is inclined to accept temporal Platonism should
also accept PPT,

and vice versa.

This should make it plain,

of course,

that there is an

equally good reason for asserting NPPT, namely, the view
that

I

have been calling temporal reductionism

.

As with

temporal Platonism and PPT, it is not obvious whether NPPT
should be seen as

a

component of temporal reductionism or as

something distinct; but in any case it seems clear that NPPT
and temporal reductionism entail one another. For if the

ontological thesis of temporal reductionism is true then
there can be no such thing as
a

a

period of empty time, i.e.,

period during which the only change that occurs is the

pure passage of time. And,

similarly,
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if there is no such

thing as this kind of change, then it is not possible for
there to be

a

period of empty time. So anyone who is

inclined to accept temporal reductionism should also acccept
NPPT,

and vice versa.
In addition to its connection with temporal

reductionism, there is another plausible reason for

accepting NPPT: the pure passage of time, if there were such
a

thing, would be an utterly mysterious change that would

render our claims about the rates of run of the mill changes

relative to the rate of the pure passage of time in

principle unverif iable

.

The pure passage of time would be

mysterious because it would not be something that we could
ever observe directly

-

our only evidence for it would be

the fact that other changes occur, together with whatever

theoretical considerations lead us to posit the pure passage
of time. And the pure passage of time would render claims

about the rates of other changes relative to the rate of the

pure passage of time unverifiable because,
be able to tell,

for all we would

it might be that on some days all of the

other changes in the world speed up to

a

thousand times

their normal rates, relative to the pure passage of time,
and that on other days they slow down just as drastically.
Such

a

thing is not possible according to NPPT. For

suppose that NPPT is true. Then what is meant by 'Bikela is

running at the rate of twelve miles per hour'

?

The sentence

cannot mean that Bikela runs twelve miles in each hour of

pure time; rather,

it must mean something like this:
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Bikela

.

runs twelve miles each time the sun's position changes by

fifteen degrees. This latter change would then be simply
standard,

chosen by convention,

a

for comparing rates and

lengths of various changes. But the standard wouldn't stand
for anything else

-

it would not serve as a marker for

approximating the pure passage of time. And if it should
turn out one day that the motion of the sun in the sky
appears to speed up drastically relative to other, familiar
changes, then we should say, not that the motion of the sun

has sped up drastically relative to the pure passage of
time, while every other change has maintained its rate, but,

rather,

simply that the sun's motion has sped up relative to

the other normal changes. We may then want to choose another

standard for comparing the rates and lengths of changes,

especially if the speed of the sun seems to have become
erratic. In so choosing we would no doubt want to select

a

change that occurs periodically and that seems relatively

constant
So if NPPT is true,

then all of our talk about the

rates of different changes must be understood as talk that
is meant to compare the rate of one ordinary change to the

rate of another; a question such as

'How fast does x

change?' must be a question about the speed of the change in
x

relative to the speed of some other change

(s).

It

just so

happens that in answering such questions we generally select
change,
the change in the position of the sun as the second

standard way of
to which the first one is compared. Thus the
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answering such

a

question is to:

measuring the change in
position we pick miles)
(preferably

a

x
;

(e.g.,
(ii)

cyclical one,

the sun around the earth)

;

(i)

pick some unit for

for the change in Bikela'

pick some other change

such as the apparent rotation of
(iii)

pick some unit for

measuring this other change (e.g.,
revolution, also known as an hour)

l/ 24 th of a

and (iv)

;

full

compare the

rate of the change in x to the rate of this other change by

comparing the number of units by which

x changes to the

number of units by which this other thing changes

concurrently (getting an answer like 'Twelve miles per
hour'

)

If PPT is true,

on the other hand,

then talk about

rates can be understood in either of several ways. We could
still say that such talk simply consists of comparisons

between the rates of different changes, sometimes including
the pure passage of time; or we could say that talk about

rates essentially involves comparisons between the rates of

different changes and the rate of the pure passage of time.
If this is the case,

change

then whenever we select some observable

(such as the change in the position of the sun,

the change in the position of the hands on

purpose of measuring

interested

in,

a

a clock)

or

for the

particular change whose rate we are

that observable change is merely

a

stand-in

for the pure passage of time.

Two main questions arise, then, concerning our talk

about rates: Is there really such
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thing as the pure

.

.

passage of time? And even if there is such
essential about rate talk
changes,

-

a

thing, what is

the comparison of any two

or the comparison of one change to the pure passage

of time?

All of this is relevant to The Second Rate of Passage

Argument

.

The 3D theorist is free to give either a positive

or a negative answer to the first question. Suppose he or

she says that there is no such thing as the pure passage of

time. Then what does he or she mean by 'Time flows'? Well,
as

have indicated above,

I

for a 3DAR,

3DAMA or 3DAA

theorist, this kind of talk is simply metaphorical talk
meaning,

roughly,

that many instances of "It has been the

case that p and it is not the case that p" are true. The

3DAMA or 3DAA theorist can quite reasonably say this

3DAR,

without at the same time admitting that it makes sense to
ask

'How fast does time flow?'

.

After all, it certainly

doesn't make sense to ask 'How fast is it the case that many

instances of "It has been the case that p and it is not the
case that p" are true?'
Similarly,
means,

roughly,

for a 3DRR theorist,

'Time flows'

,

if true,

that SPT is false. Such a theorist can

reasonably assert this without at the same time admitting
that it makes sense to ask 'How fast does time flow?'
all,

it certainly doesn't make sense to ask

.

After

'How fast is it

the case that SPT is false?'
Thus,

any 3D theorist who thinks that there is no such

thing as the pure passage of time will reject premise
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(1)

of

The Second Rate of Passage Argument, but will still be able
to maintain that

'Time passes'

is true when understood in

the appropriate way.
What about 3D theorists who do accept that there is

such

a

thing as the pure passage of time? Well, it seems

clear that such people will admit that 'Time flows'

is

literally true, so that they will not want to reject premise
(1)

of The Second Rate of Passage Argument. But they will

then have

a

choice about how to answer the second question

about rate talk. Suppose a 3D theorist who accepts PPT

believes that talk about any rate essentially involves

a

comparison between two different changes, but that it need
not be the case that one of the changes compared is the pure

passage of time.

(Such a person might support his or her

position by pointing out that in at least some instances we
speak of

a

certain rate without appearing to make any

reference to time. For example,
1970 World Series,

I

might say that during the

Brooks Robinson's batting average

increased at the rate of 30 points per game.) Then the 3D
theorist will think that any time one gives the rate of some
change in terms of some second change, one has likewise

given the rate of the second change.

If,

for example,

I

tell

you that Robinson's batting average increased at the rate of
30 points per game,

then

I

have also told you that the games

progressed at the rate of one game per

30 points of

Robinson's batting average. Hence, whenever one gives the
rate of some normal change in what is admittedly the
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standard way, i.e., in terms of the pure
passage of time,
then one has likewise given the rate of the
pure passage of
time in terms of the first change. If I tell
you that Bikela
is running at the rate of twelve miles
per hour of
the pure

passage of time,

for example, then

I

have also told you that

the pure passage of time is flowing at the rate of
one hour
for every mile run by Bikela. The 3D theorist who
takes this

line can thus reject premise

(3)

of The Second Rate of

Passage Argument, while still insisting that it is literally
true that time flows. For he or she will think that it is

possible to state coherently the rate at which time flows,
and that this information is in fact given each time the
rate of some normal change is described in terms of the pure

passage of time.
Suppose that

a

3D theorist who accepts PPT believes

that all talk about rates is essentially talk comparing some

change to the pure passage of time; there is still,
to me,

it seems

an important choice for such a person to make with

regard to how we are to understand rate talk. For he or she
might believe that there are no restrictions on what kind of
changes can be sensibly compared to the pure passage of
time;

in particular,

it may be sensible to compare the pure

passage of time to itself. According to this view, the

question 'How fast does time flow?' is

a

sensible question

with a sensible answer: time flows at the rate of one hour
per hour. One who takes this line will be able to reject
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premise

(3)

of The Second Rate of Passage
Argument and still

maintain that it is literally true that time
flows.
Finally,

a

3D theorist who accepts PPT may choose
to

say that what is essential about rate talk is
that it

compare

(a)

some normal change to

time. According to this view,

(b)

it does not make sense to ask

about the rate of the flow of time,
a

the pure passage of

for to do so is to make

category mistake: the answer would have to involve

a

comparison between the pure passage of time and the pure

passage of time. Such an answer would not make sense because
the pure passage of time has a unique status among changes
it is the one to which other,

normal changes are to be

compared. It is the paradigm, and, as such,

changes cannot be measured.
thus accept premise

(3)

4

-

it alone among

One who takes this line will

of The Second Rate of Passage

Argument, but he or she will be able to reject premise

(1)

of the argument, without thereby being compelled to deny

that time literally flows.
To summarize the situation with regard to The Second

Rate of Passage Argument: if what

I

have said above is

correct then there are at least four adequate responses to
that argument available to the 3D theorist. Each of these

Wittgenstein makes analogous remarks about the standard
meter: "There is one thing of which one can say neither that
it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and
that is the standard metre in Paris. -- But this is, of
course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but
only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of
measuring with a metre-rule." [Philosophical Investigations,
4

50.

]
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different responses involves giving an answer
to the
question about the pure passage of time, and
also giving
answers to the questions about rate talk. The
four responses
are:

(

1

deny that there is such

)

of time,

say that

'Time flows'

a

is

thing as the pure passage
just shorthand for either

'Many instances of "It has been the case that
p and it is

not the case that p" are true'

or else

'SPT is false'

,

and

say that rate talk just involves a comparison between any

two normal changes, thereby rejecting premise
argument,

(1)

of the

admit that there is such a thing as the pure

(ii)

passage of time, say that 'Time flows' is literally true,
but say that rate talk can involve a comparison between any
two changes, thereby rejecting premise
(

iii

admit that there is such

)

of time,

say that

a

'Time flows'

time)

of the argument;

thing as the pure passage

is literally true,

that rate talk always involves

change

(3)

a

and say

comparison in which some

(either a normal change or else the pure passage of
is compared to the pure passage of time,

rejecting premise
there is such
'Time flows'

a

(3)

of the argument;

and

(iv)

thereby
admit that

thing as the pure passage of time, say that

is literally true,

essentially involves making

a

and say that rate talk

comparison between some normal

change and the pure passage of time, so that it doesn't make
sense to ask 'How fast does time flow?'

premise

(1)

,

thereby rejecting

of the argument.

The reader will perhaps have noticed that any 3D

theorist who opts for PPT and, consequently, any one of
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responses

(ii)

,

(iii)

or

to The Second Rate of Passage

(iv)

Argument will no longer be able to offer the response that

I

suggested above to The First Rate of Passage Argument. For
that response is inconsistent with maintaining that there is

such

a

thing as the pure passage of time. What then will the

3D theorist who wishes to maintain PPT be able to say about

The First Rate of Passage Argument?
Well,

he or she will not be able to reject premise

(1)

of that argument on the grounds that time does not literally

flow or pass. But he or she should,

it seems to me,

still

deny that premise. He or she should say that PPT does not
entail that there is some second time-dimension with respect
to which the passage of normal time is to be measured. In

order to see how this move is to be made,

let us go back and

follow the dialectic of the discussion. Suppose

I

agree that

and accept all the other parts of one of the 3D

PPT is true,

packages. This is my reason for saying that time flows or
passes. Now

I

can rightfully ask: why is this supposed to

commit me to saying that there is some second time-dimension

with respect to which the flowing of normal time is to be
measured? I.e.,, why should

I

accept premise

(1)

of The

First Rate of Passage Argument? Well, there was this so-

called principle:
The passage principle: To say that some timedimension, T, flows or passes is to say that
such
there is some other time-dimension, T'
that T' is distinct from T, and the flow or
passage of events in T is to be measured with
respect to T'
,
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And why should

I

s

.

consent to the passage principle?

Presumably Smart's justification will be that we have
adopted a certain standard way of talking about flowing or
passage,

and this standard way forces us into saying that if

time flows or passes then there is this other timedimension, etc.
But before we go any further,

by

'Time flows or passes'

notice that what

mean

I

is the combination of PPT plus the

various components of the 3D view to which

subscribe. This

I

actually has little in common with what we normally mean

when we say of something
chamber)

river,

say,

or some gas in a

that it flows or passes. So it's not at all clear

that talk about time'
a

(a

s

flowing or passage must be treated in

fashion parallel to talk of other kinds of flowing or

passage. Hence the argument based on an appeal to some

parallel between talk of ordinary flowing and talk of time'
flowing won't be very impressive.

I

see no reason why

should accept the passage principle or premise
So

view,

I

and

I

(1)

accept PPT, the different components of my 3D
I

assent to 'Time flows or passes'

both the passage principle and premise
of Passage Argument. Now,

(1)

but

I

reject

of The First Rate

in a move designed to force me

into speaking of a second time-dimension,

Smart questions me

on the subject of the pure passage of time: How fast does it

occur? How are we to measure its rate?
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But here,

of course, we are back to discussing
the

issues raised by The Second Rate of
Passage Argument, so
that what I've said above about the
latter argument
is

relevant.

It seems to me that

I

have thus successfully

challenged The First Rate of Passage Argument by
calling
into question one of its premises, thereby
forcing

Smart to

resort to The Second Rate of Passage Argument in
an attempt
to justify the undefended premise in question

premise

(1)

(namely,

of The First Rate of Passage Argument); but

I

already know what to say about The Second Rate of Passage
Argument.

I

simply make one of the responses to that

argument described above.

I

conclude that Smart's arguments

will not convince any 3D theorist.

5.3 McTaqqart

'

s

Argument Against the 3D Views

McTaggart's Argument first appeared in 1908. 5 Since
then it has been reformulated, criticized and defended
dozens of times each.

6

The reader who is interested in the

"The Unreality of Time," pp. 457-474. See also his The
Nature of Existence, chapter 33.
5

See, for example, Dummett, "A Defense of McTaggart's Proof
of the Unreality of Time;" Gale, Introduction to section II
of The Philosophy of Time, and also The Language of Time;
Mellor, Real Time; Prior, Past, Present and Future;
Schlesinger, Aspects of Time; and Woolf, McTaggart , Dummett
6

and Time.
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historical details of this discussion is advised to consult
the works referred to in the last footnote.

attempt to give
Instead,

I

a

I

will not here

faithful survey of the argument's history.

will formulate what

take to be the most

I

plausible version of the argument that may be directed at
the passage views under consideration,

in order to see

whether those views can in fact be refuted by

a

variation of

McTaggart's Argument.
In its original form,

as presented by McTaggart,

the

argument was meant to prove that time is unreal. It's not
clear to me exactly what that conclusion would mean. The

strategy with which McTaggart set out to prove his
conclusion, however,

is fairly clear.

He first attempted to

show that each event and each moment of time must possess
all of the various A-properties

.

Then he attempted to show

that the possession of the various A-properties by all of

these events and moments of time would lead to numerous

contradictions. Finally, he considered what he took to be an

inevitable reply that would be made on behalf of the view
that the entities in question possess the different A-

properties; and he concluded that this reply would generate
an infinite regress of contradictions.

We have seen that the question of whether events and

moments of time possess genuine A-properties is

a

controversial question. According to the 3DAR, 3DAMA and
3DAA views they do,

7

but according to the 3DRR and 4D views

for the sake of considering
assume that the 3D theorist does
to
argument,
McTaggart's
7

It will be convenient,
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they do not. So the first stage of the reasoning employed
by
McTaggart consists of an attempt to show something that is a
tenet of three of the different versions of the 3D view. For
our purposes, the details of this first stage of McTaggart'

reasoning are unimportant, since that stage aims to show
something that is already accepted by the views in question,
namely,

3DAR,

3DAMA and 3DAA. In this section

consider the second stage of McTaggart'
a

s

I

will simply

reasoning, taken as

reductio argument against the claim that each event and

each moment of time possesses the various A-propert ies
That each event and each moment of time possesses the

various A-propert ies

,

then,

purposes of the reductio

.

is to be assumed for the

McTaggart argues as follows.

Past, present, and future are incompatible
determinations. Every event must be one or the
other, but no event can be more than one. If I
say that any event is past, that implies that
it is neither present nor future, and so with
the others
The characteristics, therefore, are
incompatible. But every event has them all. If
M is past, it has been present and future. If
it is future, it will be present and past. If
it is present, it has been future and will be
past. Thus all the three characteristics
belong to each event. How is this consistent
with their being incompatible?
It may seem that this can easily be
explained. Indeed, it has been impossible to
state the difficulty without almost giving the
explanation, since our language has verb-forms
for the past, present, and future, but no form
that is common to all three. It is never true,
the answer will run, that M is present, past,
.

.

not wish to analyze away talk about A-properties in terms of
primitive tenses, even though, as was seen in Chapter 3,
some versions of the 3D view may call for this kind of
analysis
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and future. It is present, will be past, and
has been future. Or it is past, and has been
future and present, or again is future, and
will be present and past. The characteristics
are only incompatible when they are
simultaneous, and there is no contradiction to
this in the fact that each term has all of
them successively.
But what is meant by "has been" and "will
be"? And what is meant by "is," when, as here,
it is used with a temporal meaning, and not
simply for predication? When we say that X has
been Y, we are asserting X to be Y at a moment
of past time. When we say that X will be Y, we
are asserting X to be Y at a moment of future
time. When we say that X is Y (in the temporal
sense of "is"), we are asserting X to be Y at
a moment of present time.
Thus our first statement about M - that it is
present, will be past, and has been future means that M is present at a moment of present
time, past at some moment of future time, and
future at some moment of past time. But every
moment, like every event, is both past,
present, and future. And so a similar
difficulty arises. If M is present, there is
no moment of past time at which it is past.
But the moments of future time, in which it is
past, are equally moments of past time, in
which it cannot be past. Again, that M is
future and will be present and past means that
M is future at a moment of present time, and
present and past at different moments of
future time. In that case it cannot be present
or past at any moments of past time. But all
the moments of future time, in which M will be
present or past, are equally moments of past
time.
And thus again we get a contradiction, since
the moments at which M has any one of the
three determinations of the A series are also
moments at which it cannot have that
determination. If we try to avoid this by
saying of these moments what had been
previously said of M itself - that some
moment, for example, is future, and will be
present and past - then "is" and "will be"
have the same meaning as before. Our
statement, then, means that the moment in
question is future at a present moment, and
will be present and past at different moments
of future time. This, of course, is the same
difficulty over again. And so on infinitely.
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Such an infinity is vicious. The attribution
of the characteristics past, present, and
future to the terms of any series leads to a
contradiction, unless it is specified that
they have them successively. This means, as we
have seen, that they have them in relation to
terms specified as past, present, and future.
And, since this continues infinitely, the
first set of terms never escapes from
contradiction at all. ["Time,” pp 94-96.]
.

I

have quoted McTaggart at such great length so that

the reader may judge whether my formulation and criticism of

McTaggart'

s

Argument does it justice. Notice that the way

McTaggart presents the problem, we start with the assumption
that each event possesses the different A-properties

,

which

seem to be mutually incompatible. This leads us to say that

each event possesses the different A-properties at different
times,

in order to resolve the prima facie contradictions.

But then we are faced with the problem of having to admit

that these different times must themselves possess the A-

properties, which still seem to be mutually incompatible.

Hence we make the inevitable reply, saying that the

different times we have mentioned themselves possess the

dreaded A-properties at still other times; and the regress
has begun.
It seems odd to me that McTaggart should start with

events,

regress to times,

and then continue to regress to

more and more times. Why bother with the events at all? Why
not cut straight to the chase,

since,

as he sees it,

all

that is really needed to generate an infinite and vicious
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regress is the claim that each time possesses the different

A-properties?
Well,

one reason for this roundabout procedure might be

to impress people who are happy about having events in their

ontologies but somewhat reluctant about also including
times. Perhaps McTaggart doesn't want to scare off such

people prematurely; so he begins with the relatively
innoccuous assumption about events, shows that the

incompatibility of the different A-properties will require
the move to times,

and then proceeds with his argument.

But it was seen in Chapter

3

that events are themselves

not above controversy. In particular, there are 3D

theorists,

such as Prior, who think that talk about events

is to be analysed in terms of talk about things. McTaggart,

of course,

But

could not have anticipated such

a

development.

don't think his argument suffers because he failed to

I

do so;

it is fairly obvious that whatever argument McTaggart

has can be reformulated so as to apply to reductionists
(about time,

follows,

that is)

then,

I

and event-reductionists alike. In what

will,

for the sake of simplicity,

consider

the argument as an argument against those versions of the 3D

view that include ontological commitment to both events and
times.

I

leave it to the reader to see how the argument

could be reformulated so as to apply to 3D reductionists of
the different possible sorts.
In any case it is,

for our purposes,

sufficient and

acceptable to begin with the assumption that each time
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possesses all of the different A-properties

.

Sufficient,

because McTaggart thinks that the infinite regress of
contradictions can be generated from this assumption;
acceptable, because the assumption is one that is not here
in question

that each time possesses all of the different

-

A-properties is already accepted by the versions of the 3D

view in question.
Our first premise, then, will be the assumption that

each moment of time possesses the different A-properties.
Next will be

a

premise to the effect that these different A-

properties are mutually incompatible. The rationale for this
will be McTaggart'

s

claim that "If

I

say that any event is

past, that implies that it is neither present nor future,

and so with the others..." The third premise of the argument
will be designed simply to point out

a

consequence of the

second: if these different A-properties are incompatible,

then any ascription to

a

single time of more than one of

them is contradictory. Finally, the fourth premise will
state that it follows from this that our assumption

premise
As

(1)
I

-

-

i.e.,

entails many contradictions.

see it,

then,

the argument may be perspicuously

formulated as an argument against 3DAR, 3DAMA and 3DAA as
follows
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McTaggart's Argument Against 3DAR, 3DAMA and 3DAA
(A

Reduct io)

(1) Each moment of time possesses all of the
different A-properties
[Assumption.]
.

(2) The different A-properties are mutually
incompatible

(3) If (2)
then any ascription of different
A-properties to a single time is
contradictory
(5)
(4)

If any ascription of different Aproperties to a single time is contradictory,
then (1) entails many contradictions.

It's not the case that each moment of time
possesses all of the different A-properties.

Before offering my criticism of this argument
be quick to point out that
the argument,

I

should

am not confident that this is

I

or even part of the argument,

that McTaggart

had in mind when writing the above passage. The reader may
judge for him- or herself whether

I

have faithfully

interpreted McTaggart; but other writers have certainly
interpreted McTaggart in many different ways. 8
I

do feel confident,

however, that the above argument

will do for our purposes. For

I

am sure that

I

have

correctly interpreted McTaggart at least as far as the

beginnning goes; it seems clear that his argument is based
on premises relevantly like

(1),

(2)

and (3). However else

this stage of McTaggart's Argument is interpreted,
8

See the works cited in footnote

220

5

above.

it must

.

.

be taken to begin with the assumption that each moment of

time possesses all of the different A-properties

and to

,

proceed with the claim that these different A - properties are
mutually incompatible, so that the assumption leads to
certain contradictions. Following this beginning are some

complicated sections concerned with showing that these
contradictions cannot be resolved, and exactly how these
sections of the argument ought to be spelled out is very

difficult to determine from the text; but the details of the

beginning itself are,

I

take it, uncontroversial

criticism of McTaggart's Argument that

I

.

The

offer below on

behalf of the 3D views in question is aimed only at this
uncontroversial beginning; hence the above version of the
argument is as good as any for the present purposes.
The problem with the argument,

premise

(3)

as

I

see it,

is with

But in order to explain why the 3D theorist 9

would reject that premise,
deal about premises
To begin with,

(1)

and

I

shall first have to say

a

good

(2)

it is important to recall some of the

tenets of the relevant 3D view. One of those tenets, shared
by 3DAR,

3DAMA and 3DAA alike, is that the bearers of truth

and falsity are to be ascribed truth-values at times.
the sake of convenience,

I

(For

will write in what follows as if

the 3D theorist takes sentences to be the bearers of the
For the remainder of this chapter I will use '3D view' to
refer collectively to the three versions of the 3D view in
question, namely, 3DAR, 3DAMA and 3DAA; and I will use '3D
theorist' to refer to one who holds any one of these
versions of the 3D view.
9
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truth-values. But what

I

say could also be said in terms of

propositions.) Another is the view that the various
past,
present, and future tenses of natural languages are

to be

taken as primitive. By accepting these two tenets,
the 3D

theorist in effect accepts an object-language made up of

tensed sentences about the three-dimensional objects in the
3D ontology,

together with

a

meta-language consisting of

tensed sentences ascribing truth— values at times to the
sentences of this object-language. Thus, he or she agrees to
talk using such object-language sentences as

been the case that

It has
a punt,

am falling out of

I

and such meta-language sentences as

been the case that
punt' was true in 1957.

'It has
a

It is not

I

am falling out of

necessary for the present purposes to spell

out all of the characteristics of the kind of object-

language that would be accepted by the 3D theorist. But two
further points need to be noted:

a)

since we are considering

that version of the 3D view that involves ontological

commitment to both events and times, we can assume that the
3D theorist allows quantification over both of these kinds

of entities in his or her object-language; and

b)

since we

are assuming that our 3D theorist is happy talking about A-

properties without attempting to analyze them away in terms
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of primitive tenses, we can also assume that
the 3D theorist

allows talk about, and quantification over, A-properties
in
his or her object-language.
Now,

premise

there are different things that might be meant by

(1)

of McTaggart's argument. On some possible

interpretations,

(1)

is to be taken as a statement in the

object-language, and on some possible interpretations it is
to be taken as a statement in the meta-language. One of the

former interpretations would make

(1)

equivalent to the

object-language thesis
(OL/la) For every time,
and future,

t,

t

is past,

present

which is false, even given all of the different components
of any relevant version of the 3D view. For there is,

according to any such version, with its primitive tenses, no
time that is past, present,

would make

(1)

and future.

10

Another reading

equivalent to the object-language thesis

(OL/lb) For every time, t, and A-property, $,
either it has been the case that t is $, or
else it is the case that t is $, or else it
will be the case that t is $,

•

We will agree to follow McTaggart in talking about times
as if all of these are instantaneous moments; that he wishes
to make this assumption is evident from the fact that he
wants to say that the different A-properties are mutually
10

incompatible
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which is true, given the components of any
relevant version
of the 3D view.

11

There are two corresponding meta-linguistic meanings
that may be attached to

(1)

.

The first would make

(1)

equivalent to the meta-linguistic thesis
For every time, t, there is some time,
such that 't is past', 't is present', and
is future' all are, were, or will be true

(ML/ la
t'
't

,

)

at t',

which is false, according to the 3D theorist. The second

would make

(1)

equivalent to the meta-linguistic thesis

(ML/ lb) For every time, t, there are some
times, t' and t"
such that 't is past' will
be true at t'
't is present' is, was, or will
be true at t, and 't is future' was true at
,

,

t",

which is true, given the components of any relevant version
of the 3D view.

12

Meanwhile, there are different things that might be

meant by premise

(2)

of the argument.

(2)

might be taken to

be equivalent to the object-language thesis
(0L/2a) For any time, t, and distinct Aproperties, $ and #, if t is $, then it is not
the case that either t is #, or it has been
the case that t is #, or it will be the case
that t is #,

And also, it should be added, given the assumption that
time is unbounded. Cf. McTaggart, p. 95n.
11

12

See previous footnote.
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which is false, according to the 3D theorist. But

may

(2)

also be taken to be equivalent to the object-language thesis
(0L/2b) For any time, t, and distinct Aproperties, $ and #, if t is $, then t is not
#,

which,

on any of the relevant versions of the 3D view,

true. Alternatively,

(2)

is

can be taken to be equivalent to

the meta-linguistic thesis

ML /2a) For any times, t, t' and t'
and
predicates, '$' and '#', such that '$' and
refer to distinct A-properties, if 't is $'
is, was, or will be true at t'
then 't is
is, was, or will be false at t'
'

(

,

,

'#'
#'

'

,

which is false according to any 3D theorist. But

(2)

could

also be taken to be equivalent to the meta-linguistic thesis
and
(ML/2b) For any times, t and t'
such that '$' and '#'
predicates, '$' and '#'
refer to distinct A-properties, if 't is $' is
if
then 't is #' is false at t'
true at t'
$'
then 't is #' was
was true at t'
't is
false at t' ; and if 't is $' will be true at
t' then 't is #' will be false at t',
,

;

,

,

which is true, given the tenets of any relevant version of
the 3D view, and is also, by the way, entailed by (0L/2b)
Here,

then,

are the versions of

(1)

and

(2)

that the

relevant type of 3D theorist accepts:
(OL/lb) For every time, t, and A-property, $,
either it has been the case that t is $, or
else it is the case that t is $, or else it
will be the case that t is $.
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(0L/2b) For any time, t, and distinct Aproperties, $ and #, if t is $, then t is not
#.

(ML/lb) For every time, t, there are some
times, t' and t'
such that 't is past' will
be true at t'
't is present' is, was, or will
be true at t, and 't is future' was true at
'

,

,

t'

'

.

(ML/ 2b) For any times, t and t'
and
predicates, '$' and '#'
such that '$' and '#'
refer to distinct A-properties if 't is $' is
true at t'
then 't is #' is false at t'
if
't is $' was true at t'
then 't is #' was
false at t'
and if 't is $' will be true at
t' then 't' is #' will be false at t'
,

,

,

;

,

;

.

Now,
(0L/2b)

what about premise

(3)

I

think that the truth of

and (ML/2b) make it clear that some ascriptions of

different A-properties to
For example,

if we let

't 0 '

moment of the year 1961,

single time are contradictory.

a

be a proper name for the first

it follows from

(0L/2b)

that the

following object-language sentence,
(a)

tQ is past and tg is future,

Similarly,

is contradictory.

it follows from

(ML/2b)

that

the following meta-language sentence,

(b)

'tg

future'

is past' is true in 1989,
is true in 1989,

and 'tQ is

is contradictory.

But
(

I

also think that the falsity of

(0L/2a)

and

ML /2a) make it clear that not all ascriptions of different

A-properties to

a

single time are contradictory. Indeed, to
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say that

(0L/2a)

is false is to assert the following object-

language thesis:
(7 OIj /2a) There is some time, t, and some
distinct ^-properties, $ and #, such that t is
$, and either t is #, or it has been the case
that t is #, or it will be the case that t is

The truth of this thesis is easy enough to prove; the thesis
is derivable in the 3D theorist's object-language by

existential generalization from such
(c) to is past,
tQ is present.

Now,

(c)

a

true sentence as

and it has been the case that

is certainly a sort of an ascription of

different A-properties to

a

single time, and it is just as

certainly non-contradictory (given the 3D assumptions,
including the tensed view of semantics (that is, the 3D

theorist's claim that the bearers of truth and falsity have
these truth-values at times)
(ML/2a)

is

)

.

Similarly, to say that

false is to assert this meta-linguist ic thesis:

There are some times, t, t' and t'
and some predicates, '$' and '#', such that
'$' and '#' refer to distinct A-properties,
and
is $' is, was, or will be true at t'
is #' is, was, or will be true at t'
(~ML/2a)

,

'

'

'

The latter thesis can be derived from any true meta-

linguistic sentence like the following:
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(d)
't 0 is past' is true in 1989,
future' was true in 1949.

And

(d)

it seems to me,

like

is,

ascription of different A-properties to
The 3D theorist, then,

't n

is

sort of an

a

(c)

and

a

particular time.

ought to reject premise

of

(3)

the argument. For he or she thinks that in either of the

true senses of premise

(2),

namely,

(0L/2b)

and (ML/2b)

,

(2)

does not entail that every ascription of different A-

properties to

a

sihgle time is contradictory. In particular,

the ascriptions of different A-properties to individual

times that are instances of either of the two true versions
of

(1),

namely,

(OL/lb)

and (ML/lb)

There is supposed to be

a

,

are non-contradictory.

rejoinder for McTaggart to

make to responses to his argument. It may seem that this

rejoinder should apply to what

I

have just said. Let us see

if it does.

McTaggart says, in effect, that the contradiction

generated by ascribing different A-properties to

a

single

entity resurfaces even when it is allegedly explained away.
Thus our first statement about M - that it is
present, will be past, and has been future means that M is present at a moment of present
time, past at some moment of future time, and
future at some moment of past time. But every
moment, like every event, is both past,
present, and future. And so a similar
difficulty arises. If M is present, there is
no moment of past time at which it is past.
But the moments of future time, in which it is
past, are equally moments of past time, in
which it cannot be past... [Pp. 95-96.]
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This is mere sophistry, however. For one thing, the 3D

theorist has not agreed that there ever was

a

contradiction

to begin with. He or she has explained the apparent truth of
(1)

by rephrasing it as either

(OL/lb)

or

(ML/ lb)

she has also explained the apparent truth of

rephrasing it as either (0L/2b) or (ML/2b)

;

(2)

and he or

,

by

and the

combination of all of these is consistent. The 3D theorist
has then denied that the consequent of

either of the true versions of

(2)

,

(3)

follows from

thus leaving no

contradictions to be resolved.
For another thing, the reasoning in the passage quoted

immediately above is faulty. In order to see this, consider
the present moment; call it "t*". In accordance with
(OL/lb)

,

the 3D theorist is admittedly compelled to say that

the following are all true right now:

(e)
(f)
(g)

t* is present.
It has been the case that t* is future.
It will be the case that t* is past.

Now we are supposed to agree that the following two
things are inconsistent:
There is no moment of past time at which
t* is past.
(i)

The moments of future time, at which t*
is past, are equally moments of past time.
(ii)

How can the 3D theorist make sense of

(i)

Here we must

again be careful to distinguish between tensed, object-
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language sentences

(in this case about t*)

on the one hand,

and met a- language sentences about such object-language
sentences, on the other hand. The 3D theorist will certainly
not want to accept the object-language sentence
(OL/ia) It's not the case that it has been the
case that it will be the case that t* is past,

for this is false now,

according to the 3D view. Nor will he

or she want to accept the meta-language sentence
(ML/ia) There is no time earlier than t* at
which the sentence 'It will be the case that
t* is past' was true.

For according to the 3D view, every past time is such

a

time
But

(i)

can be reformulated in such a way that the 3D

theorist will accept it. In fact, there are two main ways in

which this can be done: through the use of an objectlanguage sentence, or through the use of

a

meta-language

sentence. Thus we get two different versions of

(i)

that the

3D theorist will accept:

(OL/ib) It's not the case that it has been the
case that t* is past.
(ML/ib) There is no time, t, such that t is
earlier than t* and 't* is past' was true at
t
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And how is the 3D theorist to understand

(ii)

?

Well,

it

is obvious that he or she will not accept as true now the

following object-language sentence:
(OL/iia) For any time, t, such that it will be
the case at t that t* is past, t is past.

Nor will the 3D theorist accept the following meta-language

sentence
(ML/iia) For any time, t,
past' will be true at t,
at t *

But,

such that 't* is
is past' is true

't

.

as with

(i)

there are two main ways in which

(ii)

can be reformulated so that the 3D theorist will accept it.

These are as follows:
(OL/iib) For any time, t, such that it will be
the case at t that t* is past, there is some
such that it will be the case at t'
time, t'
that t is past.
,

(ML/iib) For every time, t, such that 't* is
past' will be true at t, there is a time, t'
such that 't is past' will be true at t'
.

Are

(OL/ib)

and (OL/iib)

inconsistent? Not at all,

according to the 3D view. Are (ML/ib) and (ML/iib)
inconsistent? No. Is any combination of versions of these
claims that the 3D theorist will accept inconsistent? No.
In short,

the 3D theorist can maintain that the

different A-properties are to be treated in the manner of
other groups of incompatible properties, such as redness and
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non-redness. Sentences are to be ascribed truth-values at
times,

in accordance with the tensed view of semantics,

and

two sentences that, taken together, attribute incompatible

properties to

a

thing can never both be true at the same

time
So in the sense in which the A-properties are mutually

incompatible, no time possesses all of them; right now we
can say truthfully of a given time only that it possesses

such-and-such mutually compatible A-properties, did possess

such-and-such other mutually compatible A-properties, and
will possess such-and-such further mutually compatible A-

propert ies
In general,

there are

a

whole bunch of sentences about

the A-properties of different times that are all true right

now and that are all consistent with one another. For any
time,

there is such a bunch; but for different times the

bunches are not the same. Indeed,
a

unique and consistent set,

S,

for each time, t, there is

of sentences about A-

properties such that every sentence in

S

is true at t.

This

generates no contradiction and, hence, no regress of

contradictions
The moral to be drawn from McTaggart's Argument is

this: as long as the 3D theorist insists that he or she

subscribes to the tensed view of semantics, takes tenses as
primitive,

and is careful not to allow object-language/meta-

language confusions, there is no sound argument based on
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premises like
3DAR,

(1)

.

(2)

and

(3)

that can be brought against

3DAMA or 3DAA

233

CHAPTER SIX: ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE 4D VIEW

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter

I

will turn to

a

consideration of some

arguments that have been brought against the 4D view,

i.e.,

the view that time does not pass. I'll begin by considering

two arguments based on the claim that the 4D view somehow
goes against what we in fact experience,

so that the view is

incompatible with empirical data. Then

will consider two

I

arguments that have to do with the 4D view and our different
attitudes toward the past and the future. The first of these
arguments, which is suggested by a passage from Derek
Parfit,

is based on the claim that it is a consequence of

the 4D view that we are all irrational because we tend to be

biased toward the future. The second of these arguments is
based on the claim, made by George Schlesinger, that
according to to the 4D view it is incoherent for
wish to be ten years younger. Finally,
argument,

I

a

person to

will consider an

often suggested in conversation by people who are

told of the 4D view and find it very strange, that appeals
to the counter-intuitiveness of the 4D view.
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I

will conclude

that none of these arguments is

a

good one; all can be

safely rejected by the 4D theorist without too much
trouble.

6.2 The Argument from Ex.perienrp

One kind of argument that has been suggested against

the 4D view is based on an appeal to that view'

s

alleged

incompat ibilty with the way in which we experience the
world. The argument is,

roughly, that thinking of time as

not passing is so contrary to what we in fact perceive that

the 4D view is untenable. Perhaps the most insistent

proponent of this line of argument has been George
Schlesinger. In his paper,
that even 4D theorists

"How Time Flies," he points out

(he calls

them "Russellians "

)

admit

that it feels to them that time flows or passes; as an

example he quotes J.J.C. Smart. "Certainly," writes Smart,
"we feel that time flows,

feeling arises out of

a

but

I

want to say... that this

metaphysical confusion."

["Time and

Becoming," p. 3.] Schlesinger himself goes on to emphasize
that this feeling is very much with us.
It might also be added that this feeling is
not some insignificant part of our experience
but rather a central one which is with us all
the time. Our thoughts are constantly occupied
with questions of what the future is going to
bring us about opportunities passing us by and
about time flying too fast. Can such a crucial
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feature of experience be dismissed? Is it not
an important rule that our account of the
universe should be based as much as possible
on experience? ["How Time Flies," p. 515.]

There are two main claims here. The first, which

Schlesinger seems to think 4D theorists will assent to (and
which,

indeed,

Smart,

for one,

seems to grant),

is that

there is some prima facie incompatibility between the 4D

view and the way in which we experience time. The difficulty
here seems to be that acceptance of the 4D view compells one
to reject an important datum from our everyday experience,

namely, the perception of time as something that flows or

passes. The second main claim suggested by the above
passage, which is implied by the two questions at the end of

the paragraph,

is meant to be some sort of general

empiricist principle to the effect that it is bad for

a

theory to contravene empirical data.
These two claims may be used in the following argument

against the 4D view.
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The Argument from Experience

(Version

I)

(1) The 4D view is prima facie incompatible
with an important datum from everyday
experience, namely, the perception we all
share of time as being something that flows or
passes
(2) As a general rule, if a theory, T, is
prima facie incompatible with some important
(4)
datum
from everyday experience, then T is

false
(3)

If

(1)

and

then the 4D view is false.

(2)

The 4D view is false.

In his next paragraph Schlesinger generously offers on

behalf of the 4D theorists

a

reply consists,

of showing that the prima facie

in effect,

incompatibility of

a

reply to this argument. The

theory with everyday experience should

not always be taken as fatal to that theory.

Russellians may reply that there are many
examples where common sense impressions have
to yield to whatever experts in a given field
tell us to be really the case. They may remind
me that my impressions of the desk I am
writing on is that it is a continuous solid
body at complete rest. Physicists will tell me
however that it is actually a swarming
collection of particles rapidly moving in all
directions with very large gaps separating
them, so that the solid body I am talking
about contains a much higher volume of empty
space than matter. If I am a sensible person
then I shall admit that the physicist, whose
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description of the desk is very different from
my own, but who is an aknowledged expert
on
the properties of matter, must be right. Thus
a common sense interpretation of
experience
has to give way to the account of those who
are authorities on a given subject, [p. 515.]

The 4D move proposed by Schlesinger,

reject premise

(2)

as

of the above argument. And

see it,

I

I

is to

think that

Schlesinger has indeed shown that that premise is false. The
empiricist principle according to which any theory that is
P-^'ama

-facie

incompatible with some datum from everyday

experience is false is not

a

good principle, as the desk

example illustrates. But Schlesinger goes on to say the

following
After some reflection it becomes evident that
nothing can be inferred from this example that
would be relevant to the problem of time. It
was not at all correct to describe the case of
the desk as one in which common sense and
professional opinion clash. It is very much
part of common sense to realize that in order
to determine the ultimate structure of solid
bodies we need the technically advanced
methods of modern science. When I am told the
facts by a physicist who discovered elementary
particles that are obviously inaccessible to
any of my senses I do not feel at all that his
results clash with my own impressions.
Provided it is explained to me clearly what he
is saying, I am bound to realize that he is
not claiming that reality is very different
from appearances. After all, he is referring
to happenings in the domain of such magnitudes
as are far beyond the limits of appearances,
in a domain of which I will acknowledge that I
have formed no impressions.
No such thing has happened in the context of
our feeling that time moves. Philosophers who
have denied the movement of time have not
shown us that our impressions are due merely
to our unthinkingly extrapolating from our
experiences in a domain to which we have
.
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access into a domain beyond our reach. They
have not shown that their thesis and what
distinctly appears to us to be directly
experienced do not really clash. The denial of
temporal becoming continues to strike us as a
total rejection of what we feel to be a
central feature of our temporal existence.
["How Time Flies," pp 515-516.]
.

As

I

understand the above passage, Schlesinger is there

saying that there is an important difference between the two
cases in question. The case of the desk that appears solid
but is actually a swarming mass of particles separated by

large spaces constitutes a case in which the incompatibility
of a scientific theory with common sense is merely prima

facie.

In fact the particle theory of the desk can be shown

to be compatible with the common sense perception of the

desk. The reason for this is that the two are not concerned

with the same phenomena; the one is concerned with

microscopic phenomena, the other with macroscopic phenomena.
Thus the prima facie incompatibility between the two can be

easily resolved. In the case of the 4D view of time versus
our everyday experience of time,
is,

according to Schlesinger,

there is

a

a

on the other hand,

there

genuine incompatiblity

.

And

good empiricist principle taking us from such an

incompat ibilty between

a

theory and what we in fact

experience to the conclusion that the theory is false. It's
one thing for a theory to appear to clash with some

empirical datum, but it's quite another thing for

really to clash with some empirical datum.
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theory

.

.

If we take into account the distinction
between mere

prima facie incompatibility between theory and datum and
genuine incompatibility between theory and datum, then we
can formulate what

I

think is the argument Schlesinger means

to be advancing against the 4D view,

it goes like this:

The Argument from Experience
(Version II)

(1) The 4D view is genuinely incompatible with
an important datum from everyday experience,
namely, the perception we all share of time as
being
something that flows or passes.
(4)

(2) As a general rule, if a theory, T, is
genuinely incompatible with some important
datum from everyday experience, then T is
false
(3)

If

(1)

and (2), then the 4D view is false.

The 4D view is false.

Schlesinger does not provide

a

response for the 4D

theorist to make to this argument; he thinks that it is

a

good argument against the 4D view. My own view, however, is
that it can be shown that the argument is unsound. The

problem is with premise

(1)

In order to appreciate what is

240

wrong with this premise, it is necessary to consider what is
the 4D account of the relevant empirical datum.
As Smart admits, the 4D theorists,

like the rest of us,

have the feeling that time flows. But what exactly is this

feeling

,

and who exactly has it? The last part of this

question may sound odd, but it raises

very important

a

point. The 4D theorists think that people are four-

dimensional objects made up of temporal parts or stages.
Thus,

they think that for

that time flows during

a

a

person,

to have the feeling

P,

period of time,

t,

is for the t-

temporal stage of P to have that feeling. Smart's having, at
tl,

the feeling that time flows,

for example,

consists in

the tl-temporal stage of the four-dimensional object that is
Smart having the feeling that time flows. No doubt this can
be at least partially understood in terms of the sentences
to which the tl-temporal stage of Smart is inclined to

assent. These might include such classics as
flies',

'Is it

'How time

tea-time already?' and 'Ridiculous the waste

sad time stretching before and after'

.

But nothing very

interesting about the nature of time can be inferred from
the mere fact that a temporal stage is inclined to assent to

such sentences.

1

Now consider the phenomenological facts of the case.
Take some arbitrary temporal slice of the four-dimensional
do not mean temporal slice, but, rather,
something with some duration. Thus a temporal stage of Smart
would not
is a four-dimensional part of Smart. Otherwise it
sentence.
a
to
assenting
stage's
of
a
speak
make sense to
i

By

'stage'

I
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object that is Smart; call it "i". Here
are some of the
relevant facts about the sensations felt by
i:

impression that

t (i)

(i.e.,

the time of

special status of being present;

(b)

i

i)

has the impression

h,

most recent of past times; 2

(c)

i

its immediate successor,

is such that t(j)

future of future times;

(d)

is such that t (h)

instant later,

(f)

is the least

and so on for i's impressions of

or less vivid memory impressions of being,
3

is the

has the impression that

the apparent A-properties of all other times;

in the state h was in;

has the

i

enjoys the

that its immediate predecessor,

j,

(a)

i

(e)

i

has more

one instant ago,

keenly anticipates being, one

in roughly the state

j

will be in;

(g)

i

has

more or less vivid memory impressions of, one instant ago,
keenly anticipating being, one instant later, in roughly the
state
later,

i

is in;

(h)

i

keenly anticipates having, one instant

more or less vivid memory impressions of being, one

instant ago,

in roughly the sate

i

is in;

(i)

i

has more or

less vivid memory impressions of being, two instants ago,

the state g was in;

(j)

in

and so on for other memory

impressions and anticipations.
It might be objected that there are Zenonian problems
facing the notion of the immediate predecessor of a temporal
slice of a four-dimensional object. Perhaps there are; but
in any case, whatever problems there are facing the 4D
view's account of these matters will translate into
corresponding problems facing the 3D view' s account of the
same matters. My own view is that in both cases the problems
are soluble. See, in this regard, Grunbaum, Modern Science
and Zeno's Paradoxes
2

Of course i wasn't really in any state one instant ago; i
is an instant-bound individual, confined to t(i). But this

3

doesn't mean that

i

can't have memory sensations.
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What else? No doubt it is fair to add the following:
(k)

has the impression that it is a three-dimensional

i

object that endures through time;' and
1

has the general

i

(1)

impression that time is flowing, and that time has flowed so
far right up to t(i),

and will continue to flow into the

future
The reader may wonder why

and why

I

am so certain of

say that it is "no doubt fair to add"

I

(a)-(j),

and

(k)

(1)

.

The reason is simple. Consider the 3D view's account of

Smart and the impressions that he has. On that account,

Smart is a three-dimensional object that endures through
time,

and that has various impressions at various times, so

that various instances of "Smart feels sensation X" are true
at various times. Well,

in general,

momentary sensation,

such that on the 3D view's account,

'Smart feels X'

account,

X,

is true at t,

a t-slice,

i,

and

'i

feels

X'

is

according to the 3D view's account

for every time,

t,

'Smart feels that t is the

present moment'

is true at t,

view's account,

for every time,

then,
t,

feels that t is the present moment'
if,

t,

there is, on the 4D view's

of Smart such that

true simplici ter. So if,
of things,

for any time,

according to the 4D
'The t-slice of Smart
is true simpliciter

according to the 3D view's account,

.

And

'Smart has the

impression that time is flowing merrily along' is true at
times tl-tn, then, according to the 4D view's account of
4

i

is in fact a three-dimensional object,

endures through time.
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but not one that

.

things,

.

The tl tn slices of Smart all have the impression

that time is flowing merrily along'
In short,

is true simplicitBr

the 3D view and the 4D view can agree on all

of the momentary,

phenomenological facts about Smart. Their

disagreement is over the correct description of these facts;
does this description involve talk about

a

three-dimensional

object that experiences the relevant sensations at different
times,

or does it involve talk about a four-dimensional

object whose stages and slices have the relevant experiences

simpliciter ? Really, then, this controversy is just the
3D/4D controversy all over again.
So the appropriate 4D response to The Argument from

Experience (Version

II)

is to reject premise

(1)

Anyone who

would advance this argument just hasn't understood the 4D
view.

Indeed,

it would have been quite suprising if that

view had turned out to be incompatible with the empirical
data. As it is, the 4D view is neither more nor less

compatible with the empirical data than the 3D view.

6.3 An Argument about the 4D view and Rationality

Another kind of argument that may be suggested against
the 4D view concerns the alleged fact that certain kinds of

commonplace attitudes toward past and future events turn out
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to be,

according to the 4D view, irrational. The claim here

is not that the 4D view fails to fit the empirical data
but,

rather,

that the view entails that some wishes, preferences

and desires that it seems rational to have are in fact
irrational. Since we don't want to give up the idea that

these attitudes can be rational

highly counter-intuitive

-

-

for to do so would be

we must conclude that the 4D view

is false.

The best example of this kind of argument that
of is suggested by a disussion in Derek Parfit'

Reasons and Persons
book that

I

5
.

Parfit does

do not follow,

arguments that

I

a

s

I

know

book,

great many things in his

and presents a number of

do not understand.

In particular,

is rife with fascinating examples that

I

establish interesting points, even though

the book

feel certain
I

cannot tell what

those points are. One such example seems to me to be

relevant to the controversy between the 3D and 4D views.

I

can't tell whether Parfit meant it this way or not, but the

example appears to suggest an argument against the 4D view.
The example goes like this:
to have some kind of
I am in some hospital,
surgery. Since this is completely safe, and
always successful, I have no fears about the
effects. The surgery may be brief, or it may
instead take a long time. Because I have to
co-operate with the surgeon, I cannot have
anaesthetics. I have had this surgery once
before, and I can remember how painful it is.
Under a new policy, because the operation is
so painful, patients are now afterwards made
5

Chapter

8,

esp. p.

179.
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to forget it. Some drug removes their memories
of the last few hours.
I have just woken up. I cannot
remember going
to sleep. I ask my nurse if it has been
decided when my operation is to be, and how
long it must take. She says that she knows the
facts about both me and another patient, but
that she cannot remember which facts apply to
whom. She can tell me only that the following
is true. I may be the patient who had his
operation yesterday. In that case, my
operation was the longest ever performed,
lasting ten hours. I may instead be the
patient who is to have a short operation later
today. It is either true that I did suffer for
ten hours, or true that I shall suffer for one

hour
I ask the nurse to find out which is true.
While she is away, it is clear to me which I
prefer to be true. If I learn that the first
is true, I shall be greatly relieved. [Reasons
and Persons, pp. 165-166.]

Why should this example pose any problem for the 4D

view? Well, according to that view, each event in Parfit'
life has the same ontological status as each other event in

his life. His future is no less real than his past or his

present. All the temporal parts of Parfit are equally real

parts of

a

single,

four-dimensional,

space-time worm. As

a

rational being Parfit should of course prefer that none of

those parts feels extensive and excruciating pain. But,
given that some of them will, and given the ontological

equality of the different parts of his life, it seems that
future pains of a certain degree and duration should be no

more disagreeable to Parfit than past pains of the same
degree and duration. But if this is true, then it seems to

follow that Parfit should prefer to have
p^lii overall,

a

life with less

even if some of it is to be in the future,
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rather than

a

life with more pain overall, but most of it in

the past. If, that is, the past and the future are really on

equal footing.
So it seems to be a consequence of the 4D view that it
is irrational for Parfit,

lying in his hospital bed waiting

for the nurse to return with the news, to prefer ten hours
of past pain over one hour of future pain. But of course we

would all feel the same way Parfit does.
More generally, it seems fair to say that we all have

a

pronounced bias toward the future over the past, in cases
like Parfit'

s

as well as in cases where it is past and

future pleasures that are at stake. But it seems to be

a

consequence of the 4D view that we all should have the same
attitude toward the future as we do toward the past; i.e.,
that it is irrational to be biased toward the future. Hence
it seems to be a consequence of the 4D view that we are all

basically irrational. Rather than give up our strong
intuition that

a

bias toward the future is a rational one,

then, we must reject the 4D view. Here is the argument

spelled out: 6

give
For another example of a writer who seems to want to
How
Schlesinger,
see
view,
the same argument against the 4D
Time Flies," pp. 510-512.
6
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The Rationality Argument Against the
4D View
(Version

I)

(1) If the 4D view is correct, then
it is
irrational to have dissimilar attitudes toward
the past and the future.
(3)
(2)

It is rational to have dissimilar
attitudes toward the past and the future.

The 4D view is incorrect.

I

think that there are two main points that the 4D

theorist must make in response to this argument. The first
has to do with the explanation for the fact that, as it
happens, we tend to be biased toward the future; the second
has to do with the claim that it is a consequence of the 4D

view that this bias is irrational. In the end,

think, the

I

4D theorist will have little trouble denying premise

of

(1)

the argument

Consider the 4D theorist's interpretation of the theory
of evolution.

It will no doubt entail,

some principle like the following

grossly oversimplified form)
species,

S,

;

among other things,

(although not in such

as a general rule,

a

for any

the four-dimensional objects that are members of

later generations of

S

tend to have more characteristics

that enhance their chances of successful reproduction than

the four-dimensional objects that are members of earlier

generations of

S.

Now consider what seems to be
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a

brute fact

about causation: causes generally precede their effects.
This means that for any two object-stages, x and

precedes

then actions of x can have

y,

a

y,

if x

causal effect on

y,

but not vice versa. This in turn means that,

in general,

any four-dimensional object,

that attempts

stage of

a

o,

o

for

to act so as to benefit later stages of o may act

successfully, but a stage of

benefit earlier stages of

o

o

that attempts to act so as to

will be wasting its time. Thus,

creatures that tend to be biased toward the future have

a

characteristic that enhances their chances of successful
reproduction, since they tend not to waste their time trying
to affect the past. All of this explains the fact that later

parts of the world tend to be filled with four-dimensional

creatures that have stages that are biased toward the
future. So the fact that we

(i.e.,

people nowadays) tend to

have this bias is easily explained.
But,

one might ask,

is it rational to have this bias?

That looks like it depends a lot on what you mean by
'rational'

.

But it may be possible to say something

instructive about this matter without having to give

a

definition of the word.

A person-stage is

a

stage.

It has its preferences and

predilections. In general, there is no easy way of telling
what it will care about. But it is safe to say that most of

them care

a

great deal about themselves,

and this seems

rational, whatever 'rational' means. Some care a lot about

simultaneous stages of other people, and that may be
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rational too. Some person-stages care about past and future
stages of other people. Many person-stages, as it happens,
care

a

great deal about future stages of the person they are

part of (and the explanation for this is sugested above)

a

And so on.
What stages of what people

a

particular person-stage

cares about will help to determine what actions we think

would be rational for that stage to attempt to perform.
Other factors are involved too, and these are not easy to
specify,

since our notion of rationality is

a

little fuzzy.

But among these other factors is this one: in general, as

noted above, no stage can act so as to have

a

causal effect

on an earlier stage, but some stages can act so as to have a

causal effect on some later stages.
This,

it seems to me,

partially explains our thinking

that it is irrational to try to act so as to have a causal

effect on some earlier stage, and it also partially explains
our thinking that it can be rational to try to act so as to

have

a

causal effect on some later stage.

But Parfit's point has nothing to do with trying to
act. His point is that it seems rational for a stage to

prefer it to be true that earlier stages of the person it is
a

part of had ten hours of suffering rather than true that

later stages of the same person will have one hour of
suffering, even if nothing can be done in either case to

prevent the suffering; and the 4D view, it seems, entails
that this is irrational.
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Does the 4D view really entail this? Consider George.
He likes ice cream and dislikes yogurt,

even though he knows

the facts about which is more healthful. Is it rational
for

George to like ice cream and dislike yogurt? That seems like
a

s -'-Hy

question; he likes what he likes,

and dislikes what

he dislikes. The question of rationality doesn't enter into

matters of taste. But now we can ask, Given his tastes, is
it rational for George to prefer it to be true that there is

ice cream rather than yogurt in the icebox,

even though

there is nothing he can do about it now? This, it seems to
me,

is a reasonable question,

with an easy answer; Yes.

Person-stages are similar to George, in relevant
respects, when it comes to preferences and rationality. Most
of them,

I

have suggested, have a general predilection for

caring more about the future than the past, as

a result,

I

have suggested, of evolution together with the fact that

they can't influence the past.
right explanation is,

(Whether or not this is the

of course,

really beside the point.)

Now we ask, Is it rational for person-stages to have this
general predilection for caring more about the future than
the past? This is another silly question. Each stage just
has the predilections it has; it makes no more sense to ask,

about a given stage, whether it is rational for it to have
the preferences it has than it does to ask,

of George,

whether it is rational for him to like ice cream rather than
yogurt. But here is another question: Given the way stages
are,

i.e.,

given their bias toward the future,
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is it

:

.

rational for

a

stage to prefer it to be true that earlier

stages of the person it is

a

part of had ten hours of

suffering rather than true that later stages of the same

person will have one hour of suffering, even if nothing can
be done in either case to prevent the suffering? This,

seems to me,

is a reasonable guestion,

it

with an easy answer:

Yes
So the appropriate move for the 4D theorist to make is

to reject premise

(1)

of the above argument. Like George,

a

stage cannot control the tastes that it has. It is no more

irrational for

a

stage to care more about the future than it

is for George to like ice cream more than yogurt. And like

George,

it is rational for a stage to have preferences that

conform to its predilections. Thus,

it is rational for a

stage to have preferences that conform to its bias toward
the future.

There is a similar kind of argument that has been

suggested against the 4D view; this one concerns certain
kinds of wishes that,

it is alleged,

are incoherent

according to the 4D view. Here is another quote from

Schlesinger
Suppose a person P says on 1 January 1982
which is his fiftieth birthday, 'How I wish I
and explicitly denies
was ten years younger'
that
he wishes that he
that what he means is
later
so that in 1982
ten
years
had been born
No, he does
old.
years
forty
only
he would be
birth and
his
of
date
the
change
not wish to
old in
years
fifty
be
to
satisfied
is fully
well-known
one
that
aware
also
is
1982... P
Russellian translation of the statement 'Now
it is New Year 1972' is 'New Year 1972 is
,
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simultaneous with this utterance' but he would
emphatically re ject the suggestion that all
that he is wishing is that some utterance be
simultaneous with New Year 1972. What P is
concerned with is his aging self; he would
very much like to be ten years younger. On
McTaggart's view [i.e., roughly, the 3D view]
P s wish makes full sense and the
fact that it
has no chance of being fulfilled does not make
it less so. On Russell's view however it makes
no sense at all. This seems to create a
difficulty for the latter, especially so when
it is pointed out that we are not dealing here
w ith some fancy too ludicrous to be given a
second thought This kind of wish is expressed
by millions of people every day and I should
suspect by Russellians no less than by others.
["How Time' Flies," pp. 512-513.]
.

The argument that Schlesinger means to be advancing

here is fairly easy to see. It goes roughly like this:

The Rationality Argument Against the 4D View
(Version II)

(3)

(1) If the 4D view is correct, then it cannot
make sense to wish to be ten years younger.
(2)

It can make sense to

wish to be ten years

younger
The 4D view is incorrect.

suffers from the same defect as

This argument, however,

The Argument from Rationality
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(Version

I)

;

it is based on a

.

.

.

,

.

false claim about what is entailed by
the 4D view. Let me
explain

Consider this question: What is
wishes to be ten years younger?

p,

P

wishing when he

after all,

is a person-

stage. Or at any rate, the one who does the
wishing is

person-stage

(it

may even make sense to speak of the whole

person having such
wish)

.

a

a wish,

if all of its stages have the

Let us refer to this wisher as "P/t",

shorthand for

'the t-stage of p'
So P/t makes this wish,
I

wish

I

i.e.,

was ten years younger'

.

utters the sentence 'How

What does P/t mean by this?

Here are some different possibilities:
a.

P/t could mean that he wishes that he were

identical with P/t-10

(i.e.,

years younger than P/t)

may not. Note,

the stage of P that is ten

This may be a coherent wish or it

in any case,

that it cannot come true,

for

the following is a good principle:
(NI) For any stages
necessarily, ~ (x=y)

Everything

is,

x

and

as we all know,

y,

if

~ (x=y)

what it is, and not another

thing. But not much should be made of this.

coherently wish that the number
all,

case,

then,

7

I

could

were an even number, after

and that is something that is necessarily false. In any

whether the necessary falsity of the proposition that

P/t is identical to P/t-10 entails that P/t's wish is an

incoherent one or not,

I

think it does entail that this is
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.

not what P/t has in mind. For P/t knows
to know

-

P/t-10,

so

-

or could be made

that it's necessary that he is not identical to
I

don't think he would say that that is what he's

wishing (assuming that he would say that what he's wishing
is something that is not necessarily false)
b.

P/t could mean that he wishes that in the next

instant he would suddenly change into

a

stage that is

qualitatively identical to P/t-10. But what could be meant
here by

'change into'? Well, perhaps to say that P/t wishes

that he would suddenly change into

a

stage that is

qualitatively identical to P/t-10 means that P/t wishes that
the P-stage immediately following him (i.e., his successor)

would be qualitatively identical to P/t-10.

(But does P/t

want his successor to remember being P/t only an instant
ago? If so then it cannot be qualitatively identical to P/t10

.

)

c.

Or P/t could be wishing that his successor

would find himself in the situation that P/t-10 was in.
d.

Or both b and c.

(As

far as

I

can tell from the

above passage, this is pretty much what Schlesinger has in
mind.
e.

Or P/t could want his successor to be in the

situation that P/t-10 was in, with the outward

characteristics of P/t-10, but with the mental

characteristics of P/t.
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f.

Or P/t could want his successor to be in the

roughly the situation P/t is in, with all of the outward and

inward characteristics of P/t-10.
g.

Or P/t could want his successor to be in

roughly the situation P/t is in, with the outward

characteristics of P/t-10, and the inward characteristics of
P/t.

There are more possibilities. But the point is this: bg are all coherent.

P/t could sensibly wish for any of these

things to come true. The fact that there are, according to
the 4D view, so many different possible interpretations of

P/t's wish that are all sensible should of course be

considered

a

virtue of that view.

7

In short,

the correct 4D

response to the Rationality Argument Against the 4D View
(Version II)

is to reject premise

(1)

of that argument.

Here is a strange twist on things: it is one of the 3D
views, namely 3DAA, that actually has a problem with P's
wish. The 4D view can understand P's wish in one of the ways
described above. 3DRR, 3DAR and 3DAMA can understand it in
some way like this: P wishes that suddenly everything would
go back to being the way it was in 1972; this means that
things that exist in 1982 but didn't exist in 1972 will stop
existing, things that don't exist in 1982 but did exist in
1972 will come back into existence as they were in 1972, and
things that exist in 1982 and also existed in 1972 will
suddenly go back to being the way they were in 1972. 3DAA,
on the other hand, cannot simply understand P's wish in this
way, for nothing can be said in 1982 about the things that
existed in 1972 but have since ceased to exist; i.e., no
singular propositions about such things can be expressed in
1982. So the proponent of 3DAA will have to settle for this:
P wishes that all of the general propositions that were true
in 1972 would be true again in 1982, and also that all of
the singular propositions that were true in 1972 and that
still exist in 1982 would also be true again in 1982. This
of course leaves out the singular propositions about objects
that existed in 1972 but no longer exist in 1982. (I don't
think anyone would think that this is fatal for 3DAA
7

.
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•

—The

4

Argument from the Counter-intuitiveness of the 4D

View

Still,

it may seem that the 4D view suffers from just

being plain counter-intuitive; so much
is unacceptable.

so,

in fact,

that it

The proponent of the 3D view may argue that

we all learned at our mothers'

knees to view the world as

a

three-dimensional world, full of three-dimensional objects
that persist through time in virtue of the fact that they
endure. Now Russell and his friends are asking us to reject

this way of viewing the world,

in favor of an alternative

way that often leaves even 4D theorists in

a

state of

counter-intuitive bewilderment. It is asking too much; we
cannot do it. For this reason, the 4D view is simply

untenable. The argument that suggests itself here is the

following
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The Argument from the Counter-intuitiveness of the
4D View

(1)

The 4D view is extremely counter-

intuitive

.

(3) If a view is as
(2)
counter-intuitive as the
4D view is, then it is untenable.

The 4D view is untenable.

It is sometimes difficult to know exactly what

philosophers mean by 'counter-intuitive'

,

but

I

think that

the 4D theorist more or less has to accept premise

this argument. The view is

(1)

of

strange one; it does seem to go

a

against our pre-philosophical intuitions. But is this enough
to render the view untenable?

I

don't think so. As long as a

view doesn't contravene some empirical datum, it seems to
me,

counter-intuitiveness is not enough to make it

untenable. Here Schlesinger'
are

a

s

desk example is relevant, as

host of other examples from the sciences. It is just

a

fact about theorizing that if we do it well, then we must

sometimes end up embracing views that seem, in some sense,

downright strange. Still, we often do this, and in many
cases,

at least,

it is the right thing to do. Furthermore,

if we attempted to spell out the principle that premise

of the above argument is based on,
^

(2)

specifying to what degree

view may be counter-intuitive before it must be dropped,
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and making this principle strong enough to rule out the 4D
view,

then we would end up with too strong

i.e.,

one that rules out views that we don't wish to rule

a

principle,

out. But perhaps the easiest way to see that such a

principle would be

a

bad one,

in any case,

is simply to note

that our intuitions tend to change over time.
So the 4D theorist should reject premise

(2)

of this

argument. In so doing, the 4D theorist should admit, he or
she is no doubt biting a bullet. But it is not a large

bullet,

such a person can claim, nor is it an explosive one.

All is well in 4D-land.
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CHAPTER

7:

CONCLUSION

7.1 Mv Reasons for Preferring 3DAA

spent the last two chapters defending the five

I

different views formulated in Chapters 2-4 against various

traditional arguments that could be brought against them. My
overall claim has been that none of these five can be

successfully refuted. Nevertheless,

preference for one of the five.
rivals.

In this section

I

I

I

myself have

a

prefer 3DAA over its

will explain my reasons for that

preference
To begin with,

Chapters

5

and

6

I

note that if what

I

have said in

above is correct, then each of the views in

question is consistent. So there would be nothing

contradictory about holding any one of them. In particular,
then,

there is nothing contradictory about holding any of

the 3D views,

in spite of the traditional attempts by non-

passage theorists to show that their opponents' views are in
some way contradictory. So the considerations that have
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traditionally been taken to count against the 3D views
should,

in fact,

Next

not count against them.

note that my pre-philosophical intuitions favor

I

the 3D view of physical objects over the 4D view. That is,

have this peculiarity:

I

I

am just naturally inclined to think

of the physical objects in the world as three-dimensional

objects that endure through time rather than as four-

dimensional space-time worms that perdure. Hence, because
the 3D views are open to me

shown to be inconsistent)
Next

(i)

I

because they cannot be

reject the 4D view.

note a curious fact about the relationship among

I

the 4D view,
sense,

,

(i.e.,

3DRR and 3DAR: these three are,

extensionally equivalent. By this

I

in an important

mean two things:

every sentence-token of English that is not time-

theoretical (i.e., sentence-tokens other than ones that are
of types like
etc.)

'Time passes'

is such that,

'The White House endures'

,

if it is true according to one of these

three views, then it is true according to the other two
views; and

for each of the three views there is a

(ii)

mapping from the elements of any model that, according to
that view,

represents the real world to elements of any of

the models that,

according to the other two views, represent

the real world.

Point

(i)

is perhaps easier to see than point

the reader who is skeptical about

whether it is true,

I

(i)

and wishes to test

recommend beginning with
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(ii)

a

For

.

reconsideration of the sentence-tokens (l)-(5) that were

discussed in Chapter
Point

(ii)

above.

4

is a little more complicated. For one thing,

it cannot be literally true,

because it cannot be the case

that models of all three of the views in question exist. For
two of the putative models are each supposed to have as

member

a

a

domain consisting of all of the three-dimensional

physical objects in the world, and the other putative model
is supposed to have as one of its members a domain

consisting of all of the four-dimensional physical objects
in the world; but clearly it's not true that each of these

domains exists,

for the objects in the world are either all

three-dimensional or else all four-dimensional (i.e., either
they all endure, or else they all perdure)
Point

(ii)

can be more accurately phrased as follows:

for each of the three views, there is a mapping from the

putative elements of any putative model that, according to
that view,

represents the real world to putative elements of

any of the putative models that,
views,

according to the other two

represent the real world. Consider,

first,

the

putative 4D model, Ml, and the putative 3DRR model, M2,

described in Chapter

4

above. Pretend that both are real.

Then for each member of the domain of Ml

dimensional Montana)
domain of M2

,

there is

a

(e.g.,

the four-

corresponding member of the

(the three-dimensional Montana)

;

and for each

pair consisting of a member of the domain of Ml and

a

predicate of Ml such that the extension of that predicate
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contains that member of the domain (e.g., the four-

dimensional Montana and the 4D predicate that has as its

extension all and only objects with tl temporal parts that
are quarterbacks)

,

there is a corresponding pair consisting

of a member of the domain of M2 and a predicate of M2 such

that the extension of that predicate contains that member of

the domain

(the three-dimensional Montana and the 3DRR

predicate that has as its extension all and only objects
that are quarterbacks at tl)

Similar remarks apply to the relationship between M2
and M3, the putative 3DAR model described in Chapter
is,

for each member of the domain of M2

dimensional Montana)

,

there is

a

(e.g.,

a

That

the three-

corresponding member of the

domain of M3 (the three-dimensional Montana)
pair consisting of

4.

;

and for each

member of the domain of M2 and

a

predicate of M2 such that the extension of that predicate
contains that member of the domain (e.g., the three-

dimensional Montana and the 3DRR predicate that has as its

extension all and only objects that are quarterbacks at tl)
there is

a

corresponding triple consisting of

the domain of M3,

a

a

,

member of

point on the line contained in M3, and

a

predicate of M3, such that the extension of that predicate
at that point contains that member of the domain

(the three-

dimensional Montana, the point pi, and the predicate that
has as its extension at any time all and only objects that
are quarterbacks at that time)
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In a certain important sense,

then,

the 4D,

3DRR and

3DAR views agree with one another on all non-time-

theoretical issues. They represent different ways of

systematically saying the same thing; they are different,
but equivalent,

Carnap
I

1

consider this

After all,
and now

linguistic frameworks, in the terminology of

I

I

a

reason for rejecting 3DRR and 3DAR

have said that

I

choose to reject the 4D view,

am saying that these other two views are merely

different versions of the view

I

choose to reject; hence

I

should reject them too. 2
That leaves me with two different views to choose from.
Now,

I

can't find any good empirical or theoretical reason

to make time ontologically asymmetrical; it seems to me that
we ought to treat the past and the future alike. If the

future is unreal, then so is the past. So that rules out
3DAMA,

1

leaving only 3DAA.

Carnap,

"Empiricism,

Semantics and Ontology."

Of course, this equivalence business works two ways.
Another reaction would be, Oh, then I guess the 4D view
isn't so bad.
2

264

s

7.2 Apparent Problems Facing 3n aa

In this section

I

will briefly consider some apparent

problems facing 3DAA. Each of these problems involves what
seems to be a counter-intuitive result about 3DAA'

treatment of the past; each,

I

will argue,

is a merely

apparent problem.
One result of 3DAA that was made explicit in Chapter
is that,

4

according to 3DAA, there are now no singular

propositions about Socrates. Thus, there are now no true
sentences of the form "PSs", where the term in place of
is some predicate and

'$'

is a name that refers to Socrates.

's'

Given the treatment of sentences that fail to refer for

which

opted in Chapter

I

4

(namely,

they're all false), it

follows that there are now no true sentences about Socrates.
Some may find this troubling.
I

don't find it troubling, however, because, temporal

actualist that

I

am,

I

don't think there can be

a

proposition that contains some constituent that doesn't
exist,

any more than there can be any other set that

contains

a

member that doesn't exist. Besides, the intuition

that there ought to be some true sentences about Socrates
can be satisfied, even according to 3DAA,

in terms of

general propositions about the way things used to be. These

general propositions can be expressed by such general

sentences as
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S

P (Ex (S 1 x &

i.e.,

Wx)

,

it has been the case that there is an x such that x is

called "Socrates" and
P (Ex

i.e.,

)

1
(

x is wise;

x & Ey (P 1 y &

T 2 xy)

and

)

)

,

it has been the case that there is an x such that x is

called "Socrates" and there is

a y

such that y is called

"Plato" and x is the teacher of y.
Of course,

it may well be that all of the general

sentences about the putative past existence of
was called "Socrates",
things,

That is,

are false,

a

person who

and did and suffered such-and-such

due to the indeterminacy of the matter.

it may well be that in the 3DAA models that

represent the actual world, there are some routes to the
left of the point corresponding to the present time on which

there never was such

a

person. If so, then so be it.

general sentences about the past existence of

a

If such

man called

"Socrates" are not true in virtue of the way things are now,
then,

temporal actualist that

I

am,

I

don't see how they

could be true.
A second apparent problem for 3DAA can be formulated as
follows.

It's one thing to say that there are now no

singular facts about Socrates, who doesn't exist these days;
but it is very implausible to admit that there may be
of facts about the past doings of presently existing
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a

lack

individuals. Yet it is

a

consequence of 3DAA that if there

are now no physically deterministic traces of what Cranston,
a

presently existing person with

fallible memory, had for

a

lunch exactly fifteen years ago, then there is currently no
fact of the matter about Cranston'
day.

I.e.,

s

luncheon menu on that

it may be the case that there's no true

proposition to the effect that Cranston had such-and-such
for lunch fifteen years ago.

Indeed,

the problem can be made even more immediate.

Suppose that some current particle,
now

a

is such that it is

p,

physically indeterministic matter whether p was in one

location,

1,

or another location,

1',

a

second ago. Then it

is a consequence of 3DAA that there is no fact of the matter

about where p was
that p was at

1

a

second ago. Moreover, the proposition

one second ago is false,

proposition that p was at

1'

is a consequence of 3DAA,

at least as

as is the

one second ago.
I

In general,

it

have spelled out the

view above, that there can be an utter lack of facts about
even the least past of past matters.
I

think that the correct 3DAA response to this

objection is to say that this is
all,

a

a

desirable result. After

proposition can be true only if it corresponds to the

world in the appropriate way; and since there are only
present objects in the world,

a

proposition can be true only

if it corresponds to present objects in the world in the

appropriate way.
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Another apparent problem facing 3DAA is
that, according
to 3DAA, we cannot talk about relations
between things
at a

time when one or more of the relata aren't
present, but
there are cases in which it seems that we
should be able to
do just this. We want to say, for example,
that I am related
to my paternal grandfather,

even though he no longer exists.

Yet it is a consequence of 3DAA that there are
now no

singular propositions about my paternal grandfather.
In response to this,

the 3DAA theorist can point out

that there is a sense in which we can talk about the

relation between my grandfather and me, even though we won't

thereby express any singular propositions about my
grandfather. For there is the 3DAA sentence
P (Ex (F 2 2 xn)

i.e.,

)

,

it has been the case that there is a x such that x is

the paternal grandfather of Ned. This sentence can be true

because

I

exist now,

grandfather and

I

and there was a time when my

both existed.

The situation is not so simple, however, when we want

to talk about relations between things that never co-

existed. We would like,

for example,

to be able to say that

my great-great-grandfather stood in the great-great-

grandfather relation to me; but this seems problematic,
since there was never

a

time when he and

I

both existed. The

3DAA solution to this apparent problem is to point out that
there are such 3DAA sentences as
268
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.

.

F 2 1 dn

& P (Ex (F 2 xd & P (Ey (F 2 yx
1
P (Ez (F 2 lZ y) ))))),

i.e.,

my father is my father,

(there is a x such that

has been the case that

(x

&

and it has been the case that

is the father of my father and it

(there is a y such that

father of x and it has been the case that

that

is the father of y)

(z

)

)

)

)

)

(y

is the

(there is a

z

such

Similarly, we can say that

Napoleon was smaller than Hercules, because there are such
3DAA sentences as
P (ExEy (N x x &
S 2 2 yu)
)

)

&

P (EzEu (H!z

&

uz

&

(there are an x and a y such

(there are a

z

and a u such that

is called "Hercules" and u is the size of
u)

1

is called "Napoleon" and y is the size of x and it

(x

has been the case that

than

S2

,

it has been the case that

i.e.,

that

)

S 2 x yx

)

)

z

(z

and y is smaller

)

7.3 Conclusion

I

began by considering the question 'Does time pass?'

In Chapters 2-3

I

showed that there are at least five

different views that should each count as an answer to this

269

question. In Chapter

4

I

considered the type of formal

language, with semantics, that would be suited to each of

those views. Then in Chapters

5

and

6

I

argued that there

are no good arguments against any of the five views.

Finally,

in this chapter

preferring 3DAA, and

I

I

have expressed my reasons for

have considered some possible

objections to that view, attempting to show, in the case of
each such objection, that the objection can be met

successfully by

a

3DAA theorist.
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